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SALIENT FEATURES OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE PAST 25 YEARS
1. Summarized overall appraisal
(a) Dynamism and social change; image of development in the 1950s.
and the actual changes
An appraisal of Lai in America's economic and social development 
in the post-war period shows that., the» global conception of the 
interrelationship between- économie,dynamism and social change 
prevailing two decades,ago.was invalidated by.events in an unexpected 
way. Economic dynamism reached levels considered then to be highly 
ambitious and was closely associated with.social changes yhich fell 
far short of the greater, degree of consensus and more equitable goals 
assumed by the development ideologies of the beginning of the period 
to be inherent in the high rates of economic growth.
By the early 1950s, a,concept of development compatible with 
the conditions then prevailing had been evolved. It conveyed an 
image of continuous progress.based on. industrial development which, 
combined with certain, economic and social reforms, would lead to a 
higher degree of social consensus. The upholding of this image.by 
the governments and predominating social groups was explained by the
attempts to form national societies which would avoid a repetition of
certain-traumatic'experiences that had affected their economic and 
social structures! At the same time, the successful results which 
the industrial development policies were having in many countries 
underscored the image of a replica of the industrial countries* 
modelsw Side by side with the boom and-social stability of the 
central economies in<the 1950s* the effects of'the Marshall Plan and 
United States hegemony in the cold war period gave strength to the 
idea that growth was associated with well-being.
The development process 1/ has shown a persisterit situation 
where a relatively high economic growth rate has beén accompanied by
1/ The review contained in this chapter-refers to the economic
style prevailing in Latin America, not,in Cuba which of course
adopted a different economic and social system from that of the
rest of the countries in the region. ./a distribution
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a distribution Of income and property:; which failed to develop 
favourably for the less privileged grdups representing at least 
half the population. This persistent feature over so long, a period 
has shown itself to be a characteriatic-of the prevailing style of 
devèlpipfflent. Ahy^attempt t to givepriority to redistribution 
objectives or merely to equate them with' o-ther aims has led to 
crises that have seriously affected jthe«system1s operation.
On the other hand, the?Latin, American economies have shown 
great powers of adaptationt'dbbAaJhânglng^C(mdit.ioi|'s created by the ' , 
actual process of transformation 'osf production ; and by. external 
variables. ■. V:V-t
In its économie aspects, the; system has been adaptepl to thé 
needs of relatively' acfcvanced stages of industrie idevelopmentvaind 
to an external context whichhas from time to time altered the trends 
of trade and financing. On the political side, it absorbed a large 
proportion of the middle strata that emerged as a result of 
urbanization, the educational, system and the industrial development 
process. The absorption Of these groups widened they political base 
of thé system, which lost * its pre-war character* of-a system With an 
extremely-minority basé-*orir-c - i.' v; ■ ■
(bj Extent and depth of the production Changes
Vigorous economic growth radically changed the production 
structure. The region almost quadrupled its product between 1950 
and 1975; it increased, its manufacturing output five-fold, its 
production Of cement .six-fold, of energy eight-fold * of machinery 
and equipment, nine-fold and its steel output fifteenrfold. These 
important, changes in scale were linked with substantial modifications 
in the structure of supply.
The region became industrialized and was able, with an 
increasing .degree of independence, to supply the transport, 
CQffimpni-pations and construction sectors and a structure of , . 
consumption comprising non-durable manufactured goods and important 
lines of durables. Certain sectors of basic inputs such as steel 
and petrochemical products, symbols of the first stages of heavy 
industry, are already operating in many countries of the region.
/Consumer expectations
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Consumer expectations, however, exacerbated by modern 
information media, are reaching extensive population groups. The 
capital formation required to satisfy this demand, lies far beyond 
the region's capacity. Accordingly, if the industrial structure is 
considered in relation to the sophisticated levels of demand aspired 
to by the high- and middle-income groups and by those other social 
strata which are endeavouring to attain them, it will be realized 
that the terms of the imbalance between expectations and actual 
possibilities which have so influenced the political attitude of the 
middle-income groups a n d .the growth of demand are still fully valid.
At the same time, the volume of production, which in absolute 
terms is appreciable, loses some of its value compared with the 
volume that would be necessary to solve the problems of critical 
poverty affecting large sectors of the population. Hence, while the 
progress achieved is magnified if considered in the context of the 
population in the modern sectors, it diminishes in relation to the 
whole population.
The production changes also altered the scale, composition and 
relative importance of foreign trade. Growth, in the first 15 years 
was essentially based on import substitution at the national level, 
so that the region played no part in the world's dynamic trade 
in manufactures. It also lost ground in world trade in important 
agricultural and mining products. The combination of these two factors 
brought the region's share in world trade down from 9 per cent in 
1950 to 5 per cent in 1970. It should be noted, however, that now 
in the 1970s the Latin American countries are striving to open their 
economies to foreign trade and diversify their exports, placing the 
industrial development process in a wider context than the domestic 
market.
The composition and volume of imports also changes as a result 
of the changes in domestic production. The region became an important 
buyer of industrial intermediate and capital goods from many countries-. 
This represents a negotiating potential of which the region has not 
yet made full use, while it also creates a potential of the utmost 
importance for substitution and expansion in intra-regional trade.
/Whatever the
-  k  -
Whatever the context in which the situation is analysed, there 
is no doubt that the State and the transnational corporation were-; 
the most dynamic production agents and showed a capacity for 
mobilizing resources in large-scale activities and projects which 
should be noted as,-one of the most significant developments in the 
period. In particular, governments and public enterprises in key ; 
inf r astrae ture •> and "basic resources sectors achieved'impressive 
results. State management capacity today is far superior to what 
it has been in the past<> A technocracy capable of directing policies 
that mobilize high proportions of the economy's resources has 
gradually-been formed.. The biggest public enterprises in some 
countries attained a scale -which makes them competitive:at a world 
level, ■ ~
(c ) Inflexibility and changé in the distribution of property
and income
The growth and transformation of production have been 
permanently accompanied by the process of unequal income distribution. 
Thiè situation has persisted both in boom periods when any solution 
has' beén deferred pending the benefits deriving from growth, and 
in periods of recession. When a large part o f  the burden of the 
adjustments has fallen on the groups with least economic'and 
political power. . • ;
The unequal distribution of benefits is found hot only in 
the distribution of the ownership of the means of production but 
also in the concentration of technical progress in modernization 
characterizing the various production sectors.
The unequal distribution of the ownership of natural resources 
existing at the beginning of the 1950s was a matter of great 
political concern, but in practice it was not substantially altered 
in favour of the under-privileged sectors. It was thè agricultural 
séctór in the early 1950s where it seemed possible to achieve a 
fairer distribution of property and where the economies of scale 
did not seem to entail properties of too large a size. ' It also 
seemed suitable for experiments in co-operative forms of production
/or property.
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or property. Available figures foy the.end of the 1960s: «how that in 
those respects neither agrarian,reformj nor, any other type of.measure 
attempted in this sense achieved any significant progress. Quite 
the contrary, it seems, to have increased, the number ©f rural wage- 
earners without access to the ownership-or us# of land, even of the 
limited size required for family svflasistence.
Simultaneously with these changes, another very important 
process was taking place. This was the..;fOsr;jnation'Of a new class 
of rural entrepreneur who, taking fpll s$yyant$ige of the technical and 
infrastructure services instituted by the government, responded with
r. •' '
considerable dynamism to the stimulus of^demand. „The development 
of the modern agricultural enterprise undoubtedly has-an important 
impact in terras of increasing production and incorporating technological 
progress, but it is also a factor of the expulsion of agricultural 
manpower, and if presented as a solution to the problems of 
agricultural supply it actually discourages agrarian reform decisions 
and the implementation of .programmes in. this field..
In the mining and energy, resources ,sector the ,natural trend - ’ 
towards concentration owing^tQ the .technical natqr#, of;..produc.tidn - 
activities has been confirmed by increasing ownership by public 
enterprises. When for. political reasons these and other¿public 
enterprises have increased employment beyond strictly necessary 
limits or have reduced the prices of products consumed by the mass 
of the population, this has had a redistributive effect at least 
in the medium and short,term both for the groups obtaining 
employment and for the consumers. .
Manufacturing has grown more vigpro.usly than any other 
sector, even though in most countries it started from relatively 
low levels, so that a large part of its structure has been created 
in the past 25 years. In many sectors the economies of scale 
require large-scale plants which, added to their monopolistic 
character, leads to a strong concentration of ownership. In many 
countries the transnational corpora;tions^and the public enterprise 
were the most important agents fn the mop,p «dynamic sectors and 
industrial ownership was increasingly concentrated in their hands.
/The trend
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The trend towards concentration seems to have extended even 
to -sectors which "were traditionally spread oùt, such as the retail 
trade.;/It is also significant that foreign capital is not only 
concentrated in dynamic and technologically complex sectors of 
industry but it also reaches sectors like commerce where its 
volume is necessarily of lesser dr scant importance to the countries 
concerned. ii:
The concentration of ownership in economic activities has 
favoured the expansion of middle- and high-income groups. The 
increasing size o f ;the middle’strata which generally originated in 
the •iewejS-incdtte groups and worked in sectors with lower levels of 
productivity is; in itself assign of the positive effect of the 
expansion'of this fbrm of ownership. The implications for urban 
wage-earhers in these sectors were on the whole also positive.
For the marginal groups, however,* the relative0situation meant 
that the highly' inequitable ^distribution’of ïncomè^ prevailing 
at the beginning of the period was maintained for more than half 
the population. Of course,’even In this group some sub-groups may 
be identified which enjoyed ôômë hot insignificant absolute 
improvements; however, compared with the consumer expectations 
encouraged by thé system itself, these appear totally inadequate.
To palliate the inadequate distribution of income, in the
first two-decades the Staixe implemented a public expenditure policy
aimed at covering minimum needs, particularly in the services sector.
State action-In the fields of education and health were the most 
successful forms of action. The marked decline in illiteracy and 
the increasing percentages of the population which had access to 
primary, secondary and university education undoubtedly represent 
inestimable forms of redistribution of services; however, they have 
not always' benefited those most seriously affècted by the distribution 
of income, and the1 relevance of their content in satisfying 
development/needs left*much to be desired. 1 The'increase in the 
population largely achieved by the decline in mortality rates speaks 
for itself of the successful results achieved in' the health sector.
/If the
If the indicators o'f the social groups ,,are considered in relative 
terms,'however, once again the impressive improvements p£„&Qm.e 
strata leave the marginal groups in an even worse situation. Thus 
tiie middle groups1 successful efforts to gain access to secondary 
and higher education, health services and’other benefits deriving 
from State action push the indexeSuof the most neglected groups, 
particularly the rural poor, even farther from the countries' average 
values than they were in the past.
The redistributive’effects, of these policies gradually lost 
some of their importance as thedemands j?,f econpmi.c..,.growth.iLed to 
a shift in emphasis in public expenditure to investment in material 
production sectors at thq. .expense of tho'se services.
Available figures for I960,; and 1970 show- that the distribution 
of income did not change significantly during the decade. In both 
those years the poqrer half of the population obtained about Ik per 
cent of total income;, thevnext 2.0 per c-e&t about the same proportion, 
and the top 30 per cent received1 the remaining-72 per cent.
The figures in table,,, 1, besides reflecting the persistence of j,; 
"the unsatisfactory "distribution of income.. .show the-vigorous growth 
of demand of the middle- and high-income-grbups. These groups^ in 
obtaining the lion's share of ̂ income, in fact mainly oriented,.the- 
structure of supply and created a market of attractive dimensions 
for the large-scale enterprise, particularly the transnational 
corporation.
The figures available for a group of countries at the beginning 
of the 1970s show that, although unequal income distribution is a 
feature common to all of them, it has certain shades both between 
the countries themselves and between the urban and the rural area.
It is clear from these figures than in some countries the situation 
of the poorest 20 per cent is extremely serious and appears to be 
concentrated in the rural sector (see table 2).
/Table 1
LATIN iMERICAs PER CAPITA mcdffi IN i960 DOLLABS AND CHANGES IN THE'SHARE OP'THE ' 
VARIOUS SOCIO-ECffiCMIC STRATA IN THE TOTAL INCOME OP THE REGION
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Table 1
Socio-econom ic s tr a ta
Slmsre o f each 
stratum  in  
th e  t o t a l  income
Per c a p ita  income 
in  1360 d o lla r s  &/
• , ,
■ : , ■ ■•••> . . ' -
In crease in  per 






lio n s  
o f
i960
d o lla rs}
Per­
centage 
o f th e 













d o lla r s
20$ poorest 3 .X 2 .5 53 55  ' 3 .8 2 107.6 0 ,4
30$ fo llo w in g 10 .3 U .4 118 167 4 l ,5 3 913 15 .^ .
50$ poorest 13 .^ 13.3 ?2 122 32.6 30 4  025 15.8
20$ fo llo w in g l 4.1 13.3 243 306 25.3 63 3 359 13.2
20$ b efo re  th e  h igh est 10$ 24.6 28.0 424 616 45.3 132 10 237 4 o,3
10$ h igh est **7.9 44,2 1  643 1  3^5 1 7 .7 292 7 , 785 3 0 ,7
5$ h igh est 33.4 23.3 2 305 2 630 14,1 325 4 332 17.1
T o ta l - 100.0 100.0 ;<■; & ; &&.; 25 4o6 100.0
Souroet CEPAL estim ates, on th e  b a s is  o f  n atio n a l surveys.
Notes The average d is tr ib u tio n  in  L atin  America in  1970 has been estim ated b a s is  o f  inform ation  provided
by A rgen tin a, B r a z i l ,  C h ile , Colombia, M exico, Paraguay, Honduras and Venezuela.





LATIN AMERICAS INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES
Dabi8 2
( Per oen ta g e  o f to ta l  Income represented by eaoh stratum of the population)
Individual recipients 7 Households




Rioa Chile.; Ecuador Panama
Vene-Peru Uruguay zuela
Hón- Mexiooduras
Soeio-Soonomio S tr a ta
Metro­
p o lita n
Area
Na- ; 
t io n a l 
to ta l
Na­





a g r io u l-
tu r a l
a /
Na­
t io n a l 
non- 
a g r i c u l­
tu r a l
s /
Na­
tio n a l
urban
Na­
tio n a l
to t a l
Na­
t io n a l
urban
Na-
tio n a l
M etro-
. non- 
p o lita n
a g r io u l-  
arBa tu ra i
y
Na­
tio n a l
toted
Na­
tio n a l
t o t a l
(1 ) ( 2) - ( 3) (4 ) ( 5) ( 6 ) ; (? )  / ( 8) (9 ) (1 0 ) . (11) (12 )
200 poorest 5 .3 1 .9 2-»8 7 4 .3 3 .7 2 .5 1 ,6 : 2.6 2 .9  J 3 .6 2*3 3 .4
300 fo llo w in g 1 7 .7 9 .0 12^3 15 .ÏV l 4 ,8 11.3 10 .1 1 1 .5  ‘ 13 .3  15.8 8.5 1 2 .3
500 poorest 23.0 10 . 9 . 15.1 19 . 4 ; 18 Ì5  ; 13.8 11 .7 14.1 16 ,2  1 9 .4 . 10 ,8 15 .7
200 fo llo w in g  / 18 .0 12 .2 l 5*-0 15.6 15 .8 13 .5 16 .5 16.3 18/3 ~ 1 7 .I 10.9 14 .8
205* b efo re  the lO0 high est 27.8 24.2 25.2 24,4 26 ,4 25.7 28.7 25.6  / 29.8 2 7 . 1 - 28. 3 , 27.5
100 h i p e s t Jt.su/ 52.% / - 44. 6b / 39. 2b / 46.8 43,1 44.0  r . 35 .? b /  36.4 50.0 42 . 1b /
T ota l 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - : 1*00.0 100.0 100.0 10Ö.0 , lo o .o  100.0 100.0' : 100.0
C o e ff ic ie n t  o f  ¡Gini *« . '7
concen tration  . , o .4ob/ 0.63b/ 0 .5 ^ / 0,48  . 0.49b/ 9.56 0,56 0.54 0.49 : 0.47 -0.62 o.53b/
Souroest ( l )  N atio n al I n s t itu te  o f  S t a t i s t !  os and Census* Survey onemployment and unemployment , ' 1970 ,  i
(2) IBGE (B ra zilia n  I n s t i t u t e  o f Geography and S t a t i s t i c s ) : '  Incom esSurvey, ENAD (N ational households su rvey by sampling) -  2, 4^* q u a rtertu'to i ' ’A '*?/*• '.*•
(3 ) DANE (N ational ad m in istrative  department o f s t a t i s t ! o s ) ,  Households Survey 1970*
( 4 ) C en tral O ffic e  o f C ensus, 7^  Households Survey 1971,  U rban& reas. ,
( 5 ) C en tral O ffic e  of C ensus, Continual survey o f lab ou r, November 19&7*-February 1968,
(0 ) N ational I n s t itu te  o f  Planning and C o-ord in ation , Households survey in  the urban a re a , 1968. 
( 7) S t a t i s t i c s  and Census O ff ic e , S p eolal survey.on incomes through households, 1970*
('8) C en tral O ffic e  o f Employment, Households.Survey, 197°»
( 9 ) U n iv e rs ity  o f the R ep u b lic , The d is tr ib u tio n  o f  income in  Uruguay, 19 7̂ «
(10) C en tral O ffic e  o f S t a t i s t i c s  and N ational Census, Households Survey, 1971»
(11) Cent'ral O ffic e  o f S t a t i s t i c s  and Census, Survey on fam ily  income and expenditure, 19?7- 1968.
(12) Bank o f Mexloo, Survey on fa m ily  income and expenditure, 1968, 
a /  A c tiv e  r e o ip le n ts .
b /  In  the adjustm ents made.by underestim ation 
~  Argentina- ( 0,44  anA 34, 60) ;  B r a z il  (0,6? as
the Gini c o e ff ic ie n ts  and the share o f the l a s t  d e c ile  in income were, re sp e o tlv e ly , the fo llow in g: ,
3.53 and 44 ,10 ); Colombia (0,56 and 4-7. 5$)» Uruguay (4-3. 3^) and Mexico (0 ,5? and 4  5  >30)*d 57. 1/5)* C h ile  ( 0 ,
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(d) The structural problem of employment*
The productive system has clearly shown{that it cannot generate
sufficient productive employment for the increasing labour force
of the region, and particularly for the big contingents of urban
manpower. * ' { \ . v
Progress in the internal mobilization o£ productive resources
and the growth of investment huve'been insufficient in comparison
with the supply of labour swollen by thè high population growth-
rate. The agricultural sector has been losing labour through
migration from rural to urban 1&re as,* ’ In'addition, investment has
mainly been devoted to the development of highly capital-intensive
industrial and infrastructure -activities,, so ; that Its effect on
employment has been partially eliminated." These factors, among
others, directly affect-' the problems of open unemployment faced by.
the countries, of the region. Open unemployment in.,a'group bf '
17 countries of the region was estimated at roughly 5-8 pen cent
of the economically active population towards 1970, i.e.,
approximately k million persohs.2/ ,{ - {
•Open unemployment, however, is neither« the onljr employment
problem in Latin America, norj evén the main iòne in'quanfitdtive
terms, •;■ ! ; :
■ Studies on the subject iindicate, tjbat "the predominant form
in which-labour force under-utilization occurs in the less* developed
countries is*underemployment, and particularly invisible
under employment".2/ While the definition‘and measurement oif the
different forms of underemployment is a subject of much discussion,
it is nonetheless an easily verified fact that much of the urban
and rural population of Latin America is employed in : activities of
. *' • * very low productivity, or their working potential is sporadically
2/ See PREALC (ILO): The employment problem in Latin America 
and the Caribbean: facts, outlooks and policies - Santiago, 
November 1975» table 1-2. {
y  Ibid., Chapter I.
' ■ /devoted to
devoted to temporary work a“r, ultimately, remunerated at income
levels which are openly belovf subsistence levels, if the latter
are defined according to any ¡'social criterion. Estimates made by
PREALC to establish the orde* of magnitude of the employment problem
appear in table 3« They indicate that for a group of countries
of the region which account for about 75 per cent of the population
of Latin America and'.the Caribbean, the total under-employment of
labour, including open unemployment,and agricultural and non-
agricultural underemployment, represented in 1970 the equivalent of
28 per cent of the labour force; i.e., the productive potential of
one in every k active persons was not used. Almost 20 per cent of
the total underemployment of labour would be accounted for by open
unemployment, the 'remaiping; 80 per cent being attributable equally
to forms of rural; aind urban underemployment. It is also noted that
generalizations ahopt thèse! orders of magnitude of ..the situation
cannot be made for nil,the countries considered! nor for all the
* ' * *V ~ t *forms of underemployment of labour. ~ ;
This vast underemployment of labour is linked;with a number
« ..r ; . aj r . -■ ’
of features of tfteftpçofeiibtive structure of. the ,Latin American
« y *î  ̂ l seconomy and, in pa^tîioular,, with; the .marked differences in the
■ a - - i ' ’ ■ ' ’ . , r- ' > !technological leyel of; the productivet units, within ¡the different
branches of production'. As a counterpart to the high concentration
of capital, à dominant feature of the majority of pro dùc.t i vie upits
of the economy ite .;a VchrOnjLc shortage of capital and backward
technologies' corresponding to incipient ,stages of development.;
The productive processes are thus .highly heterogeneous, 
which results in very uneven productivity and incomes. It is 
estimated that towards 1970, for the region as a whole, the 
"modern" sector mainly based in manufacturing industries and mining, 
and to a lesser extent agriculture, absorbed only 12 per cent of the 
labour force while accounting for 50 per cent of the production of 
goods; while the "primitve" sedtor, heavily agricultural, absorbed 
one-third of employment and contributed only 5 per cent of 
the product, the remainder of employment and the product being 






LATIN AMERICA: TOTAL UNDER-UTILIZATION OF LABOUR IN AROUND I97O
fbble 3
Country
Eoonomioally a o tlv e  Open
population  unemployment
Equivalent Non a g r ie u l-  
unemployment tu r a l  under­
in  a g r ic u ltu r e ^  - employments/
E quivalent 
non a g r ic u l­
tu ra l 
employment
Total under­
u t i l i s a t io n  
o f  labour
T otal
A g ricu l­
tu ra l
Non agri_ Thou- 





Rate ; cThou- 











Argentina 8 823 I 3 I 8 7 505 166 1 .9 132 10 2 086 27*5 ; : 901 12 .0 1 2 » 13.6
B ra s il 28 044 11  965 16 m  1  935 6 .9 if 188 / 35 « 99*» 43*5 3 50$ 2 1.8 9 «28 34-3
Colombia . « 395 2 686 3 7 ° 9  473 7 .4 «72 25 1 '*»5** 39.2 749 20.2 1 894 29*«
C hile 2 721 665 ■ ' 2 656 I30 5*0 133 20 . 779 37.9 35« . 1 7 .3 619 22*8
Mfeyloo 12 »173 5 293 7  180 c  474 3*8 2 322 ko ^ j  003 27.9 847 Î 1 . & 3 0*3 29*2
Venesuela 3 015 : 7 llf 2 301 - 187 6.2 136 : •19 ... 987 42 . 9 : 472 20*5 795 24.2
A ll  the oou n tries l i s t e d 61 »«71 22 64l 38 830 3 367 5*5 7  583 34 Ï 14,303»—. 36*8. 6 830 17*6 17 780 28*4
Percentage o f  u n d e r-u tlllsa tio n
-
/  . 18 .9 42*7 38.4 f' 100.0
Source: PREALC (ILO) -  The problem o f employment in  L atin  America and th e Caribbean: s itu a tio n , prespeots and p e llo le s *  San tiago, November 1975* 
For the sources and methodology o f  the oa lo u latio n  see ta b le s  1 -1  to  1-8 e f  the study mentioned* 
a /  The ra te s  r e fe r  to  the re lev a n t econom ically a o tlv e  population*
b/ The t o t a l  under-uti 1 is a t lo n  has been o a lou lated  on the b asis o f  th e percentage d lfforen o e between supply and demand o f lab o u r, thus Including 
open unemployment. The methodologies used are  n ot always th e same, p a r tly  beoause o f le e a l  fe a tu re s , so th a t the fig u r e s  should n ot be taken 
a t  th e ir  a b so lu te  va lu e: they only serve to  estim ate orders of. magnitude* r;





‘ ¿ s e r a i s  o p 'the '¿sokposition cp aiPLb'sÄiT /iWa ?Hs PRonJCT nï'& ann  »erica
-  - BY TE(3titK>ÎX)GICAI< STItAIA AT. TH3 ES® j5F THS 1960s
La tin  America ... ■■! Central America Argentina
Current
, .la te r 
mediate
Pom er Tota l Current
latejp
.mediate
tV f* >*■ • , *.
Former' To ta l Current
In te r
mediate
Former To ta l
To ta l product 
Employment
/
1 ^ 4 47.7 34 .3 100 8 .1 33.6 ' ' 55 .0  100 21.3 65 .3 5 .3 100
Product - - 53 .3 41 .-6 . 3 i l • 1 0 0 4 2 .6 •: c, 48L03 ’ . i  >>Jtonfl00 5O.6 4.0,5 0 .3 100
A rr icu ltu re
Employment 6.8 .77. .7 . . 55.5 100 ,.. 5 .0 15. 0 . 80,0 100 5 . 0 57.0 18,0 100
Product 47.5 33.2 " 13.3 100 43 . ? 30.6 25.5 100 65.1 32.3 2.6 100
Manufactures '■ V i
y‘.T) .• -i '
Employment ■ 17.5 64; ? 17.6 100.'. l 4 .o 5 7 .4 28.6 100 25.6 70 .6 ■> 3,3 100




Employment 38.0 £ . 2 100 20.0 66,0 20,0 100 50.0 4o,o 10.0 100
Product 31.5 7 . 5 ' 1.0 100 5 7 .2 "• " 140.0 2.8.: ' 100 77.8 21.6 0.6 100
Source: C3*AL, The labour feroap and aoonomle ctevelopaent of Latih Amerlog. 1b reoent ;yetegs, 2/CH.12/L.1.
1 r* : j*
<%• , ' »4 J •• •
.Tu* • *♦, •
/The significance
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The significance of the primitive sector from the standpoint of 
employment would certainly increase if the vast services sector 
were taken into account. The primitive sector of production thus 
holds a large proportiqn of the working population in conditions • 
of low productivity and very low incomes *rhich constitutes the main 
■source of the under employment;.bf l^kpur./ As may-be ̂ seen JLn table 4, 
the technological differences vary among branches and among countries.
To illustrate these differences, jthe table shows,‘the extreme cases 
in the region.
Unemployment and underemployment of labour, combined with 
distributive problems, are responsible for the fact that large 
sectors o.f the Latin American population currently, live in conditions 
of extreme poverty.; The extent of ̂ this poverty can be, seen from 
recent estimates which are summarized in tables 5 and 6. Table 5 
is taken from an ILO study ,4j/ and "indicates that'about 43 per cent 
of the Latin American population in 1972 live in conditions of 
"serious poverty’̂, i.e. , „more, than 110 million persons, of whom 
70 million (i.e., 27 per cent of the population) may be said to be 
"destitute". Table 6 summarizes the information for various countries 
of the region on the basis of a minimum balanced diet according to 
national nutritional patterns. It establishes a proportion of the 
population of each country with incomes below the cost of that diet; 
it appears that the incomes of about 35 per cent of the total population 
of these countries are below the cost of that diet, although with 
great differences in the situation of each country. Overlooking 
the difficulties inherent in the delimitation and measurement of 
the "poverty line" and the definition of the problem itself, it 
is clear that widespread poverty is a serious problem facing the 
region, which is in clear contrast with the potential which could 
be derived from the expansion of production and the rates of 
economic growth.
4/ ILO: Employment, growth and basic needs. Geneva, 1976.
/Table 5
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Table $ ,
ESTEHP OP POVERTY1 III DEVELOP!!« COUNTRIES, 197 2
Region
' T ota l 
population 
(m illio n s)
In sta te  of 
"extreme poverty*^
• "Indigent,,b/








A sia 1 196 71 49 9 42
A frio a J . , ' ' 239 ' 69 1 * 39
L atin  Anerioa 274 118 43 73 2?
T ota l jg/ 1 815 iao & 22k 22.'
Source; ILP* Unploynent, growth and essential needs, Geiava 1976, P* 23»
a/ The state of 'tetrads poverty" arises -lnthe ease of annual incomes of less thah 
US$500 f°r Western Europe; US$180 fer Latin Anerioa; US$115 for Afrioa and US$100 
for Asia,
b/ The state of "Indigence" arises in the oase of inooaes of less than US$250 in 
Western Europe; US$90 In Latin Anerioa; US$59 in Afriea and US$56 in Asia» ~
9/  Sc 0 hiding the developing countries of Europe, and. Oceania, with populations of 
25 Billion inhabitants and over*
/Table 6
-  *
THE SIZE OF THE STRATUM OF ECTREME. POVERTY IN SOME 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES IN I97O -  ESTIMATES
Table 6
Annual p er oapita  
cost o f  the mini 
inaa balanced d ie t  
ao cording to 
n atio n a l food 
standards 
(I960 d o lla r s )  a/
Argentina



















w ith  incomes 
be low the 
co st 0f  idle 
-•'niniisun 
balanced 











Source} Raoul Nelson. iiI/' v-~ ■
e/ Cost o f food c a lc u la te d  on th e  b asis  of the most reoerrt income and expenditure 
svrveys of eaoh country# As i s  shown by some n atio n al alim entary p attern s 
which r e v e a l an excess in  th e consumption of a r t i c le s  of low n u tr it io n a l value 
and a  d e f ic i t  o f others o f high va lu e, t i e  oiinual cost of the average balanced 
d ie t  could be lower i f  the food h a b its  and taboos observable in  the va rio u s 
countries o f the area  were ohatged# 
b/ The coun tries mentioned aoeount f o r  Just over 855* o f th e t o t a l  population  of 
L a tin  Amerioa.
/(e) Changes
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(e) Changes in productive, conimercial and financial jrejtations 
with the exterio r .
The relations between thè-changes- in the economic and social 
process and the evolution of the'-international context are further 
significant featured of developments ovier the last 25 years.
In production, !the links with the exterior changed significantly. 
Direct foreign investment was directed to different sectors than in 
the past. Investment in natural resources lost ground in comparison 
with investment in the more dynamic branches of -the industrial 
sector. The nationalization of mines and petroleum heightened this 
trend over the last 5 years. >
Foreign investment in agriculture and mining was, in general, 
of little significance, except in the case Of oil;:in ¡Venezuela in 
the 1950s. Likewise, investment in mining was occasionally important 
during relatively short periods in medium and small countries, but 
this investment is 'of little consequence for the region as a whole.
On the contrary, and particularly in the late 1960s, direct 
foreign investment roéëcdhèiderably infthe more dynamic branches 
of industry, and for"large"countries like Brazil and Mexico : it became 
a dominant economic force ih kàÿ product's in suchi sectors as. metal- . 
working and chemicals. Furthermore, -the foreign companies became 
transnational, and thus their operations became more complex.,v . Thus,,
'■ . Yfor example, thëir relations with their mother companies huA 
important effects on the balance of payments, since the flows of 
imports and exports were determined by the interests of the 
corporations rather than by clear national policies. Again, these 
companies’ ownership of technological innovations, access to private 
and public international credit, attraction of domestic credit and 
use of national and imported basic inputs, make it difficult for 
the countries to work out suitable control or orientation policies.
In international trade, the countries greatly changed the 
composition of exports and impdrts. Exports tended to become 
diversified, both through the growth of the commodities characteristic 
of each country, and through the increasing incorporation of
/semimanufactured and
semimanufactured and manufactured products. This caused-.many' 
countries to cease to be dependent on the foreign market for a 
single product, which represents an' appreciable step forward for' 
the management of thé’balança of pàytótents.
Imports changed in'lifa'e with the process of internal 
transformation Of' production and, particularly, the progress of 
industrialization. The structure of imports today is morë coêfplex, 
and specialized intermediate inputs have increasingly taken the 
placé of consumer goods, which has caused greater rigidity at the 
qualitative leVel. There are no striking differences between the 
import/product ratio at the beginning and the end of the period, 
but todày the goods imported are certainly of greater technological 
complexity than in the ptest* as befits a new stage in Latin 
American development. >1 -
The adjuètment of the sthuêture and amount of external • 
financing to the new conditions5 in-International financial markets 
in the second half of the-l96Qs ih another important change in the 
last ten'years. During muehéf the. 1950 s and particularly in-the 
middle of the 1960s the raglan -received small amounts; of- external 
financing; and most -loans • came from official sources.! Subsequently, 
this situation changed -significantly.' Funds bècamer abundant and an 
increasing amount of the financing tended to stem from private' 
international banks. The region’s capacity to tap this financing, 
and its role in economic growth, became fundamental features of 
recent years#- In particular, the large countries became closely- 
linked with the international financial market, establishing a 
system of re-ìatiòns which is radically diffèrent from past practice 
The flexibility and rapidity of Operations, the criteria for loan 
analysis, the shorter loans and higher interest rates differ from 
the conditions of official loans! • The governments have had to 
develop a new system of halations and negotiation which is1 in 
many respects intimately linked with thé transnational corporations
/The region
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The region's indebtedness as a result of this system of 
financing creates a different balance-of-payments position than 
at the beginning of the period, since the amount of debt service 
absorbs much of current export earnings. The region must therefore 
strongly promote exports, once again adjust the productive structure 
to reduce imports, and thus find new openings in world trade and 
in the world economy. Trade of manufactures with the developed 
countries and within the region is presently at the take-off stage 
and will represent a new stage in the foreign, relations of the 
region.,
’ • 2. Social change \
(a) The^persistence of ;distyiblltiv'e' problems
As indicated at the outset, economic growth was accompanied 
by serious problems and contradictions. These are related to the 
basic social and political structure, and therefore an overall 
appraisal must include a study of the social transformation which 
accompanied economic growth.
Social change was in many respects greater than, but did not 
conform to, the forecasts stemming from the concept of development. 
It was thought that unless socio-economic reforms were carried out 
and capital formation efforts supported by external assistance, 
it would be difficult to maintain simultaneously stable governments 
and democratic values. The wretched plight of large groups of the 
population gave grounds for believing that social and political 
tensions would increase dangerously, particularly in the case of 
the great agricultural masses: hence the acceptance by some 
leadership groups of reform plans which could lead to a national 
society basqd on greater social consensus. During the last 25 years 
no substantial changes have occurred, in most countries, in access 
to property or to income on the part of the mass of the population; 
nor have fundamental changes occurred which would give the 
underpriviledged groups a significantly more equalitarian share.
/(b) Population
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Social change was strong influenced by two unrelenting 
and quantitatively highly important phenomena: population growth 
and migration from the countryside to urban areas.
During the period the average rate of population growth was 
2.8 per cent, and the region's population grew from 160 to 
315 million persons between 1950 and 1975» Tbe population of 
cities with less than 20,000. inhabitants represented three-quarters 
of the population in 1950, and about half in 1975» This striking 
change caused the population explosion in the large cities. In 1950 
Latin America had 6 or 7 cities with over one million inhabitants; 
in I98O it will have 25» At present it already has one city with 
over 10 million inhabitants (Mexico City) and three more which 
are close to that mark (Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo).
The countries continue to differ greatly in population 
patterns and trends. Four countries with approximately 15 per cent 
of the population of the region have already undergone the demographic 
transition to moderate growth rates. In three of these countries,
60 per cent or more of the population was urban in 1970, the rural 
population was constant and its contribution to urban growth will 
be moderate. Five large or medium-sized countries with about 
68 per cent of the regional population have rates as high as or 
higher than the Latin American average. They all have reasonable 
expectations that these rates will begin to fall at the end of the 
197Qs.. They also have high rates of urbanization and the rural 
population growth rate is relatively low (about 1.5 per cent annually). 
The remaining countries. - which account for approximately 16 per 
cent of the population - are in general small and rural, with high 
population growth rates which will not fall in the short-run since 
they still have high mortality rates which can be brought down.
Rural growth rates continue to be high, between 2 and 3 per cent 
annually.
(b) Population trends and urbanization
/ ( c ) Occupational
(c) Occupational structure. Growth of the middle strata
The great urban expansion brought with it heavy demands on 
society, as was foreseen in the post-war period. It was then 
supposed that industrialization and the expansion of services 
would provide the occupational answer to rural/urban migration.
Urban planning would enable these explosive urban settlements 
to be controlled and organized.
Judged in absolute terms the occupational achievements of 
industrialization and the public services may be considered 
satisfactory. Against a 5 per cent growth of the urban population, 
however, they are inadequate. The job deficits were made good by 
the activities of the so-called informal sectors. These succeeded 
in becoming stable and adapted to the urban societies, and have 
come to form a system which generates its own forms of supply and 
demand.
In the context of the functioning of the modern and informal 
sectors new population strata were generated. The groups in the 
so-called "higher" or '’middle" occupation ¿/ have increased their 
share in the occupation strata, which shows the urban economy's 
capacity to promote the formation of high and middle-level social 
strata (see table 7). Contrary to what was supposed in the 1960s, 
low-skilled jobs in the tertiaty sector,6/ did not increase unduly, 
and the percentages tended to remain much the same. Naturally, 
the absolute number of jobs of this kind rose considerably, with 
a great impact on the distributive problem. In sum, the occupational
Table 7
occupational strata, 1960-1970
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,  samples from n a tio n a l censuses; B r a z i l- i960, sample from n atio n a l census; 1972, sampling surveys o f s ix  reg io n s. There may be a  sampling erro r in  
percentage assigned to  the high and medium s tr a ta  in  the primary seotor; Costa Rica: 1963 and 197°» sampling surveys oovering urban areas; C h ile : i960, 
sus (n ational oensuses in  both oases); Ecuador; 1962 and I968, sampling surveys covering urban areas; Panama: i960 and 1970,  samples from n a tio n a l 
and 1972,  samples from n ational oensuses; Uruguay: 1963, census sample; 197° ,  sampling su rveys. Montevideo only in  both eases; Venezuela: i960, 
¡urveys (n ational censuses in  both o ases).
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On the other hand, it established a clear difference between these 
strata which nanaged to incorporate themselves in the more dynamic 
and "modern" production and service sectors and those which 
remained outside them.
(d) Economic and political problems-of urbanization
These problems-were unquestionably too great for the capacity 
of urban planning to deal with theral 'The response of the State 
to the challenges of urban growth wais concentrated in housing 
policy. It was the middle strata, however, which had the greatest 
access to the benefits of' gòvérnméttt action, thus incidentally 
showing their capacity for political mobilization.
Government urban policy was unàblé to avert a growing split 
within the large cities. On the one hand, there were the'modern 
districts, far from the cèntres, based on thé widespread use of 
automobiles, and'on the other1, there remained the unsatisfactory 
human settlements spontaneously created by rural-urban migration. 
Government policy on these settlements ended up as State assistance 
in view of the amount of resources necessary for a modern housing 
or urbanization programme.
The issue of political tension originating in these large 
urban groups has cóme to occupy a central position. The problem 
is to avoid a social and économie breakdown in an urban economy' 
with unfair income distribution and access to employment and services 
and with obvious contrasts in consumption lévels and life-styles.
It seems that the combination of a small but effective percentage 
of real opportunities', moderate increases in consumption,1 hopes 
of progress, minimum welfare policies and authoritarian régimes 
has këpt the situation under control. - .
/(e) Rigidity
- ' 2 k -
The rural situation today continues to be worse than the 
urban situation. The absolute poverty of large strata and the 
bad distribution of property and power were and stil’l' are 
characteristic of rural areas. . In the 1950s and at.the beginning 
of the 1960s it was thought that agricultural reform was not only 
a solution to rural problems but also a measure which was in step 
with the process of industrialization. It was assumed that the 
State, the industrial entrepreneurs, the middle classes and urban 
wage-earners and the rural masses had common interests in a policy 
which would lead to a more efficient use of the land and rural 
labour, and higher production and incomes which would furnish new 
markets for manufactured goods and open the way for rural democracy 
and the organization of groups which would break the power of the 
landowning sectors opposed to development.
The high costs of agricultural reform, its slow maturation 
and above all the evident fact that the groups involved could 
reach most of their goals at the expense of the rural masses whose 
political pressure was Weaker than had been supposed, took the . 
wind out of the sails of reform, leaving a high percentage of the 
potential beneficiaries in an under-privileged situation.
The sloiir or tortuous progress of agrarian reform led to a . 
large number of proposals usually suggested as complementary but . 
which were in fact alternatives. The most important were colonization 
and the relocation of poor rural groups through the expansion 
of the ̂ agricultural frontier, agricultural extension in the form .'*■ •’ 'V 'v' . ' ' ' ' 1 ’ ’of supplying rural areas with public services, the creation of 
agricultural unions and basic organizations and "community 
development" policies designed to co-ordinate and unify the other 
initiatives.
(e) Rigidity and changes in the rural sector
/As a
As a result of, the economic. Jteve3.pgment of the system and the 
slight impact of most of these policieŝ ,'*the .problems of the 
past have tended to persist to a large extent in rural areas.
At the same time, however, there are a number of important changes. 
In the first place, a,modern cpmmepcial agricultural economy 
has emerged primarily among the large and medium-scale landowners 
who have made better use than any othep group of the ¡State 
infrastructure projects and.¡of agricultural extension,in the 
form of technology. Secondly^agrarian.reform did free some of 
the beneficiary groups from extreme poverty. Others managed to 
enter the commercial econe^y.nr acquire.nçn-agricultural sources 
of income in transport, trade and artisanal or other activities. . 
These successful groups widened the gap between themselves and, 
those left.behind, in the eyes.of the Matter* These became a 
scattered» landless wage-earning mass depending on seasonal labour 
and without political power. Finally, important progress was 
made in education and health; hpweyer, as in sp many other areas 
the .rural/urban gap ten4sd .to remain or even .increase» so,$hat L 
such successes are once again relative. These transformations, 
improved the Tsitua.tion,of some groups and .alsp . create^ in thp r 
rural sector a more.complex stratification, than in,the ,195Qs, ,
in which the more underprivileged groups were unable ip improve t , 
their relative position or solve their.more serious problems.
/3. Economic
- 26 -
3« Economie dynamism’ and changé
(a) The dévélopment strategies and external^conditions/ Stages of
the growth process -
The rate of economic growth and the orientation of the changes 
in production were determined by tbe combination of internal 
development policies and potential and external factors at the 
national level.
The influence of the external factors was particularly marked
in the fluctuations of the rate of growth. The size of the economies
and, in general, the internal developmènt conditions 'largely 
determined the trends and orientation of the changes in production.
The various forms which these factors took gave rise to marked 
differences between countries and different stages in thé economic 
growth of the last 25 years. The évolution of the external variables, 
in relation to exports and financing for example, was similar for 
many countries. However the disparity in the supply of natural 
resources, the size of internal markets, salary levels, the socio­
political organization and the capacity of defining and implementing
development policies led to economic processes with varying dynamism 
and structure.
Two stages can be distinguished, in this long-term analysis of 
the economic development of the region, if thé evolution of these 
internal and external factors is considered in the countries which 
have the highest percentages of population/ The first covers the 
decade of the 1950s and the first five years of the 1960s. The 
second covers the rest of the decade of the 1960s and the 1970s.
This division into two stages in the middle of the last decade 
naturally constitutes an analytic simplification. It does not 
necessarily have precise application for each of the countries because 
of the particular features already mentioned, and the selection of the 
year 1965 as a dividing line mainly serves the purposes of statistical 
simplification. Nevertheless, significant and characteristic features 
prevail in each period which justify this global approach.
/The first
- 27 -
The first stage (1950-1965) ischaracterized by an external 
situation which after the boom in Korea developed unfavourably for 
the region. After an initial period in which the prices in the 
international market rose rapidly and the volumes exported increased, 
there was a slackening in the external markets which lasted until 
the mid-1960s. Exports grew slowly and the terms of trade 
deteriorated. At the same time the borrowing capacity and 
availability of external financing were relatively low. Substitutive 
industrialization was aOOentuated and imports grew slowly in many 
large and medium-sized countries. The imports coefficient fell, and 
this phenomenon reached significant proportions in some countries 
and particularly in Brazil. It should be stressed, however, that the 
external situation was not unfavourable-for all the countries, 
particularly for most of the Central American countries.
The slackening in the rate of the capacity of external buying 
already described stimulated in most countries, although to varying 
degrees, the trends towards the substitutive industrialization of 
imports which had emerged during the 1930s and after the Second World 
War. The countries in which the imports capacity suffered the 
greatest restrictions, such as the countries of the southern cone, 
Brazil and in some years Mexico, had to make major internal efforts 
to implement their industrialization strategy. These countries 
experienced a decline in the speed of the process at the end Of the 
1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, of varying intensity and 
fluctuations in the different cases. ; Through their greater efforts 
these countries, particularly Brazil and Mexico, advanced more rapidly 
in the stages of industrialization, but the restrictions of imports 
led them to force the substitutive process to levels which were liot 
always compatible with the desirable requirements of efficiency and 
which passed on the excessive costs to the consumers and other 
production sectors.
Other countries of lesser economic and demographic size, such 
as the Central American countries, did not suffer similar restrictions 
in their external conditions and towards the end of the period a first
/and fruitful
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and fruitful stage of subregional integration began to materialize. 
This enabled them to secure an advance in industrialization which 
would not have-been easy to attain in restrictive external conditions 
because of the small size of the markets.
The second stage, which lasted from the middle of the 1960s up 
to the 1970s, is characterized by a gradual improvement in the 
external conditions which reached a peak in the biennium 1972-1973.
Exports increased in dynamism and diversification and the 
ratios of the terms of trade tended to improve, as well as the 
availability .of external financing, particularly during the 1970s.
At this second stage there were marked disparities in the 
capacity of the countries to adapt to the new international context. 
The differing conditions of the Latin American countries for 
securing external financing, embarking on new targets of change in 
internal production and diversifying exports created marked diversity 
in dynamism and the national economic processes.
The countries which took greatest advantage of the external 
situation were those which Combined an active policy of internal 
change with dynamic incorporation into the external commercial and 
financial market.
In general the Latin American economies carried out major 
changes in the institutional structure of their economies. The 
governments gradually progressed in planning their activities in both 
the long and the short term. Although they did not always succeed in 
including the action within the framework of a formal plan,.public 
activity in practice gained in coherence and clarity of objectives.
The increasing .level of training of the public technocracies and 
bureaucracies contributed greatly to this improvement. In many 
countries they showed a capacity to carry out major investments, both 
in infrastructure and in industrial sectors, and to smoothly operate 
economic policies which made it possible to carry out long-term 
strategies and adapt to the changing external conditions.
Progress was also made, although moire unevenly, in tax, 
administrative and agrarian reforms. These reforms naturally provoked
/greater reactions
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greater reactions than the rent of the public action and, particularly 
in the agrarian sphere, the advances are far from satisfactory in . 
most cases.
The financial markets were organized by promoting major 
processes of accumulation and a greater incorporation into the 
international framework. Inflationary adjustments were progressively 
introduced into these markets so that the distorsions registered in 
the capital and investment markets were eliminated.
The improved institutional: organization of the public sector 
made it possible to carry out. an economic policy which, while in 
general maintaining the objectives of industrialization, adapted the 
instruments to the new conditions. :
The economic policy incorporated the growing concern about 
inflation in an organic way. Inflation,; which in the first stage was 
limited to- a few ¡countries, .ended up by becoming a widespread 
phenomenon during , the? 19<7Qe ¡in the context of the, world inflationary 
process and because-of the -varied action of external and internal 
factors in the countries pf the region, an is explained in chapter IV. 
The efforts to harmonize¿growth, inflation and employment .show that 
many countries are introducing more(.elaborate, forma of economic policy.
The new international conditions and the-,, rigidity created in 
many countries by imports substitution determined or facilitated 
changes in economic policy. In general, the countries' tried to 
insert, their industrialization process in broader markets so as to 
be able to realize new stages and remedy some of the distoraions of 
the past. For this they combined a policy of export promotion v/ith 
greater liberalization of imports through measures affecting tariffs, 
exchange rates and tax subsidies.
The requirements of the accumulation process, together with the 
concern to maintain a reasonable degree of autonomy in the operation 
of key sectors, also led to a reconsideration of the attitude towards 
foreign capital. In respect of natural resources there was a 
widespread attitude in favour of their nationalization which enabled 
the countries to. maintain or recover control of their mining and
/energy activities.
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energy activities. In the other sectors of the economy, however, an 
attitude, more favourable to foreign;,capital prevailed whichin many 
cases was reflected in a major influence of transnational enterprises 
in the more dynamic sectors of demand..
Accelerated economic dynamism and major changes in production 
developed-under the new external conditions, encouraged by the 
national policies. In these circumstances the most favoured 
countries were those of large market size and other small countries 
which began to exploit resources with,good international prices which 
proved to have an appreciable marginal, effect on the economy. Among 
the first group, the countries which were particularly favoured were 
those which, relying on the industrial base already created by the 
mid-1960s, offered attractive political and salary conditions for 
foreign capital, secured appreciable proportions of the financing 
and technology and carried out a decisive industrialization strategy. 
Among the second,, those which gained most were. those which, taking 
advantage of the balance-of-payments situation created by the 
expansion of exports, secured external financing,and on this basis 
embarked on the first stages of industrialization., ,
On the other hand, there were the,medium-sized * and smallh 
countries which had already carried out the first stage of the 
substitutive process or which did not have adequate natural resources 
to substantially increase the income of their exports. These 
countries were faced with a double problem: they neither possessed a 
market with capacity to advance in the industrial process and secure 
external, financing, nor were capable of satisfying a more sophisticated 
demand by means of external trade. The subregional integration 
schemes then appeared as a suitable solution for a major group of 
countries, .
In many countries the improvement in the purchasing power of 
exports and the abundant external financing reversed the trend of the 
previous period;towards decline in the imports coefficient. The 
economies functioned during the period with a greater-availability of 
imports. Although the flexibility,of supply deriving from this f
/cireurnstance should
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circumstance should be noted as one of the factors which made possible 
a high level of dynamism, it is equally true that the system 
functioned with increasing foreign borrowing which became accentuated 
from 197b onwards when the external conditions deteriorated because 
of the effects and repercussions of economic recession in the 
industrial countries and the deterioration of the terms of trade 
aggravated by the rise in petroleum prices for the importer countries. 
The external debt services and repayments of direct foreign investment 
steadily increased in magnitude and towards the end of the period 
constituted one of the major causes of the deficit in the balance of 
payments on the current account. Furthermore, a considerable 
proportion of the debt had been contracted with the private foreign 
bank which operated with more onerous and risky time limits, interest 
and conditions than those prevailing in multilateral official financing.
The serious external bottleneck which is revealed by the high 
deficits on the current account of the balance of payments in the non­
petroleum exporting countries, which began in 197b, affected the‘J . 'drastic fall in the rate of economic growth in 1975 and this problem 
prevails in spite of a certain improvement recorded last year.
A new stage in the economic development of the Latin American 
countries, offering varying prospects according to the particular 
conditions which affect them, finally seems to be emerging. The 
petroleum-exporting countries, and especially Venezuela, have favourable 
prospects for accelerating their development and can appreciably 
influence the economic dynamism of other countries of the region if 
reciprocal trade is expanded and economic and financial co-operation 
strengthened. The other countries, however, will have to confront the 
ablution of their acute problems of external payments in an 
international situation which will be lees favourable than in the 
years before the recession, particularly if the recovery of the growth 
rate in the industrial countries continues to be delayed.
For this second group of countries the development of their 
internal markets, a new stage of industrialization in intermediate 
essential products and capital goods, which will undoubtedly vary in
/nature and
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nature and dynamism from one country to another, and also the 
broadening and diversification of^regional trade and trade with other 
non-traditional areas will be the decisive factors, in some more 
urgent aspects than in recent years, in promoting their subsequent 
economic development.
(b) Acceleration and differentiation of economic growth between 
countries >
Throughout this period the raté of economic growth of the region 
as a whole tended to accelerate. The average annual' growth rate rose 
from around 5 per cent during the' 1950s to about 5*5 per cent in the 
1960s and 6 .3 per cent in the first half oif the 1970s. Over the* 
twenty-five years this is equivalent to ah average of 5*5 per cent a 
year, which exceeds the rate Of the developed countries with market 
, economies by nearly one per cent. This did not occur in the case'of 
the per capita product because * WhilèJ demographic growth reached rates 
of nearly 3 per cent, the region'did hot1succeed in doubling its per 
capita product or in improving its‘relative position in relation to 
the developed countries. (¡See tables 8 and 9* )
The greater dynamism covered the great majority of countries 
despite thé différences in rhythm which can be distinguished between 
them. During the 1950s only three countries exceeded 6 per cent, 
while in thé first half of the 1970s seven attained that rate, 
including Brazil and Mexico which account for about 50 per cent of 
the population. Similarly in the 1950s seven countries did not attain 
k per cent, while in the first half of the 1970s only four failed to 
reach this rate.
AS has already been pointed out, the differences between 
countries in respect of the size of national markets, conditions, and 
internal potential and policies, in the end led to differences in 
the rate and structuré of their growth, especially in the last stage 
considered. The less favoured countries were those which encountered 
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The most favoured, on the other hand, were those which were able to 
add to the level and dynamism of internal and external demand a balance 
of payments capable of sustaining the flow of imported goods involved 
in changes in production.
On the basis of these differences, it is possible to distinguish 
three groups of countries:
(a) Those which because of their greater market size and capacity 
of securing external financing obtained high growth and clear advance in 
industrial sectors by incorporating consumer durable goods and 
improving the technical efficiency of the industrial infrastructure 
with adequate scales in steel, petroleum refining, energy generation, 
etc., and which advanced in the first stages of the capital goods 
industry and the chemical industries. These countries grew and secured 
a better articulated industrial structure and created markets which
are now attractive in many sectors at the world level.
(b) The small countries and some medium-sized countries which 
progressed in the first stages of industrial development.
(c) The countries which grew less, as is the case of the countries 
of the southern cone which, after pioneering the process of changes in 
production, subsequently, because of various factors, encountered 
difficulties in attaining growth rates similar to the regional 
averages, thus losing influence in their share in the generation of
the regional project, although the marked differences among them of 
an economic and industrial nature are obvious.
£c) Progress in industrialization. Transformation of the sectoral
' structure
i
The process of industrialization in the last 25 years profoundly 
changed the productive structure of the region. (See table 10.)
The share of manufacturing industry rose from 18 per cent in 
1§50 to 25 per cent in 1975* The countries of greater economic and 
demographic weight already had a high degree of industrialization in 
1950, which they maintained throughout the period (20.4 per cent in 
1950 and 26.6 per cent in 1975). The medium and small countries had 
lower levels in 1950 and made considerably less progress, passing from 




LATIN AMERICAS SI ARE OP THE AGRICULTURAL AND IIANUFACTU/IIG SECTOR IN THE PRO DUCT 
(Percentages of -a» gross domestic product at 1970 prices)
Country Agricultural seetcr a/ Manufacturing industry
1950 I960 1970 1975 1950 i960 1970 1975
Argentina 16.7 M 
. 
\S
\ • ON 13.1 12.0 23.2 26,3 33.2 32.2
Bolivia 25.4 24.4 16.9 15.8 12.4 11.6 12.9 13.6
Brazil 20,6 I6.5 14.3 12.2 17.9 22.3 24.8 25.6
Colombia . £ . 2 33.0 28.6 26.8 ■ 13.7 16.4- 17.5 18.8
Costa Rica b/ 36.4 29.3 25.0 23.2 11.5 12.4 15.1 17.2
Cuba - - am - am *■* m. am
Chile 111.2 9.8 7.? . 3.3 23.I ¿f.9 27.2 23.8
Ecuador 4o,3 38.1 29.2 22.1 17.1 17.0 19.0 20.3
El Salvador : 4i.o 35.7 • 30.6 2U.1 12.9 13.8 17.6 18.1
Guatemala 35.3 32.6 30*1 30*1 10.7. 11.7 14,6 14.5
Haiti 52.8 48,8 50,8 45.2 8.3 8.8 9.8 H.7
Honduras 45.2 32.7 £ . 6 31.7 9.2 15.2 l4,o I6.0
Mexloo 18.2 16.1 . ; 11.3 9.7 I8.6 ,19.2 23.4 24.1
Nioaragua 33.1 26.4 20..3 26.9 10,0 11.9 17.5 17.8
Panama 31.5 25.7 20 .7 13.8 7 .9 11,6 15.8 13.9
Paraguay 45.8 39.5 3-4.3 33.0 17.8 . 15.2 17.3 17.5
Peru 25*3 24.6 19.8 15.3 10.9 13.3 16.8 18.7
Dominican Republic 34.7- 33.8 25.8 19.1 12.5 ; 14.6 16.7 37.5




7.4 6.9 9.2 11.4 13.4
Latin America (19 countries) 20.1 18.2 14.9 1 3.2 17.9 20,3 23.0 23.9
a /  Comprises: AgrioultUi-e,  forestry , hunting and fishing.
The manufacturing industry inoludes nine's and quarries.
/reflect, particularly
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reflect, particularly in more recent years, the varying capacity of 
countries to cover more advanced rubrics of the industrial process.
The larger countries are advancing in the substitution of intermediate 
and capital goods while the others are already encountering 
difficulties in some consumer durable lines. Chile and Uruguay, which 
made an early start in industrialization, are good examples of these 
difficulties, since although they have a high degree of 
industrialization they were unable to advance at the same rate as the 
larger countries during the period.
In the agricultural sector the opposite occurred. While it is 
true that with a rising income level there is normally a displacement 
of demand, in many Latin American countries the decline in the share 
of agriculture has gone further than the structure of demand would 
suggest.
The adjustment mechanism between demand and production has been 
the external sector. Particularly in more recent years (1970-197*0 
imports have grown at a significantly higher rate than exports (10 per 
cent and one per cent respectively). The share of the agricultural 
product in the product of the region has declined from about 20 per 
cent in 1950 to 13 per cent in 1975» In 1950 this proportion was 
above 30 per cent in eleven countries, in 1975 only in three. In 1975 
the three economically and demographically larger countries had ratios 
below this average. Chile and Venezuela continue, as in 1950, to be 
the countries with the smallest share of agriculture in the product 
(about 7 per cent). The rate of growth of production has been falling
in the sector, from 3*7 per cent in the 1950s to 3*2 in the 1960s and*below 3 per cent in the 1970s.
The transformation of the productive structure has led to a 
substantial change in the lével and quality of supply. The industrial 
sector has greatly increased the supply of consumer goods, covering 
almost all demand in many countries. Production of intermediate goods 
has also increased, particularly in some basic intermediate industries 
such as steel and petroleum refining. In recent years the chemical 
and petro-chemical industry has tended to grow, but these branches are
/unevenly distributed
unevenly-distributed among the countries. Capital goods have, 
progressed least, but the serious balance of payments problems are' 
strengthening the. trend towards a substitution policy- in thèse-brahches, 
particularly in countries like Brazil and México. Hence, looking at 
th® region as a whole, it may be.said that thè structure of industrial 
supply is tending to-become more complete.
Looking at what happened in the different countries, it may be 
seen that the. medium and Small countries easily advance in thè more
; ' ftraditional branches, but run into increasing difficulties as they 
attempt to advance into thé intermediate and capital goods sectors, 
where bigger production scales arè necessary. Thus the trends to 
continue the transformation of production are uneven. On the one hand, 
the large countries are in a position to progress and join in world 
trade. On the other, the medium and small countries must make a much 
greater effort to continue their transformation of'production. Thus 
the growth df regional trade and the success of thè integration schemes 
.will certainly be important factors for transformation to continue, 
and. their failure would represent a blow to the strengthening of thè ■ 
regional economy.- -
(d) The degree of exploitation of natural resources in relation to.
external conditions ,
Prior to industrialization, endowment with natural resources 
was an important factor in the development of the Latin American 
countries. "
Thé development which has taken place in the last 25 years has 
called for the use of considerable and increasing quantities of natural 
resources. The region as a whole has abundant natural resources, but 
their exploitation often involves solving institutional problems or 
carrying out significant investments which are not easily divisible 
into small units. On the other hand, exports of natural resources 
continue to be a key element in the growth of the capacity to import,, 
even if they are no longer the dynamic factor in demand as in the past.
Over the last 25 years the region has not increased thé 
exploitation of its resources in the proportions called for by the
/growth of
growth of domestic and external demand. , To fill |:he gap, it resorted 
to foreign trade, particularly in the more favourable ,y§ars in the 
period 19'65rl973*. By means of this expedient it. was able to avoid more 
radical reforms in such sectors as agriculture.or large-scale . 
investment in the energy and mining sectors.
In the case of agriculture, many factors combined to cause 
production to grow at a lower rate than demand. On,the internal side, 
the structure of land ownership, the unattractive level of domestic 
and external prices, and ̂ he high amounts of investment and technology 
needed for qualitative progress in the sector; on the external side, 
supply whs ofben ac-corapartied-by extremeiy attractive financial 
conditions which ma3e it easier fop the developed countries to place 
their surpluses in the region. Thus the pressure on the sector for a 
better use of its resources was hot strong in this period. Naturally, 
there were countries where this was not the case, particularly when 
the harvested area could not easily be ‘extended without high cost and 
the balance-of-paÿraents situation was not favourable.
The pressure of demand on mining resources was likewise not 
strong during this period. ' External demand continued to dominate in 
this sector, andr during thé! 25-year period' thë importing industrial 
countries opted for a policy of diversification of their supplies. 
Although expbrts of some mlnerars euch as iron ore, where the region's 
participation was very low, increased grëatly, in others, whërç its 
partic'ipatioriwas high, thëre: was à big drop. Foreign capital directed 
to mining was displaced to other regions of the world. It was only in 
recent years that the strong industrial'development of the larger 
cb'Untries of'the* region caused internal demand tb: emerge as a potential 
growth factor in the sector, and in somé cases increased'the pressure 
on resources.' : ii_
The influence of the external sector in the pressure on resources 
can be seen mbst clearly in thé case' bf energy resources. While the 
region continués to be a net exporter of energy résources, production 
grew in the period at lower rates than consumption because the price
of p'etrbleum was relatively low’, particularly in the 19608. The deficit
/countries substituted
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countries substiitited abundant imports from the Middle East for 
investment efforts in exploring aftdiSidding névi energy resources to 
their reserves and production. The higher price»Of petroleum in 1973 
was once again felt in the balance of payments and this Will naturally 
continue to be a strategie field in the next few years*
Unquestionably, to maintain high rates of economic growth in 
the future will demand.more intense exploitation of the region’s 
natural resources; investment and technological needs will grow 
considerably and there will be a greater need for different forms Of 
co-operation and growth of trade among countries Of thè area.
(a) The importance and progress of the public sector and the 
transnational enterprises as agents'of growth
The growth of the economies, the inclusion in demand of more 
sophisticated products, the need to achieve bigger production scales 
and the attempts to include industrial products in the pattern of 
exports created organizational, technological and financial needs 
in the I96OS which were very different from those of the 1950s.
The growth of production was linked with the evolution of a 
consumption structure which followed the patterns of the developed 
countries. This trend was stimulated and made possible by foreign 
capital, which in many cases came to exploit the domestic market of 
the Latin American countries, particularly those of greater economic 
and demographic size. The technology available for the production 
of the goods included in the new consumption structure was created 
in the developed countries for large markets; to a large extent this 
restricted to the larger countries the inflow of capital to produce 
goods with these technological characteristics. In addition, in many 
cases this type of industrial development requires an infrastructure 
of transport, energy and basic inputs which can only be justified for 
large markets.
The national private sector, which played an important role in 
the first stage òf the industrial process, lost ground to the public 
sector and foreign capital, the latter in thè form of the 
transnational corporation. In general, the public sector undertook
/infrastructure projects,
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infrastructure projects, the exploitation of raining and energy 
resources and projects in some industrial sectors such as steel and 
oil-refining. The transnational corporations participated in a great 
variety of sectors, but their greatest weight, was in the. more .dynamic 
or influential branches -of industry,-auchtas the motor-vehicle 
industry. ’’ ’
This trend towards ̂ the concentration of ownership in the hands 
of a small number of public and private enterprises brought the 
social and political changes and led further and further away from 
the competitive -model proclaimed in the development ideology of the 
post-war period. ■
(f) The region's capital formation and savings capacity
The .acceleration pf the region's economic growth was possible 
thanks to the high levels reached by capital formation. Investment, 
which had.grown at an average, annual rate of 5*7 per cent in the 
period 195P-1965 stage, has reached rates of around 8 .5 per cent since 
the mid-1960s (see table 11). An analysis of the situation by 
countries reveals some cases where the rate of capital formation 
accelerated greatly. Brazil, whose rates were already high, achieved 
an average rate of 11.5 per cent. Those countries which initiated 
the exploitation,of new natural resources such as Ecuador and the 
Dominican Republic reached very high rates, i.e., 16.7 and 22.7 per 
cent, respectively. In Brazil, the high rate attained coincided 
with an improvement in the capital-output ratio, which shows how 
efficient the process was. On the whole, there was a close relationship 
between the rates attained by the product and. investment. Investment 
played the dual role of increasing the supply capacity and at the 
same time of constituting an important dynamic factor of demand.
In contrast, there are the cases of Chile and Uruguay, where in the 
period 1950-1973 investment rates increased moderately in keeping 
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Argentina 15.1 17.6 21.5 : 20*5 ■• 6.1 6*0
B o liv ia 10.2 . 15.6 15.2 20.3 6.6 : : 6.1
B ra s il 23*2 19.5 23.4 26.2 6. 0. ‘ 11.5
Colombia , 22*9 21.0 19*9 21.6 . 3*3 • ,4.1
Costa Rioa 14.8 17.4 22.3 24.1 10.5 7*8
Cuba • •• • ••• • •• '
1 i
C h ile 14.6 15*4 12.6 12.6 4.6
*
o a
Ecuador 10.0 11.3 23.9 27.4 6 .« 16.7
E l Salvador n .3 17.5 14.2 15.4 8.9 2.5
Guatemala 10.8 12.6 12.4 12.6 5.0 5.1
H a iti 7.1 5*8 8.0 8.8 0.8 7*0
Honduras 15*8 15.5 16.4 21.2 5*1 6.3
Msxleo 18.8 20*4 21.3 25.« 7*5 8.2
Nioaragua 12.3 19.2 17.* 22.2 11*9 5*7
Phnare 13.3 19.0 ■: 2 9 .» ■ 22.6 7*0 . 13*7
Paraguay 6.3 14.8 17*3 22.3 9*6 9*4
Peru:-. 18.3 16.3 13.6 17.2 ■ 6.1 2.7
Domini oan Republlo 16.5 13*7 22.2 26.6 2*3 22.6
Uruguay 18*4 9.3 11.6 10.1 -2 .6 3.1
Venesuala ■ 4 i* r 25*7 30.0 3I.O 4*2 7.1
; Ia tla .A g e g l& 19.8 18.9 21.5- 23.7 ■JSmZ
2/  00 th* baslS of^average values a t 1970 prices*
/Figures for
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Figures for the region as a whole show,.a. high capacity for the 
mobilization of investment resources. The investment-product 
coefficients which had declined at the beginning■of the 1960s
compared with the beginning of the 1950s (19 and 20 per cent,
respectively) more than regained their former levels in the period 
1971-1973 (about 21.5 per cent) and reached an exceptionally high 
level in the years 197^-1975 (23*7, per cent). An analysis of the 
countries shows that the situation is somewhat uneven. In the first
place there is a group of countries.which in the last 25 years have 
maintained levels close to or higher than 20 per cent of the product. 
These are generally large or medium-sized countries: Brazil, Colombia, 
Mexico and Venezuela. In the second group are the., countries which 
have increased their levels from values .of between 10 and 15 per cent 
at the, beginning of the period. (1950-1952) to levels equal to or 
higher than 20 per cent for the majority ,of .them, ip the 1970s: 
Argentina., Bolivia, Costa Jlica, Honduras, Nicaragua» Ecuador, Panama, 
Paraguay and the Dominican Republic. Finally, the rest of the 
countries have not exceeded 15 perrcent in the 197Qs and in many cases 
the rate has slowed to very low levels. Special importance should be 
given to what occurred in the period. 197**—19,75-. when, although the 
region,was affected by the recession in the developed countries and 
the growth rate of the product declined,,, in many cases investment 
maintained its momentum, thus showing, the force of the trend towards 
long-term growth and the independent attitude adopted by agents such 
as the State and transnational corporations' to short-term fluctuations.
The dynamic performance of investment was accompanied by a
; *■ ' y ■ J1- ' ' -vigorous expansion of domestic saving. The region, which for long 
periods had recorded levels of domestic saving of about 18 per cent 
of the product (1 8 .5 per cent in 1950-1952 and 18 .2 per cent in 
196^-1966) saw its coefficient increase to 19«5 per cent in 1971-1973 
and easily exceed 20 per cent in 197^-1975 (21.3 per cent). The 
countries with consistently high investment coefficients also had 
high and relatively stable savings coefficients. In the rest, of the 
countries they fluctuated widely around iower levels. With the
/exception of
-  if If -
exception of the oil-exporting' countries and Argentina, Paraguay and 
the Dominican Republic, the trends are not towards an increasei It 
is especially noteworthy that the coefficients of six countries (Chile, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Peru and Uruguay) should fluctuate 
around 10 per cent for the 1970s, which is an exceptionally low level 
(see table 12)•
The proportion of investment financed with domestic saviDg differs 
considerably in the’ different countries. On the whole, this 
proportion has followed a less favourable course than investment.
For the countries with high and stable investment levels, domestic 
saving has represented values of between 90 and 100 per cent of 
investment. Countries such as Argentina and Venezuela stand out in 
this respect, having in many periods.financed the whole of the amount 
invested and even obtaining a surplus, Venezuela’s performance is 
especially notable, owing to the rise in the price; of petroleum. On 
the other hand, the countries with lower levels of investment generally 
finance lower percentages with domestic saving, in proportions of - 
less than 90 per cent. It should be noted, however, that there are 
some periods in whicha decline in these proportions has its origin 
in recurring balance-of-payments problems which compel the country 
to contract external loans and which, for one reason or another, 
could lead to a drop in the domestic'saving coefficient of the. period 
concerned, according to the conventional definitions.
(g) Changes in the external sector and their relationship with
economic growth
The external sector has had great influence on the rate of 
growth of the Latin American economies. For the past 25 years, although 
the nature and volume of external indebtedness have changed, the 
region’s external links have continued to hold down or accelerate 
the rate of growth. The role of relations such as those which- 
exist between external demand and economic dynamism, between imports 
and import substitution processes, and between1 foreign capital and 
the financing of imports or investment has changed substantially and 
these relations are sassociated with domestic growth ih widely 
differing ways (see. tables 15 and I2*). /Table 12
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Table 12
LATIN ¿¡SaiCAi EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL SAVINGS
Country >
Gross.national savings .a s .. 
a percentage of the gross 
dcmestio produoi e/
Grogs national savings 
as a poroenfcege of 
gross to ta l investments/
1950-
1952












Argentina 1 3 a .......... ISA ...g iA  ... 19 A , ...... 33. .105 . .. 100,.
Bolivia 9,9 10.6 11.7 17.6 97 68 76
Brazil 20.  3. 19.8 21. 0 ' . 21.2 56 101 90
Colombia 23,1 13.0 16.7 " 21.0 101 86 85
Costa Bica l4 A.9 9.3 ] ' 13,5 I 3.9 . 99 58 6lCuba • « « • •. •
Olile 14,1 13.8  ' 8.5 9 A 97
• * •
90 66
Ecuador 12A 9.3 17.6 A .8 ; 126 82 74
El Salvador 14.8 2 3 .5 ' 12.5 ' 9.7* 133 77 91
Guatemala 11.2 9 .9 ' 11A ' lO.u * 105 79 94
H aiti 6. 7 ' 2. 5 ' 6.5* 5 .7 ' 94 43 82
Honduras 13.3 ir .8 \ 13.  5 ‘ " 11A  ’ 09 76 33Mexico 17. 9 . 18 A 18.3^ 20.1 95 91 88 ,
Nicaragua • 13,7 13.8 13.4 \ 8,8 112 72 80
Panama 5 .9 . 13.2 21.4 ’ 12.0 kz 70 74
Paraguay 8.0 11«3 l4 r8 ’ 19.2 123 77 85
Peru 16.  6 13.7 12.2 ’ 8.0* 91 83 90
Domini can Republic 18,4, 8.3 18, 2 ' 22,6 116 # ' 81 .
Uruguay 17.2 11.0 11. 0( 6 .5 ' 94 119 . 96
Venezuela A .3 , 26.9 31. 5 ’ 52.9* 104 104 105
Latin America 18.2 19.5 ¿ ¡ 1 22 2£ 21



















ing "  
power
Argentina ' 3.44 2.91 • 2.48 4.03 2.42 5.®
Bolivia 1.78 —1. 2 2.22 5.77 8.97 7.05
Brazil 6.03 2.91 -0 .3 • G.83 11.2 12.71
Colombia ■ 4.66 ' 4,04 • 1.84 6.I0 5.50 6.45
Costa Rioa 6.33 4,5° " 3.35 7.25 12.35 10.31
Cuba - * ‘ - -
Chile 4.31 ■ 2.86 3.08 ' '2.88 1.44 2.29
Ecuador 4.97 7.11 3.47 6.15 11.00 11.74
El Salvador 5.3u • 7.P9 - 5.62 ■ ■■-4.55 4.07 r 3.91
Guatemala 4.20 7.00 4.23 6.06 8.18 5.oi
Haiti 1.06 - .62 - ■ —1. 2 '2.95 2.42 1.96
Honduras • 4,08 4.54 ' - 3.55 ■4.17 5.63 3.33
Mexico * 6.i7 4.65 2.56 6» 60 6.13 7*24
Nicaragua 6,90 5.00 ,> 8.42 , 4.14 6.35 5.20
Panama 5.96 ' 6.45 . 5.38 7.51 7.74 6.87
Paraguay 3.50 3.94 - 2.88 , 4.79 4.15 6.02
Peru - • 5.69 7.95 6.59 4.90 -.27 3.51
Dominican Republic 4.67 2.88 1.23 9.00 10.19 12.84
Uruguay 1.70 1.24 -2.0 .97 -3.9^ 2.53
Venezuela 7.50 6.07 1.99 4,31 0,80 3.50
Latin Auerioa





LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OP THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 
COEFFICIENTS 113 RESPECT OP THE GROSS DOiiESTIC PRODUCT AT 1970 PRICES
(Percentages)
i ’ ■ 1390-1952 1964-1966
! 1971-1973 1974-1975
Country
j . . . -. m jx2/ 9 ■ i C
f m 3*2/ e £ ; f D yxS/ 1 e■ g. f m yxS/ a g- f
Argentina 12.0 0.3 8.4 1.9 2.0 8.7 0,8 9.1 1 .1 -0.7 8 .1 1 .1 7.5 1.6 0 .1 8 .7 1 .0 6.8 1.8 1 .1
{Bolivia 15.5 -0.9 27 .1 -8.8 0.3 23.3 0. 2 19.8 -1.3 5 .0 2L.2 1.4 22.9 -3.8 *5 27.2 1.9 20.4 6.0 2.7
¡Brazil 15.6 1.6 3.1 5.2 2.9 4.0 0,8 6*0 -0.1 --0 .3 3.2 1.0 6.9 - 2.3 10.1 1.4 6.9 -0.4 5.0




26.2 8.5 26.9 7-5 0.3 29.1 1.4 21.2 1.7 7.6 33.7 1.9 29.4 -2.6 6.8 32.7 1.9 26.6 Jt.2 10.2
11.3 2.8 20.4 -6.3 0.5 12.1 2.3 16.9 -4.0 1.5 14.1 1.3 14.6 -3.4 4,2 14,2 2.2 17.6 -4.4 3.2
Ecuador 12* If 2. 2 11.8 5.2 -2.4 14.8 1.8 15.1 -0,4' 1.9 20.9, 2.6 19.1 -1.8 6.2 2>.9 3.8 - 19.1 9.1 2.5
El Salvador 25*3 0.8 2O.2 ?.4 -3.5 31.9 -0 .1 26,9 1,0 3.9 28. 2 -0.1 26.8 o.l 1.2 32.3 0.5 27.6 -1,0 6.2
Suaten&la !S 17.2 -0.2 10.7 6.6 -0 .3 21.0 0.7 17.1 1.9 2.7 16.8 0.5 18.9 -2.5 0.9 17.5 -0 .1 20,7 -5.1 1.8
Haiti ..lo,0. 2.2 12.6 5.2 0,4 15.6 -0.5 11.8 -0.1 3,4 15.6 -2.5 3.2.4 -0.7 .1*4 13.3 -1.3 10,2 -1.3 3.1
Honduras i4.0- 9.5 23a 8.4 2.0 29,9 2.4' 23.9 4.8 3.6 27.8 2.9 28.0 -0.1 2,8 3 2 .3 1.0 27, 0 -3.5 9.8
Ifexioo 14. 4 1.6 11.5 3.5 1 .0 3.2 l.ff 9.5 -0.4 1.9 9.7 2.1 9.1 0 .1 2.6 11.2 2.8 6.2 0.8 5.0
Nicaragua 22.8 3.0 18.4 9.5 -1.5 33.3 :**$. 26.3 3.1 5.4 30.3 2.3 £ . 6 (44 3 .6 36,1 ’3.1 27.8 -2.1 13.5
Panama 33. 2 9.5 30.4 4.9 7*4 36.2 4 .0 33.4 1.1 5.7 39.0 3.0 34.7 -0.2 7 .5 36.1 6 .3 •5.1 10.5
Paraguay 15.X 0.6 .13.8 3.5 -1.6 17.4 0,6 12.8 1.7 3.5 16.6 1*1 13.5 1*6 2.6 17.5 0.9 12.7 2.6 3.1
Peru 16.0 1.0 15.7 -0.5 1.8' 10.5 2.2 21.7 -3.7 2.7 15.0 1.7 16.3 -1.0 1.4 21.2 1.7 12.0 1.7 9.2
Dominican Republic 18.8 5-5 26.0 0.2 -1.9 20.3 0.8 17.2 —1.0 4*9 22,9' 0*2 19.1 0m- 4.0 24,9 1.5 15.3 7.2 3.9
Uruguay' 17.7 0,6 .12.4 4.6 1.3 9.2 0.9 12.6 -0.7 -1.8 11,6 0.9 10.1 1*7 0.7 11.7 1.4 11.8 -2.4 3-7
Venezuela *3-3.8 21.6 34.0 33.0 —1.6 21,0 10,3 5 4.8 -1 .0 20.4 5 .6 21.5 5.4 -0.9 24.9 1.8 16.2 28.7 -18.2
Latin America 
(19 countries) 16.7 2.7 i ; . 4 4*7 1.3 10.9 2.0 12.0 0.1 0.8 11.6 l »7 10.9 0.4 2.0 13.3 1.8 10.1 2.3 2.7
Notes The sj’mbols mean:
m s imports of goods and services,
yc s net pa:taerrts of profits and interest to the exterior, 
e s exports of goods and services, 
g : effect of the share of external trade', 
f  : net external financing. 
a/ Includes net private donations.
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Jn the first stage covering the period•1950-1965» the region's 
exports grew at a lower rate than the product, and the terms of trade 
deteriorated. As a result, the purchasing power of exports increased 
substantially less than the product . (2 per cent and 5.2 per cent, 
respectively). This situation mainly affected the large and medium­
sized countries. In contrast, the small countries, such as those of 
Central America, increased the purchasing power of exports at rates 
similar to those of the product, and in,some cases even higher. The 
biggest differences were recorded by Brazil whose export purchasing 
power fell 0.3 per cent,’ while the product grew by 6 per cent.
These drops in the purchasing power of exports were not compensated 
for by external financing and many countries found it impossible to 
maintain rates for the supply of imports similar to those of previous 
periods. Fairly radical changes took place between 1950 and 1965- 
Imports as a percentage of the product fell from 16*7 per cent in the 
period 1950-1952 to 10.9 per cent in 1964-1966. ' The effects of the 
deterioration in the terms of trade were significant in the case of 
many countries, added to'which in some the relative importance of 
net external financing diminished1* For the region as a whole, expressed 
in terms of percentages.of the product, trade gains - at 1970 prices - 
were 4.? per cent in 1950-1952 and only 0.1 per cent in 1964-1966, 
while net external financing was 1.3 per cent and 0.3 per cent in the 
same periods.
At the level of the individual countries, Brazil recorded the 
most spectacular changes in that it reduced its import coefficient 
from 15*6 to 4.8 per cent, and its external financing coefficient 
from 2.9 to 0 .3 per cent, between 1950-1952 and 1964-1966. Similar 
but not such pronounced changes were recorded in Argentina, Colombia, 
Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela (this last country radically reduced 
its import coefficient - from 43.8 per cent1 to 21 per cent - but it 
still remained at fairly high levels).
The Central American countries, on.the other hand, managed to 
increase both coefficients and thus in most cases were able to 




At this stage, the countries most seriously affected by external 
restrictions made more progress in import substitution industrialization 
Ethan the countries which, were able to main'taiif their supply of external 
goods. By 1965, however, they had reached import levels Which could 
hardly he further compressed. Such levels wére not compatible with 
new stages of industrial developmentwhich’required quantities and 
types of capital and intermediate goods that could not be produced 
locally or in which it was hot* feasible’-to invest under the 
prevailing conditions. The persistence of the* foreign trade trend 
conflicted with long-term growth. + In; the mid-1960s 'the countries 
initiated a new stage, introducing gradual’adjustments in their 
'external relations;policies. 1
The new sthg'es which began in the mid-1960s was characterized 
by a reactivation off the external markets. Between 1965 and 1973 the 
purchasing power of"exports for the’whole region grew at a higher 
rate than the product ;(6.6 per" cent and 6.2 per cent, respectively).
This situation prevailed in- most Of the countries of Latin'America.
The countries also had inoreasing access to external credit which 
enhanced their im'port possibilities. A càsè worth noting is that 
of Brazil whose import-product coefficient increased from 4.8'per 
cent in 1964-1966 to 8.2 per- cent in 1971-1973» On the' whole, most 
of the countries'maintained theii*'coefficients, halting the decline 
recorded in the previous period. On the other hand, some Gentral 
American countries which, as noted earlier, had fairly high import 
coefficients* redUced them somewhat although they remained at high 
absolute levels. In’ broad térmé, it maÿ bé noted that the import 
coefficients of the large countries are below 10 per cent, those 
of the medium-sissed countries are around 15 per cent and those of 
the remaining côuniriês are over 20 per cent.
The trend towards a more open economy was accentuated in the
years 1975 and 1974. Oil the one hand, the major countries like Brazil 
and Mexico obtained large volumes of-external financing which made 
their doméstic supply even»moré flexible. On the other hand, thè T' 
oil-exporting countries were dble t'<5 • increase their imports sUbstàtitlally 
thanks to their considerably export earnings.
/The expansion
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The expansion of imports was accompanied by changes in their 
composition. This presents considerable differences between the 
countries of the region, mainly determined by their domestic production 
structure and supply of natural resources.
Import substitution attained its fullest scope in non-durable 
consumer goods and the process has been spreading, in different 
periods and degrees, to many countries of the region, so that the 
share of this type of goods in total imports has declined. On a lesser 
scale, the same situation is true of durable consumer goods, although 
limited to the countries of largest economic size. The share of 
consumer goods in Latin America's imports continued to decline in the 
last decade, from an average of 15*7 per cent in the 1960s (calculated 
on the basis of current values) to 12.1 per cent in 1974, mainly 
because of the drop recorded by the countries with high coefficients.
In 1974, however, nine countries presented coefficients of over 
20*per cent. In contrast, countries like Argentina and Brazil which 
had'made most progress in industrial developmènt and were to a high 
degree self-supporting in agricultural products, maintained a low and 
unchanging proportion (between 6 and 8 per cent) during those years, 
which is indicative of the limits they had reached in this respect.
In others, such is Mexico and Colombia, the share of consumer goods 
in total imports', mainly agricultural products, has increased in the 
last few years (see table 15).
In the major countries of the region, industry has made progress 
in the substitution of a wide range of capital goods. This has been 
one of the factors accompanying the sharp decline in thé share of 
imported capital goods in total investment (see table 16). In 
1950 these goods represented about 28 per cent Of investment.in 
Latin America, the proportion dropping Sharply to just over 15 per cent 
in 1965. Since then it has remained at around that level, declining 
to-14.7 per cent in 1971» This trend is mainly attributable to the 
developments in the major countries of the region and, to a lesser 
extent, in some of thé medium-sized countries. In Argentina and 
Brazil the coefficient declined from nearly 24 per cent to a little 




LATIN AMERICA* STRUCTURE UP IMPORTS OP GOODS 
(Percentages of total Imports of goods. In current dollars)
Table 15












































¡Argentina 6.2 I 6.9 4.9 5.4 7.7 4.7 7.5 14.5 51.4 59.7 63.1 62.8 34.2 28.6 24.4 17.3 S
¡Bolivia 24.8 20.4 19.7 22.9 !•?- . °»7- -0.9 1 .2 39.0 38.1 ? 38.9 ' 34.9 37.5§ 40.4 ; 35.7 ;
¡Brazil 7.6 7.9 r-- 8.i 5.5 16.2 "ii5.£- 15.0 ,23.7 -45.Q ,42.8 .41.4 47.4 3 0 .7 31.0 < 35.0 j 22.7 j
Colombia 9.0 io.7 12.9 15.0 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.2 45.4; 44.0 55.1 59.8 43.9 45.3 I 31.6 i 24.7 j
'Costa Rloa 27.6 28.1 26.3 23.2 4.7 3.6 4.5 3.4 45.1 44.6 42.9 45.5 22.5 22.4 25.3 - 27.6 J
'Cuba >•« .** ... si* ... ... ... • * • ... ... ... *•* • * * ... ... 1 i... i
Chile 14.6 13.5 14.6 n.9 5.9 6.0 7.2 14,2 42.4 40.7. 41.4 51.2 36.8 38.5 36.5 | 22.5 s
'Ecuador 17.0 ; 15.6 17.1 15.0 .6.0 *6.0“ : 2.8 1.5 43.5 44.9’ 43.8 41.2 32 .3 33.0 36.3 > 42.0 i
¡El Salvador 32.1 ; 32.2 26.0 28.7' 1.7 l.o o.5 4.9 47.8 49.6 54.5 47.8 18.2 17.6 18,9 i 1 7.6 1
¡Guatemala 27.2 1 27.2 25.4 22,8 3.1 1.4 2.2 15,4 47.3 50.5 48.5 42.8 22.4 22.3 23.0 i 18.6 j
¡Haiti 71.8 * 64.4 65.0 63.1 6.3 6.9 9.0 17.0 6.8 6.4 6.3 5.9 1 3 .7 12.6 1 1.0 j 10.3 j
¡Honduras 30.0 j 3°*l 27.4 26.0 . 6.4 46.3 ,9.° 15.7 39.2 38.0;' 37.8-*' 35.2V 23.3 24.8 24.9 S 22.0 j
¡Mexico 12.4 :• 14.0 15.1 17.6 2.9 3.0 6.7: 6.1 43,4” 43.0 39.1 43.6 40.9 41.8 39.1 j 31.8 |
¡Nicaragua 28.7 I 29.5 27.9 22,4 2.6 1.8 1.9 1.5 43.7 44.5 47.0 55.1 23.7 24,2 22,7 20.4 j
¡Panama 33.9 32.3 25.0 21.6 19.1 18.5 20.9 35.0 29.2 27.5 32,7 28.0 17.8 19.2 20.0 | 14.8 |
{Paraguay 17.8 ; 24.1 1 6 ,5 13.3 9.2 9.7 6.5 24.4 33.3 26.5 28.6 23.I 33.3 35.1 44.0 1 35.6 i
¡Peru 17.7 j 14.2 15.2 10.8 3.0 2.0 5.6 7.8 42.5 49.9 42,2 47.2 36.1 36.1 35.3 33.9 !
¡Dominican Republio 31.2 i 28.7 29.0 25.4 7.4 5.6 6.5 15.0 36.7 36.0 4o*o 36.4 24.5 26.5 24.4 j 22.2 i
Uruguay 9.5 ‘ 7.0 10.4 8.4 15.1 14.5 23.5 33.0 46.5 47.6 49.8 45.4 28.1 25.4 15.7 12,6 :
Venezuela 25.2 j- 21.4 21.5 16.1 0.8 1.2 0.8 0.4 4o.o 41,2 40.5 51.3 ia.7 34.9 ■ 36.4 32.0 i









SATIN AMERICA: IMPORTS OF CAPITAL OOODS AND THEIR RELATION TO THE PRODUCT AND INVESTMENT
Country
Imported ca p ita l goods In  
re la tio n  to the gross domestlo 
product (percentage)
Imported ca p ita l goods In  
re la tio n  to  to ta l Investment 
(percentage)
1950 1965 1973 1950 1965 1973
Argentina 3 .» 1.9 1.4 23*9 10.6 6.8
B o liv ia 3*2 8.7 6.1§/ 39*1 52.9 4o.8a/
B k s il "  5 .« 0.9 2.8 23*8 4.4 11.4
Colombia 6.3 4.7 3*7 28.9 23.8 21.8
Costa Rlaa 4 ,i 7*4 7«8§/ 31*2 34.1 32.7a/
Cuba m '*• - v “ m
Chile 4,2 . > 8 5*5 28.1 24.0 43.6
Ecuador 3*3 4.1 7*0 34.8 i 37*4 S9.7
E l Salvador 4.1 6.5 3*92/ 39*4 39*3 25. 19/
Cuatenala 3.9 •4.8 3.4«/ 32.6 ! 36.4 24. 39/
H a iti *» **. ** «* -  -• -
Honduras 4.4 6.2 6 .^ / 33*6 41.3 37.5a/
Mexico
. . • * 4.8 3 .« 2*6fef 27.8 15.1 12. 6^
Nicaragua 5.4 8.3 4.3b/ 56.6 43.5 39.9b/
Panama 3*6 5*6 7.1b/ 23*3 32.0 25.5«/
Paraguay m - m 1 •*
Peru 4.9 5*3 3.7S/ 32*7 33*7 26. 8b/
Dominican Republic - -  " »  ! - - •»
Uruguay *» «• «* - ••
Venezuela 12.2 6.4 6.9S/ 36.4 24.7 23. 0b/





and the same trend was observable in Mexico (from nearly 28 per cent 
to 15 per cent).* It dropped to a lesser extent in Venezuela and 
Chile between those years. In the rest of the countries, imported 
capital goods represented over 50 per cent of total, investment in the 
whole period, a proportion which was even increasing in several small 
countries. Since the mid-1960s when investment expanded rapidly, the 
coefficient has declined in most countries except Brazil and Chile, 
where it has risen significantly. In 1975 the three major countries 
of the region had coefficients of less than 15 per cent, while of the 
12 remaining countries for which data are available, half of them had 
coefficients of 50 per cent and over. Other factors also influenced 
this process. Those countries which faced a more severe and prolonged 
restriction of external resources were forced to give preference to 
investment involving lesser requirements in terms of imported capital 
goods* and also in the short term to sacrifice some of their imports 
of these goods in order to ensure the supply of those on which the 
maintenance of the level of domestic economic activity depended 
to a critical extent, such as raw materials and intermediate goods 
for industry. In the few countries like Brazil where the severe 
restrictions on their import capacity were followed by a substantial 
improvement in their external purchasing power and the rapid growth 
of external investment, it was possible' to increase the absorption 
of capital goods at an even faster rate than the rapid growth of 
investment,, as has actually occurred in recent years.
Generally speaking, raw.materials and capital goods have accounted 
for the highest percentage of imports. The relation between the 
share of these1 two items reflects the balance of the different 
branches of industry. .For example, Argentina, which is more advanced 
in the engineering industries than in those, producing basic industrial 
inputs, records proportions of over 55,per cent of its imports for 
this last item. For the average countries, intermediate goods 
represent the most important group in their imports.(see table 1 5)•
The supply of energy resources is another of the domestic 
variables influencing the composition of the value of imports. In
/the last
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the last 15 years this item has represented the largest share in 
Brazil, Panama and Uruguay, where it has been consistently above 
15 per cent of total imports. The sharp increases in the price of 
fuels since 1973 significantly altered the proportions, which are 
calculated on the basis of current values. In those countries which 
are not self-sufficient in petroleum the proportion of their external 
expenditure on these products increased significantly. In 1974,
10 countries spent over 15 per cent of the value of their imports 
on fuels. The extreme cases were Panama, Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil, 
which spent 35» 33» 25 and 24 per cent, respectively, of the value 
of their imports on this item.
The composition of Latin America's exports has also changed, 
in line with the development of its production structure and external 
relations. The general trend has been a greater diversification of 
the products exported, although this has not succeeded in essentially 
changing the heavy concentration on a few primary products. In 1955» 
exports of agricultural products, non-ferrous minerals, fuels and 
related products represented 97 per cent of the total exported (in 
terms of dollars at 1970 prices), while in 1973 they represented a 
little over 82 per cent.
As will be seen in table 17» the relative decrease was a 
general one covering the various items, except fertilizers and crude 
minerals, being somewhat more pronounced in the case of agricultural 
raw materials. On the other hand, exports of chemicals and iron and 
steel products, which together accounted for only 1.3 per cent of the 
total exported in 1955» increased their share to nearly 5 per cent 
in 1973« A more significant change was observable in the proportion 
of machinery, transport•equipment and other manufactured products, 
which rose from nearly 2 per cent in 1955 to nearly 13 per cent in 
1973» The changes in the structure of Latin American exports have 
been more significant since 1963, in particular the expansion of 




LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES: EVOLUTION OP EXPORTS BY GROUPS OP GOODS 
(HlIIions of dollars at 1970 prices)
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Groins of goods In  acoordanoe 














ce rrî  
age
Pood (Of 1+22+4) 4 434 46.1 6 015 43.3 7 318 38.9
Primary goods of agricultural origin ( 2- 22- 27- 23) 826 8.6 1 117 8.0 & o 3.4
Subtotal 1*2. Sb2L 1121 51.4 7 ?58 4 2 i l
Crude fe r t il iz e rs  and crude minerals, 
m etalliferous ores and metal scrap 
(# + 28) 542 5.6 1 O33 7 .4 1 839 9.8
Mineral fu e ls , lubricants and. related 
materials ( 3) 2 727 28.3 3 934 28.3 4 419 23.5
Non-ferrous metals ( 68) 786 8.2 1 053 7 .6 1 287 6.8
Subtotal 4 056 42.2 6 020 4&Ü. 2JÜ2 4 o .l
Gienicals (5 ) 81 0.8 192 1.4 659 3.5
Iron and stee l {&/) 43 0.4 1 # 0.9 # 0 1.4
Subtotal l j4 hi 2£ hi 929 i b l
Ilaohinery and transport equipment (7 ) 21 0 .2 81 0.6 801 4 .3
Misoellanoous manufactured artio les ( 6f8- 67- 68) 162 1.7 330 2.4 1 579 8.4
Subtotal m hi 411 Isl 2 J6 0 12.7
Total ? 622 100,0 13 082 1 2 M 18 811 ^00.0
Source: CEPAL,
II. CONTRADICTION IN RECENT SOCIAL CHANGES AND THE 
PROBLEM OF UNIFIED DEVELOPMENT
The following pages examine certain contradictions and negative 
aspects of the processes of growth and social transformation that 
are summarized in the preceding chapter. The relevant longer-term 
trends include.
1. The long-term trends
The population has grown and experienced spatial redistribution 
and concentration with unprecedented rapidity. Half of a population 
that has more than doubled since 1950 is now urban and urban 
predominance is bound to increase steadily. -v .
While the rural population and the rural economy have become 
modernized and internally differentiated in many respects, the welfare 
gap between city and countryside has not narrowed. The majority of 
the rural population continues to experience extreme poverty, 
powerlessness, and discrimination in public social allocations. The 
breakdown of traditional land tenure systems and the forms taken 
by agricultural modernization have increased the relative importance 
of the landless underemployed rural proletariat.
In the urban areas, heterogeneous "middle" strata, mainly engaged 
in non-manual salaried occupation's, have grown raufch more rapidly than 
either the groups of manual workers in industry and basic services 
or the groups classified as "marginal", "sub-proletarian", etc. This 
differential growth of urban middle strata has sustained and been 
sustained by exceptionally rapid expansion of secondary and higher 
education, and by the expansion of public and private white-collar 
employment absorbing the products of this education. It has been 
accompanied by the entrenchment of "modern" consumption patterns in 
broad groups of the urban population. This market has shaped and been 
shaped by the lines taken by industrial development and by the 
penetration of mass communication media.
/The greater
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The greater part of the urban population in most countries has 
shared to some extent in national per capita income gains, although 
these gains have been very unevenly distributed, the upper and upper- 
middle strata receiving the lion's share. The greater part of the 
rural population has gained little or nothing. The imitative 
modernization and diversification of consumption patterns, however, 
have meant an increasing strain on incomes, with apparent neglect 
of basic needs, the rising indebtedness, and perceptions of relative 
poverty and insecurity accompnaying improvements in monetary incomes.
Increasing shares of public sector resources and of national 
incomes have been allocated to social services, particularly education; 
there have been more irregular and intermittent increases in allocations 
supporting the consumption levels of certain population groups, 
particularly through public housing and subsidized distribution of 
foods. These allocations have for the most part been biased in favour 
of the urban middle strata and have commonly reinforced rather than 
counteracted the prevailing inequalities in income distribution. They 
have generated strong interest groups - the functionaries of the 
services as well as the clienteles - pressing for further expansion 
along the same lines.
Shifts in the distribution of power in the societies have not 
been accompanied in most countries by any significant enhancement of 
popular participation in decision-making. The relative importance of 
landowning classes has declined, and there has been a trend toward 
the sharing of power between technobureaucracies and major industrial 
and financial interests, with increasing participation by transnational 
enterprises. The former have been increasingly emboldened to seek 
control by their own rising technical capacity, and also by the recurrent 
difficulties of "normal" political processes of interest-group 
representation and bargaining in managing the social conflicts 
generated by rapid change and increasing inequality, and in applying 
coherent criteria for allocation of resources.
/2. The
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S i n c e  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h é  1 9 ? 0 s  t h e  n a t i o n a l  s o c i e t i e s  h a v e  
e x p e r i e n c e d  a  s e r i e s  o f  s t i m u l i  a n d  s h o c k s ^  m a i n l y  o r i g i n a t i n g  
o u t s i d e  t h e  r e g i o n  t h a t  h a v e  a c c e n t u a t e d  t h e  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  i n  t h e  
p r e v a i l i n g  s t y l e  o f  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  h e i g h t e n e d  s o c i a l  t e n s i o n  a n d  
i n s e c u r i t y ,  a n d  a l s o  s t r e n g t h e n e d  t h e  t r e n d  t o w a r d  t e c h n o b u r e a u c r a t i c  
t a c t i c s  a i m e d  a t  s u p p r e s s i o n  o f  t h e  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  a n d  s h o r i n g  u p  o f
t h e  v i a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  s t y l e .  T h e  s t i m u l i  a n d  s h o c k s  h a v e
m uch i n  common w i t h  t h o s e  e x p e r i e n c e d  i n  t h e  h i g h - i n c o m e  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  
c o u n t r i e s  d u r i n g  t h e  s a m e  y e a r s ,  a s  m i g h t  b e  e x p e c t e d  f r o m  t h e  s t a g e s
o f  m o d e r n i z a t i o n ,  u r b a n i z a t i o n ,  a n d  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  a c h i e v e d  b y  t h e
L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  s o c i e t i e s .  N a t u r a l l y  t h e y  h a v e  a f f e c t e d  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
c o u n t r i e s  i n  d i f f e r i n g  c o m b i n a t i o n s  a n d  w i t h  s o m e w h a t  d i f f e r e n t  t i m i n g ,  
d e p e n d i n g  o n  f a c t o r s  r a n g i n g  f r o m  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  m a i n  e x p o r t  
p r o d u c t s  t o  t h e  l e v e l  o f  p o l i t i c a l  m o b i l i z a t i o n  p r e v i o u s l y  r e a c h e d ,  
a n d  t h e s e  c o m b i n a t i o n s  h a v e  g e n e r a t e d  w i d e l y  d i f f e r i n g  r e a c t i o n s  
f r o m  t h e  s o c i e t i e s  a n d  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t s .  C u b a ,  w i t h  i t s  r a d i c a l l y  
d i f f e r e n t  s t y l e  o f  d e v e l o p m é r i t  r e q u i r e s  a  s e p a r a t e  d i s c u s s i o n .
C u b a  h a s  e x p e r i e n c e d  e x t e r n a l  s t i m u l i  a n d  s h o c k s  s i m i l a r  t o  
t h o s e  o f  o t h e r  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  s i n c e  1 9 7 0 ,  o w i n g  t o  i t s  
c o n t i n u i n g  d e p e n d e n c e  o n  s u g a r  e x p o r t s  a n d  t h e  e x t r e m e  i n s t a b i l i t y  
o f  w o r l d  s u g a r  p r i c e s .  W i t h i n  t h e  C u b a n  s t y l e  o f  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  h o w e v e r ,  
t h e  r e s u l t i n g  r i s e  a n d  f a l l  i n  i m p o r t  c a p a c i t y ,  w h i l e  r e q u i r i n g ,  
r e n e w e d  a u s t e r i t y  i n  c o n s u m p t i o n ,  d o  n o t  s e e m  t o  h a v e  a f f e c t e d  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  t h e  m a j o r  s o c i a l  f e a t u r e s  a n d  t r e n d s .  T h e  e v o l u t i o n  a n d  
a l s o  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  t h i s  s t y l e  o f  d e v e l o p m e n t  h a v e  i n f l u e n c e d  
many a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  i d e o l o g i c a l  d e b a t e  o v e r  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  d e v e l o p m e n t .  
T h e  h i g h l y  s i m p l i f i e d  v i s i o n  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  i m p a c t  o f  r e c e n t  s t i m u l i  
a n d  s h o c k s  t h a t  i s  a t t e m p t e d  b e l o w ,  h o w e v e r ,  a p p l i e s  o n l y  t o  t h e  
c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  m a r k e t  e c o n o m i e s ,  h o w e v e r  m u ch  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  m a r k e t  
may h a v e  b e e n  m o d i f i e d  b y  p l a n n i n g  a n d  g r o w t h  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  s e c t o r .
T h e  h i g h  r a t e s  o f  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  a n d  e x c e p t i o n a l l y  f a v o u r a b l e  
e x p o r t  p r i c e s  i n  t h e  e a r l y  1 9 7 0 s ,  s t r e n g t h e n e d  c o n f i d e n c e  i n  t h e  
v i a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  s t y l e  o f  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  f u r t h e r  s t i m u l a t e d
2. The period since 1970
/the consumer
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the consumer society and the domestic industries supplying it, and 
permitted the state to relieve.social tensions by expanding social 
services, by assistential programmes, and above all by absorbing in 
public employment an important part of the rising output of secondary 
and higher education. This brief euphoria has been followed, mainly 
since 19?k, by new deteriorations in terms of trade, intensifying 
debt servicing problems etc,, reducing resources available to the 
governments and forcing austerity policies negating the social 
aspirations stimulated in the immediate past. Inflation has become 
important in practically all countries and has reached unprecedented 
levels in the minority of countries in which the different social 
strata had learned to live with chronic inflation (those of the 
"Southern Cone"). Open unemployment has risen, the barriers to 
absorbtion of women and youth seeking to enter the labour force 
have become more formidable, and it is probable that the-ability of 
the poorer urban and rural strata to maintain minimum levels of 
consumption is deteriorating, although this conclusion depends on 
very fragmentary information and observations. At the same time, 
a deterioration in the real incomes, levels of consumption, and 
employment prospects of major parts of.the middle strata that have 
become wedded to the "consumerist" style of development is evident;.and 
although some groups continue to gain, consumer purchasing power 
and consumer goods industries have suffered, A particularly striking 
change in several countries is the sudden halt to the phenomenally 
rapid expansion of enrolment in higher education, and the accompanying 
governmental campaings to freeze or reduce the bureaucratic employment 
that previously absorbed an important proportioin of -the output of, 
higher education. The political problems posed by the plight of-- , 
the relatively organized and articulate middle- strata are, at least, 
in the short term, probably more disquieting to governments than 
the plight of '.the relatively unorganized and voiceless poor.- The 
phenomena noted here may be only temporary and similar shocks have 
occurred in the past. It is striking, however, that the substantial 
economic growth and the rising levels of consumption and social.services
/achieved by
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achieved by a large part of the Latin American population have not 
mitigated their psychological impact; consumption aspirations have 
continually advanced ahead of the capacity of the economies to 
satisfy them and even temporary stagnation provokes strong social 
tensions that threaten the stability of the style of development.
The beginning of the 1970s saw a great deal, of innovation in 
governmental social policies, with the coming to power of new 
combinations of social forces or, in a larger number of cases, the 
emergence of a technobrureaucratic elite determined to achieve 
a style of development incorporating a larger measure of social 
justice and popular participation. These innovations co-existed 
contradictorily with the complacency induced by the favourable 
economic conjuncture, and were accorded wide acceptance in principle. 
The objectives have not been achieved owing.partly to insufficient 
capacity to cope with the demands and resistances arising within the 
societies, partly, to contradictions in objectives and inefficiency 
in execution of policies, partly to external factors and more recently 
to the impact of international economic crises and inflation on the 
resources needed to carry out major redistributive programmes in the 
absence of a high degree of social consensus and discipline. Some 
national authorities justify the reversion to policies of fiscal 
austerity and renunciation of controls over market forces as a 
temporary concession to harsh realities. Others are convinced that 
this is the only sound strategy for development over the long term.
In either case, in societies in which different classes have achieved 
a significant degree of mobilization and expectations of continued 
improvement in their lot, the risks are obvious: serious social 
conflicts arise with their sequel of repressive measures, and the 
organized groups best able to resist austerity policies are favoured.
While the stimuli and shocks affect the urban population most 
visibly they are also exacerbating the tensions previously present 
in the rural population. Favourable markets for agricultural exports 
have helped to speed up the capitalist modermization of agriculture 
and the marginalization of small cultivators and workers dependent
/on the
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o n  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  h a c i e n d a  s y s t e m .  . S l u m p s  i n  e x p o r t  m a r k e t s  h a v e  
t h e n  r e d u c e d  t h e  d e m a n d  f o r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  w a g e  l a b o u r ,  a n d  a l s o  
s t r a i n e d  t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  t o  i m p o r t  b a s i c  f o o d s .  T h e  
a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  c i t i e s  t o  a b s o r b  m i g r a n t s  i n t o  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  t h e .  
s o - c a l l e d  " i n f o r m a l  s e c t o r "  i s ,  a t  l e a s t  t e m p o r a r i l y ,  s h r i n k i n g ,  
a n d  s o  a r e  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  t e m p o r a r y  l a b o u r  m i g r a t i o n  t o  r i c h e r  
c o u n t r i e s  -  a  c h a n g e  o f  c o n s i d e r a b l e  i m p o r t a n c e  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
M e x i c o  v i s - ' a - v i s  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  A g r a r i a n  r e f o r m s  t h a t  h a v e  
b e n e f i t e d  s i z a b l e  m i n o r i t i e s  o f  t h e  r u r a l  p o p u l a t i o n  i n  a  f e w  
c o u n t r i e s  s e e m  t o  h a v e  r e a c h e d  a  d e a d  e n d ;  f o r  t h e  m o s t  p a r t  t h e y  
now l a c k  n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  b a c k i n g ,  s i n c e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  m o d e r n i z a t i o n  
s e e m s  t o  h a v e  t a k e n  a n  i r r e v e r s i b l y  d i f f e r e n t  c o u r s e ,  a n d  t h e y  h a v è  
f o u n d  n o  a n s w e r  t o  t h e  p l i g h t  o f  t h e  p o o r e s t  r u r a l  s t r a t a ,  i n e v i t a b l y  
e x c l u d e d  f r o m  a n y  t e n u r e  r e f o r m  a i m e d  a t  e c o n o m i c a l l y  v i a b l e  s m a l l  
h o l d i n g s  o r  c o - o p e r a t i v e s .  I n  t h e i r  c o m b i n a t i o n ,  t h e s e  f a c t o r s  ;
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i m p l y  a n  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  o f  r u r a l  p o v e r t y  a n d  a  n a r r o w i n g  o f  t h e  v, 
a l t e r n a t i v e s  p r e v i o u s l y  o p e n  t o  t h e  r u r a l  m a s s e s  -  w h i c h  w e r e  m e a g r e  
a t  b e s t .  R i s i n g  l e v e l s  o f  r u r a l  s o c i a l  c o n f l i c t , p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  ‘ 
t h e  f o r m  o f  l a n d  s e i z u r e s ,  a r e  e v i d e n t  i n  p a r t s  o f  c e r t a i n  c o u n t r i f e s ,  
b u t  i n  g e n e r a l  t h e  d e c l i n i n g  r e l a t i v e  w e i g h t  O f  t h e  r u r a l  p o p u l a t i o n  
a n d  t h e  v i g o r o u s  g r o w t h  i n  s o m e  l i n e s  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i o n  
m e a n s  t h a t  r u r a l  i m p o v e r i s h m e n t  r a r e l y  r e c e i v e s  e f f e c t i v e  p r i o r i t y  
i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  o f  government's a n d  i n  u r b a n  p u b l i c  o p i n i o n *  !
T h e  p a s t  c y c l e s  o f  r a p i d  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  a n d  c r i s e s  f o r c i n g  
i n t e r n a l  e c o n o m i c  i n n o v a t i o n s ,  a c c o m p a n i e d  b y  r a t h e r  u n b a l a n c e d  a n d  
p r e c a r i o u s  e x p a n s i o n  a n d  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  g r o u p s  a b l e  
t o  m a k e  t h e m s e l v e s  h e a r d  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s ,  h a v e  b e e n  a d v e r s e  
t o  e f f e c t i v e  p l a n n i n g ,  i n  s p i t e  o f  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n  o f  p l a n n i n g  
m e c h a n i s m s  i n  m o s t  c o u n t r i e s  s i n c e  t h e  1 9 5 0 s ,  o r  t o  t h e - a c h i e v e m e n t  
o f  e g a l i t a r i a n  s o c i a l  p o l i c i e s .  I n  p r o s p e r o u s  y e a r s  t h e  a r g u m e n t  
t h a t  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  b y  i t s e l f  w o u l d  e v e n t u a l l y  e l i m i n a t e  p o v e r t y  
a n d  u n e m p l o y m e n t  s e e m e d  p l a u s i b l e .  I n  y e a r s  o f  c r i s i s  t h e  a r g u m e n t  
p r e v a i l e d  t h a t  t h i s  w a s  n o  t i m e  f o r  c o s t l y  a n d  p r o b a b l y  d i s r u p t i v e  
r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  r e f o r m s .  A p i e c e m e a l  a g g l o m e r a t i o n  o f  s o c i a l  m e a s u r e s
/responding to
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r e s p o n d i n g  t o  group  p r e s s u r e s  a n d  t h e  m o d e l s  o f f e r e d  b y  t h e .  h i g f a r  
i n c o m e  c o u n t r i e s  t o o k  p l a c e ,  a n d  s o m e  o f  t h e m  h a d  a  m a j o r  i m p a c t  
o n  t h e  s o c i e t i e s  a n d  t h e  e c o n o m i e s ,  b u t  t h e y  d i d  n o t  r e s p o n d  t o  a n y  
o v e r a l l  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  t h e i r  p l a c e  i n  a  d e v e l o p m e n t  s t r a t e g y , .  . A r g u m e n t s  
t h a t  t h i  fags' s h o u l d  b e  d o n e  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  t h a t  t h e  s o c i a l  s e r v i c e s  
s h o u l d  b e  p l a n n e d  so a s  t o . :  c o n t r i b u t e  ' s i m u l t a n e o u s l y ,  t o - p r o d u c t i v i t y  
a n d  s o c i f a l  e i q u a l i t y  w e r e  n o t  l a c k i n g ,  b u t  w e r e  u n a b l e  t o  c h a n g e  t h e  
o v e r a l l  t r e n d .  • .
3» The problems of unified development
t Ihe achievements and shortcomings of economic development during 
the 1960s, as they entered into the consciousness of political leaders, 
social scientists and planners, seemed to demonstrate the urgency 
and also the possibility of acting differently and more coherently.
The national societies had achieved a much greater material capacity 
and also technical-administrative capacity to do so. While formal 
planning had not been.particularly effective, the relative importance 
of the public sector in national life had grown considerably, and 
the technobureaucracies managing it had gained experience and 
confidence. It had also become more obvious that the existing processes 
of economic growth and social change would not lead spontaneously 
to a- wider diffusion of the fruits of development or to greater 
national autonomy. Thus the theme of ’’unified development” or 
"unifipd approaches to development”, which had in fact been present 
in n?any variants and under different names in the discussions of 
planning since the 1950s, came to the fore. To its proponents this 
meant, a development strategy achieving a high rate of economic growth 
and at the. same time changing the structure of growth, the allocation 
of public resources, the ,content and distribution of social services, 
the patterns, of consumption, and the patterns of human relationships 
so as/to correspond to the human welfare and human rights objectives 
set, forth in numerous international declarations.
/The experiences
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The experiences 6f the early 1970s in Latin America demonstrate, 
unfortunately, that the acceptance of general formulations on 
"unified development" did not amount to a real commitment to 
application in the face of the stimuli and shocks that have been 
described above«. The formulations themselves have justifiably been 
criticized as "utopias by aggregation of objectives", masking the 
lack of agreement by their sponsors on any unified theory of social 
change. The capacity for real integration of objectives has also 
been strained by the series of international campaigns of recent 
years - on population, the human environment, habitat, employment, 
equality of the sexes, etc. - all legitimate in themselves, but 
pointing to different approaches and priorities that have been "unified" 
only by juxtaposition. The limited adaptability of the material And 
technical resources generated by tile prevailing style of development 
in Latin America, and above all of the' expectations of the greater 
part of the population, to the requirements of radically different 
"unified" styles has become clearer. So has the extent to which 
the decision-making capacity of the national authorities that have 
struggled toward "unified development" is restricted by the character 
of their political base, the compartmentalization of the administrative 
apparatus, the entrenchment of the transnational enterprises, the 
identification of the mass communication media with the consumer 
society, and other factors of internal as well as external origin.
The present reactions to crisis demonstrate once again the ambivalence 
of attitudes toward the prevailing style of development. On the one 
hand, there is wide recognition of its precariousness and inability 
to conceive of its projection into the future on an ever larger scale 
without transformation. On the other, there is a continuing inability 
to formulate convincing strategies for transformation and plausible 
agents of transformation. The stage of dependent semi-development 
and societal differentiation reached by the larger countries of 
Latin America seems to rule out strategies that might be open to 
poorer, more homogeneous and more predominantly rural societies, as 
well as strategies that might bef open to societies that are fully
/industrialized or
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industrialized or even "post-industrial", with more ample per capita 
resources that can be redistributed with relative efficiency and 
public consensus through the State. "Unified development", if it, 
is to achieve operational meaning in the Latin American context,, 
must meet the realities of internally heterogenous and eonflictive 
societies undergoing change processes that at present either escape 
the control of any coherent social force or are being subjected to 
centralized controls with relatively narrow objectives.
h. Some questions for the future
In other terms, the obstacles to application of unified 
development strategies that were emphasized in the Chaguaramas 
:Appraisal (.Sections I.A. and B) have become still more pronounced 
during the past two years. The governments face an accumulation of 
problems with deep roots in the national economic and social structures, 
problems that can be overcome only through coherent long-term policies 
with firm political backing, but they also face continaully changing 
pressures and crises that absorb most of their attention. The year 
1975 .saw the main impact of the recession in the central economies, 
and in spite of an upturn for the region as a whole, 1976 has been 
a year of shocks and emergency remedies for a good many of the countries 
of Latin America.
-What is done or. not done in the next few years will have 
incalculable consequences for the long-term future, and the effort to 
design policies for this future cannot be set aside, however difficult.
A comparison of the course of events over the past-quarter-century 
reveals the pitfalls in the way of rational attempts to plan the 
future in the-face of the real dynamizing forces in the international 
-and national, political and economic orders; hopefully such an exercise 
should help toward avoidance .of some pitfalls of the future. It 
would bp presumptuous for a report such as the present to offer 
additional general prescriptions for unified development; the national 
authorities are already suffering from a surfeit of prescriptions 
unrelated to their differing £eal priorities and capacities for action.
/It may
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It may be worthwhile, however, to point to certain common features in 
the policy challenges they now confront:, ,
(a) Both long-term human welfare objectives and short-term . , 
crises of financing, distribution and unwanted byproducts call for 
a rethinking of the overall impact of social programmes that have 
already established a claim to considerable public resources, acquired 
elaborate administrative structures, and attracted influencial 
clienteles. Reforms are now being undertaken, particularly in the 
case of education, social security and housing,, in most of these 
programmes, in different ways and with different priorities in 
individual countries, but invariably under the impact of financing 
crises and the impossibility of satisfying within the prevailing style 
of development the expectations that the programmes have aroused.
Under these conditions the redistributive aims of the social programmes, 
rarely realised in practice although continually cited as justifications 
are likely to be even more poorly served t h a n  before. That is, in
the name of efficiency, the social programmes can become more openly 
subordinated to the presumed human resource requirements of the present 
style of development and the capacity to pay for services of the 
different strata in the society. If the national authorities adhere 
to the criteria for unified development set forth in the Quito and 
Chaguaramas Appraisals quite different approaches to reform are palled 
for. How can they make use of the present orises, with their exposure 
Of the insufficient realism of past expectations and their inexorable 
demands for more efficient use of scarce public resources, to, enhance 
the political practicability and public understanding.of social 
programmes aimed at redressing of the disadvantages of the masses, 
strengthening of national autonomy and creativity, and qualifying 
human resources for the desired future style of development?
(b) The combination of population increase-, urban concentration, 
deterioration of the environment, waste of natural resources, and 
high prices Of Certain imported inputs, particularly oil, call for 
far-reaching changes in consumption, patterns and in the degree of - 
public control over certain resources. Even relatively conservative
/sectors of
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sectors of opinion, particularly in the international financing 
agencies, now insist, for example, on the necessity of curbing private 
automobile use in favour of public transport, of urban design reducing 
the need for transport,' and of strict controls over urban land use 
and prices. Some countries are raising the price of gasoline and 
taking other control measures to restrict automobile use. Such 
changes clash not only with the expectations of the more articulate 
sectors of urban public opinion, but also with two of the most 
important sources of dynamism of the prevailing style of development: 
autmobile manufacture and urban commercial and upper-income residential 
construction. The plight of the cities and balance of payments 
difficulties, along with other factors, will eventually make vigorous 
action unavoidable, but how can action be achieved with a reasonable 
degree of public consensus in the face of the lines of development of 
the transnational enterprises, the commitment of the mass communication 
media to the consumer society, and the contribution to employment 
of the enterprises that would be affected?
(c) The combined problems of critical poverty, maldistribution 
of income, underemployment, low productivity of much of the labour , 
force, and inability of the masses of the population to participate 
meaningfully in national political processes, although even more 
important in terms of human welfare values than thè challenges just 
described, but it is even harder to foresee what will be done and what 
should be done. Short-term responses to crises, taking the form of 
inflation, contraction of employment and declining real wages, have an 
inevitable impact on the lower-income groups and those with least 
political power. At the satùe time, governments will not be able to 
disregard the deteriorating situation of the rural masses, now 
manifesting itself in renewed conflict over land tenure, the rapid 
rise within the present economic conjuncture of open unemployment in 
the cities, and the limited opportunities for youth to enter the labour 
force. However, the probable combination of remedial measures.can be 
gravely deficient and dangerous for the future: limited doles of food, 
public works employment at subsistence wages, and promotion of aided
/self-help in
self-help in the so-called "informal" sector of the urban economy. 
Such measures in their combination might arrive without deliberate 
intention at a conversion of the spontaneous segregation of the poor 
into systematic segregation, with' different levels of services, 
diffèrent standards for housing, and an' expectation that a judicious 
amount of aid and control would enable thé poor to meet their own 
néeds until such"time as thé "modern" economy can incorporate them 
on ité own terms’. How can such a future be guarded against in the . 
unavoidable adoption under crisis conditions of stopgap measures, 
to cope with critical poverty?
/III. TECHNOLOGICAL
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III. TECHNOLOGICAL ASPECTS IN LATIN AMERICA'S
DEVELOPMENT
1. Introduction
Development theory has not succeeded in incorporating,(the 
subject of technological change in a satisfactory manner. Fop many 
years this was considered a variable which lay outside the economic 
system, a technical datum on which the economist had little or 
nothing to say. Only recently has one begun to admit the possibility 
that the rate, nature, and orientation of the technological change 
produced in a given society are closely interrelated with the social 
and political processes, and with the general operation of the 
economy in question. In other words, only recently has one begun 
to accept the need for an endogenous theory of technological 
innovation covering the studies involved in the overall analysis of 
the long-term process.
The systematic study of this subject, however, has at least
enabled, the conclusion to be reached that:
"... technological change is a complex process which is 
influenced by a number of factors of various kinds, economic, 
educational, scientific, social, cultural, and political. In 
all these fields technological progress demands the satisfaction 
of all the various conditions, necessary, none of which is on 
its own sufficient to achieve significant advances.
"There is no doubt that the style and development strategy
chosen exercises a decisive influence on the type of
technological change to be promoted, since in each case the 
role and participation of the State, foreign investment, 
public or private enterprise will differ and so too will 
incentives and control policies, and the relative priority 
assigned to the various sectors of economic activity and to 
social development. As a result, the policy for technological 
change must be fully and expressly embodied in the national
/development policy
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development policy and the corresponding planning system, in 
other words, it must be part of the chosen development style."1/ 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, there is no doubt that there 
are also "objectives and priorities which generally apply. The 
correction of educational shortcomings, the development of appropriate 
scientific capacity and the promotion of creativity with the ensuing 
establishment of a sector of "technological supply" with the capacity 
to evaluate, assimilate and innovate, are no doubt the prerequisites 
of any effort at sustained and integrated development".2/ ?
A development model or style which gives pride of place to 
the maximization of the rate of economic growth, the rapid progress 
of the manufacturing industry and the export of manufactured goods, 
with its accompanying emphasis on progress in the sector which has 
come to be known as the "modern" one in the economy, calls for a 
process of technological change which gives; priority to the usq of 
complex technology, and which - at least in the short and medium 
terras - will, for the most part, come from abroad. If, in addition, 
the economy develops within a capitalist system with a mixed economy 
in which private enterprise predominates, it is likely that 
priority will be given to foreign investment, licensing contracts 
and other similar mechanisms which constitute the most generalized 
forms taken by the technological advance necessary for the successs 
of the chosen model.
If, on the other hand, the development style aims at focussing 
attention on the solution of the problems of abject poverty, of 
unemployment and underemployment, the distribution of wealth and 
income, greater emphasis will be placed on the creation of indigenous 
technology and the adaptation of foreign technology to conditions 
which call for the greater use of labour per unit of capital and 
physical production. In such a case, technological policy will also
1/ Scientific and technological; progress for Latin America's
r%, development. (ST/CEPAL/Conf.53/L. 3), 197̂ , p. 179.
2/ Ibid.
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aim at achieving the effective absorption and diffusion at local 
level of the technological know-how necessary for raising the level 
of productivity in traditional small scale economic activity and in 
agriculture, in particular.
Finally, a development style which takes a path other than 
that•followed in this field by the industrial countries, and which 
does hot approve of attempts to follow in the very footstepts of 
those countries in their development process, will give greater 
importance to the objective of achieving greater,autonomy in their 
decisions on development in general and technological change in 
particular*
» In sum, the diversity of situations and stages of development 
is so grëat1 that it is impossible to work with a single analytical 
frame- of reference. It is for this reason that the main headings. . 
of this chapter refer mainly to the three largest countries of Latin 
America, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico which show important ,
Similarities in this respect. Without prejudice to the foregoing, 
some remarks are also made which apply to the less industrialized 
countries of the region or those with a more modest resource endowment.
2. Technological change in the more industria]ized 
Latin American ,country es
It is undeniable that as regards modernization and technological 
change the three countries mentioned above are clearly far ahead of 
the other countries of thé region. It is true that several others 
(Venezuela, Colombia, etc.) are emulating the development experience 
of the former, but whatever quantitative indicator is used would : 
show that the'gap between them is substantial and that closing it 
is not just a matter of a few years. Moreover, it must be admitted 
that' the size of the interregional technological gap is p’roducihg 
nëw situatiOris in the'Latin American economic arid political seene, 
the analysis of which is becoming increasingly urgent.
One; can see ."that Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico (and, to a \ - 
lesser extent Colombia as well), are exercising, although the process
/is only
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is only beginning, increasing influence on the remainder of Latin 
America, through both their gradual establishment as intra-regional 
suppliers of manufactures, and the growing frequency with which they 
emerge as sources of a growing intra-zonal flow of direct investment 
and the transfer of technology originating in the region, or of 
imported technologies which have undergone a process of 
"acclimatization" to the local conditions in which they are used.
As regards both these roles, what appears to be in the full process 
of gestation is a new pattern of intra- and extra-regional relations 
which require detailed examination. There is no doubt that the 
technological process is an important aspect of this new emerging 
scene. • '
Even at the risk of introducing a Certain degree of 
arbitrariness in the analysis, it seems desirable, as a means of 
comparison to distinguish between at least two different stages of 
evolution as regards the process of industrialization and technological 
change in developing countries as a whole. On one hand there are a 
certain number of countries which in recent literature go under the 
name of "recently industrialized", "late starters", etc.3/ in which 
the whole of the post-war period has witnessed a process of 
technological change of far-reaching importance. In Latin America, 
although differences may be found between the countries,¿/ Argentina, 
Brazil, and Mexico may be taken as cases in point.
3/ In his study established in 1968', A. Hirschman began to use
the concept of countries at a stage of late late industrialization 
to differentiate between the situations of Argentina and Brazil 
and those of Germany, Japan and the USSR. See: The Political 
Economy of Import Substitution Industrialization. Quaterly 
Journal of Economics. February 1968.
k/ Although it seems to be a fact that other countries of the
Latin American area - for example, Colombia or Venezuela - are 
close on the footsteps of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, and will 
in the future have to face similar situations and problems, the 
differences as regards the level and degree of diffusion of 
technological progress achieved are evident. First, the 
opening and expansion of "spearhead" industrial branches has 
tended to be of more recent date, as a result they have (Concl.)
/Furthermore, we
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Furthermore, we find in the majority of underdeveloped 
countries - some in Latin America and the large majority among the 
countries of the Third World - that "modernization" and technological 
change are the exception rather than the rule. They are at a very 
early stage of development, several decades behind that of the 
industrialized world and even that of the developed areas of the 
countries of "late industrialization" (at least as regards the 
aspects of development in question).
The review of the experience of the three countries mentioned 
above 5/ is important for various reasons. First of all, because in 
those cases the process of modernization and technological change has 
been linked with long-term structural changes which have a great deal 
in common. Such changes stem from processes such as the increase in 
economic concentration, the participation of foreign capital in the 
various branches of production, the gradual assimilation of 
technological patterns and the demand inherent in societies at a 
relatively higher stage development. Secondly, because these 
countries are exercising a growing influence on the remainder of
bj (Concl.) had less time to begin to generate the technological 
externalities which are of such importance in Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico. Secondly, the "critical mass" of these 
"spearhead" industries is not sufficiently important so far 
(see the scale and non-integrated forms of operation of the 
motor-vehicle sector or that of chemicals and petro-chemical 
products). Lastly, since the externalities of the "spearhead" 
industries depend largely on the extent to which there is 
a sound professional and technical infrastructure, the 
trickle of qualified human resources into the domestic market 
is a further constraint to similar technological development 
in the short-term in the medium-sized countries of the region.
5/ It is obvious that there are also fundamental differences 
between the three largest countries of the region. In 
particular Argentina, does not have a reserve population, 
whereas there is an abundant labour force in Mexico and 
Brazil. This is seen, for example, in the relative strength 
of the trade-union sector, an important factor that should be 
borne in mind in a more detailed examination of the differences 
between the three largest countries.
/Latin America
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Latin America, both as intra-regional suppliers of manufactures, 
and direct capital investment, or licensers of technologies adapted 
in them.
As distinct from trends in mature societies - between which it 
is valid to speak of technological interdependence - most of the 
process of modernization and technological change in the countries of 
late industrialization has been one of imitation, in other words the 
adoption of advances made several years before in the more advanced 
communities. Often this has meant the transfer of product design and/or 
prbduction processes from abroad, the entry into and/or expansion 
of multinational corporations in thè economic and social context of 
the recipient country, and also the participation of engineering 
firms, finance brokers, etc. of the developed world. Since this 
has tended to occur practically throughout the entire spectrum of 
economic activity, and has stemmed from concerted operations in 
highly imperfect markets - the markets for technical services, 
licences, rights for the use of patents, etc. - such international 
transfers have shaped a pattern of technological and, therefore, 
economic dependence, which is significantly different from the 
situation of interdependence which can be observed among advanced 
countries.
However, it iè becoming increasingly clear that this massive 
inflow of foreign technology has set in motion in several of the 
countries of "late industrialization" a series of structural processes 
which so far have only been studied partially. Among them, the 
transfer of foreign technology has been associated with: (l) the 
appearance of an emerging - but rapidly growing - domestic technological 
capacity which is taking shape through both the adaptation of foreign 
technology to local conditions of application, and through the 
generation of some domestic technological designs. (2) An increasing 
capacity for the export of manufactures requiring relatively 
sophisticated technology. (3) The emergence of a tendency towards 
the export of local capital and technology to other regions of the 
developing world.
/These structural
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These structural.features - at present embryonic, but in our 
opinion in the full process of growth - exist side by side with 
features such as a rapid increase in the participation of foreign 
capital in manufacturing production,.and in the economy in general; 
the increasing concentration of,the main productive sectors, a certain 
tendency towards the deterioration of the patterns of income 
distribution and, consequently, of the relative wellbeing of those 
sectors of the population which have not participated in technological 
progress, etc. In sum, the process, of technological modernization 
in countries such as Argentina, Brazil or Mexico, has been associated 
with a complex economic and social evolution, and it is, undoubtedly, 
necessary to study their interrelation in depth.
The process of industrialization outlined in the previous 
paragraphs determined the predominant forms of the resulting 
technological change, at least insofar as the industrial sector is 
concerned. .
In brief, the following could.be considered the most salient 
features in the process of progress and technological change related 
to that evolution.
The industrial structure started from scratch on the basis of 
foreign technology, whether this was obtained as part of foreign 
capital investment, embodied in a turnkey project sold by specialist 
firms, or expressly in the form of manufacturing licences, technical 
assistance contracts or other means which imply transfers of 
technology from the industrial nations.
The acquisition of technology by any of the means mentioned 
above tended to be available on unfavourable terms owing to the 
imperfections of international market of technology (firm-specific 
knowledge in each case) and the limited bargaining power of the State 
and/or local firms buying it. Thus, the cost was excessively high 
and in addition they had to accept restrictive clauses such as the 
prohibition,of exports, grant-back provisions covering "adapted" 
technological know-how generated by the recipient enterprise, trade
/and technological
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and technological tied-purchase provisions covering the supply of 
parts, inputs, models, etc. The fixing of differential royalties 
between enterprises for what is essentially the same technological 
"package", etc.
In addition, there have been cases in which technological 
know-how was not really supplied to the purchaser, thereby placing 
him in a position of dependence subject to the will, of the supplier 
and at times even second-hand technology, already considered 
obsolete in the country of origin, was supplied - and what is ; ,r 
particularly serious - without in such cases the real transfer of 
know-how to the recipient country, thereby impeding the absorption 
and diffusion at national level of the new technology.
The situation described above resulted in a major increase 
in the royalties that these countries had to pay for the import of 
technology (which reflect only a fraction of the payments abroad 
which were generated in this manner, since others are not quantifiable) 
and these have increased at a cumulative rate of 20 per cent in 
recent years.6/
The counterpart to the costs of the imitative and adaptative 
technological change described above is the growing capacity to 
export final and semi-processed industrial products produced in 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. During the initial phases these 
exports were limited almost exclusively to neighbouring markets
6/ Around the end of the 1960s Mexico was spending approximately 
200 million dollars on imported technology, a figure which 
had practically doubled compared with that of 1968* See in 
this connexion CONACYT: Politica nacional de ciencia y tecno- 
logia, estrategia, lineamientos y metas.Mexico, 1976, p. 9« 
Brazil, for its part, also doubled its external payments for 
technological royalties, which increased from 42.5 to 
90.8 million dollars per year between 1965 and 1969. In this 
connexion see: N. Fedelino de Figueiredo: The Transfer of 
Technology in the Industrial Development of Brazil. CEPAL, 




and, in general, to the LAFTA area, but later their relatively
rapid rate of growth extended their market to the industrial countries.
In spite of the restrictions, costs, and disadvantages of 
the terms under which the transfer of technology took place in the 
countries in question, the industrial progress achieved by them 
has in fact been accompanied by an increase - slow but clearly 
noticeable - in the capacity of absorption, adaptation and, to a 
lesser extent, of technological creation. Thus, for example, the 
manufactures exported by Argentina are not mere copies of the 
original designs conceived in the countries of the developed world, 
an observation which:is: also valid for the manufacturing processes 
used in the manufacture of these products. The rapid growth in 
industrial productivity and its relation to the increase in the 
export of manufactures bus been assisted, to some extent, by the 
domestic technological effort. The valididty of this statement 
is naturally relative, as can-be seen from the fact that l6 of 
the 20 largest exporting firms of Argentina in recent years are 
subsidiaries of transnational corporations. A similar situation 
can be observed in the cases of Colombia, Brazil,2/ and Mexico.8/
2/ Carlos Diaz .Alejandro: "Some Characteristics of Recent
--Export Expansion in Latin America". Economic Growth Center, 
Paper 183, Yale 1973.
8/ R. Jenkins: Internalization of Capital, Multinational
'Corporations and Industrial Exports in Latin America. Mimeo, 
Mexico* 1976. CEPAL: La exportación de manufacturas en 




I n  b r i e f ,  i n d u s t r i a l  " m a t u r i t y "  a l t h o u g h  b a s i c a l l y  i m i t a t i v e  
a n d  d e p e n d e n t  h a s  l e d  t o  s o m e  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n  i n d i g e n o u s  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
c a p a c i t y ,  w h i c h  i s  c e r t a i n l y  m uc h h i g h e r  t h a n  t h a t  o b s e r v e d  i n  t h e  
r e m a i n i n g  c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  r e g i o n .  O f  c o u r s e ,  t h e r e  a r e  o t h e r  
f a c t o r s  v r h i c h  may h a v e  b e e n  t o  s o m e  e x t e n t  d e t e r m i n a n t s  i n  t h e  
a c h i e v e m e n t  o f  s u c h  p r o g r e s s ,  s U c h  a s  t h e  i m p r o v e m e n t  i n  t h e  * 
s c i e n t i f i c  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ,  t h è  Supply o f  p r o f e s s i o n a l s  a n d  t h e i r  r  
c o n t a c t s  w i t h  e x p e r t s  o f  t h e  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s ,  r e s o u r c e  
e n d o w m e n t ,  e t c .  A l l  o f  w h i c h  d o  n o t  i n v a l i d a t e  t h e  p r e v i o u s  
s t a t e m e n t .
I n  c o n n e x i o n  w i t h  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  e x p o r t  c a p a c i t y  a n d  
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  m a t u r i t y  m e n t i o n e d  a b o v e ,  m e n t i o n  m u s t  b e  made  o f  
t h e  " i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n "  o f  s o m e  A r g e n t i n e ,  B r a z i l i a n  a n d  M e x i c a n  
c o r p o r a t i o n s  b o t h  w i t h i n  a n d  o u t s i d e  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a .
T h e  s t u d y  o f  t h i s  p r o c e s s  i s  o n l y  o f  v e r y  r e c e n t  d a t e .  I t  
i s  s t i l l  a t  a n  i n c i p i e n t  s t a g e ,  a n d  i t s  s u b s e q u e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t  
w i l l  h a v e  a  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  i m p a c t  i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  t e c h n o l o g y  a n d  
f o r e i g n  t r a d e .
F r o m  t h e  p o i n t  o f  v i e w  o f  i t s  i m p a c t  o n  t h e  d o m e s t i c  
e c o n o m i c  s t r u c t u r e ,  i t  h a s  b e e n  o b s e r v e d  t h a t  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  
i n d u s t r i a l  m a t u r i t y  i n  A r g e n t i n a ,  B r a z i l  a n d  M e x i c o  h a s  b e e n  
a c c o m p a n i e d  b y  i n c r e a s i n g  e c o n o m i c  c o n c e n t r a t i o n ,  w i t h  t h e  
r e l a t i v e l y  h i g h  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
i n  t h e  m o r e  d y n a m i c  s e c t o r s  o f  e c o n o m i c  a c t i v i t y .
/3. Technological
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F r o m  t h e  f o r e g o i n g  r e m a r k s  i t  c a n  b e  s e e n  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  
n e e d  f o r  a n  i n - d e p t h  s t u d y  a n d  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  a  s e r i e s  o f  
c o h e r e n t  p o l i c i e s ,  a t  l e a s t  a s  r e g a r d s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  
a r e a s :  t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  t e c h n o l o g y  f r o m  a b r o a d ,  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  
i n d i g e n o u s  c a p a c i t y  f o r  t h e  a d a p t a t i o n  a n d  c r e a t i o n  o f  t e c h n o l o g y ,  
a n d  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  e c o n o m i c  s e c t o r s  a n d  l o w  
p r o d u c t i v i t y .
O f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e s e  t o p i c s  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  
t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  s t y l e  a d o p t e d  s o  f a r ,  b y  e a c h  o n e  o f  t h e  t h r e e  
c o u n t r i e s  u n d e r  s t u d y  i s  n o t  t h e  s a m e  a s  a n  a t t e m p t  t o  s t u d y  t h e  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  w h i c h  a  c o m p l e t e  b r e a k  w i t h  t h e  p a t t e r n  a n d  t r e n d s  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  i t  i m p l y .  T h i s  w o u l d  m a k e  i t  i m p e r a t i v e  t o  s t u d y  
f a r - r e a c h i n g  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  e c o n o m y  a n d  s o c i e t y  
i n  g e n e r a l ,  w h i c h  f o r  o b v i o u s  r e a s o n s  l i e s  o u t s i d e  o f  t h e  s c o p e  a n d  
p u r p o s e  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  d o c u m e n t .
T h e r e f o r e ,  a n  a t t e m p t  w i l l  b e  m a d e  t o  o u t l i n e  a  f e w  p r o p o s a l s  
r e g a r d i n g  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  r a i s e d ,  o n  t h e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h a t  t h e y  
r e f e r  t o  c o m p l e m e n t a r y  o r  c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  w i t h i n  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  
d e v e l o p m e n t  s t y l e .  -
T h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  t e c h n o l o g y
I t  i s  a  r e c o g n i z e d  f a c t  t h a t  t e c h n o l o g i c a l ‘ c h a n g e  i s  t a k i n g  
p l a c e  i n  t h e  t h i r d  w o r l d  a t  a  r e l e n t l e s s  p a c e ,  t h r o u g h - t h è  - 
i n c o r p o r a t i o n  o f  t e c h n o l o g y  i m p o r t e d  f r o m  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  n a t i o n s . " 
T h i s  t r e n d  i s  e v e n  m o r e  m a r k e d  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  
m o r e  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s  s u c h  a s  A r g e n t i n a ,  B r a z i l  a n d  M e x i c o .
T h e r e  i s  n o  d o u b t  t h a t  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  t h e  s c o p e  o f  t h e  e f f o r t s  
m a d e  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  c r e a t i v i t y  o f  t h e  r e g i o n  i t s e l f ,  t h e  t r a n s f e r  
o f  t e c h n o l o g y  f r o m  a b r o a d  w i l l  c o n t i n u e  i n  t h e  d e c a d e s  a h e a d  t o  b e  
t h e  m a i n  c h a n n e l  o f  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  c h a n g e  n o t  o n l y  i n  t h e  t h r e e  
c o u n t r i e s  U n d e r  s t u d y  h e r e ,  b u t  a l s o  i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  a s  a  w h o l e .  
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  a s  p o i n t e d  o u t  i n  p r e v i o u s  p a r a g r a p h s  t h e  i m p o r t a t i o n  
o f  t e c h n o l o g y  c a n  b e  a  p o w e r f u l  l e v e r  o f  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  b u t  i t s
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indiscriminate use can, also, lead to seridus economic and social 
imbalances and an increasing degree of dependence. For this reason 
it is therefore necessary to formulate, within the framework of 
national plans and priorities, a policy for the transfer of technology 
which is, apart from other considerations, fully compatible with 
the other objectives of an integrated process of scientific 
development and technological change.9/
The important thing to stress here is the fact that the 
concept of technological transfer must be understood to refer not 
only to its importation and use by a national producer, but also 
to its due absorption by the recipient country, defined as a 
process of assimilation and internal diffusion. In other words, 
one should try as far as possible to generate a real transfer and 
avoid the formation of enclaves of advanced technology, where 
such technology is used by a specific enterprise without it having 
any impact on the remainder of the economy, because it is not 
sufficiently understood or known.10/
Furthermore, it is imperative to bear in mind technological 
aspects when defining a policy relating to foreign investment.
At times the fundamental justification of specific investment lies 
precisely in the transfer of technology, since this is the only 
way of having access to specific ’’captive" technological know-how.
In any event, except in cases of purely financial operations, the 
technological aspect is almost always present where foreign capital 
is established.
The foregoing remarks clearly show that the search for the 
means of permitting the recipient country to acquire the technology 
it wishes to import in one way or another, on the best terms 
possible, must be given priority. In this connexion, there are 
three aspects of major importance in negotiating the transfer of
9/ CEPAL, Progreso científico-técnico para el desarrollo de 




t e c h n o l o g y ,  n a m e l y ,  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  o f  i t s  c o s t *  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  
a b s o r p t i o n  o f  i m p o r t e d  t e c h n o l o g y  a n d  t h e  e x c l u s i o n  o f  l i c e n s i n g  
c o n t r a c t s  a n d  o t h e r  s i m i l a r  r e s t r i c t i v e  c o n d i t i o n s  w h i c h  a r e  
c o n t r a r y  t o  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t «
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  b a r g a i n i n g  p p w e r  o f  t h e  l o c a l  u s e r  d e p e n d s  
o n  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  h i s  k n o w l e d g e  o f  t h e  w o r l d  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  m a r k e t ,  
o f  t h e  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a n d  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  l e v e l  o f  t h e  e n t e r p r i s e ,  
t h e  s o u n d n e s s  o t  i t s  f i n a n c i a l  s i t u a t i o n  a n d  o f  t h e  m a r k e t ,  t h e  
s u p p o r t  h e  ma y r e c e i v e *  a n d  t h e  g e n e r a l  s t a t e  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
o r  s u b r e g i o n a l  e c o n o m y ,  a s  t h e  c a s e  may b e ,  a l l  o f  w h i c h  a r e  t o  
b e  c o n s i d e r e d  b o t h  i n  a b s o l u t e  t e r m s  a n d  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  s i z e  
a n d  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r  o f  t h e  s u p p l i e r .
T h e s e  r e m a r k s  l e a d  t o  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n ,  b e l o w ,  o f  s o m e  , 
p r o p o s a l s  d e s i g n e d  t o  i m p r o v e  n a t i o n a l  b a r g a i n i n g  p o w e r  a n d  t o  
e n s u r e  a  g r e a t e r  d e g r e e  o f  s u c c e s s  i n  a c h i e v i n g  t h e  t h r e e  o b j e c t i v e s  
o u t l i n e d  a b o v e .  . s
( i )  T h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o r  i m p r o v e m e n t  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  m e d i a ,  ' 
w i t h  t h e  s u p p o r t  o r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f . t h e  S t a t e  i f  n e c e s s a r y ,  t h r o u g h  
w h i c h  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  b u y e r  o f  t e c h n o l o g y  w o u l d  b e  
i n f o r m e d  o f  e x i s t i n g  a l t e r n a t i v e s  i n  t h e  w o r l d  m a r k e t  a n d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
f i n d  i t  e a s i e r  t o  s h c p  f o r  a n d  s e l e c t  t h e  m o s t  a p p r o p r i a t e  t e c h n o l o g y .
( i i )  T h e  p r o m o t i o n  o f  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  n a t i o n a l  o r  s u b r e g i o n a l  
g r o u p s  o f  c o n s u l t a n t s  w i t h  e x p e r t  k n o w l e d g e  o n  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
p r o b l e m s  b y  b r a n c h e s  o r  s e c t o r  a c t i v i t i e s  t o  a s s i s t  a n d  a d v i s e  
b o t h  i n  s h o p p i n g  f o r  a n d  s e l e c t i n g  f o r e i g n  t e c h n o l o g y  a n d  i n  t h e  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  i n v o l v e d ,  a n d  i n  a c t i o n  b y  t h e  S t a t e  t o  e n s u r e  t h e  
p r o p e r  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  s u c h  t e c h n o l o g y .
( i i i )  T h e  e n c o u r a g e m e n t  o f  m o r e  f o r m a l  t i e s  w i t h  s m a l l  a n d  
m e d i u m - s i z e d  e n t e r p r i s e s  i n  t h e  l a r g e r  i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s  a n d ,  i n  
p a r t i c u l a r ,  w i t h  f i r m s  i n  t h e  s m a l l e r  i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s .  I t  i s  
r e a s o n a b l e  t o  a s s u m e  t h a t  t h i s  w o u l d  o p e n  f a v o u r a b l e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
i n  v i e w  o f  t h e  s m a l l  s c a l e s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  t h e  r e d u c e d  i n e q u a l i t y  
i n  r e l a t i v e  b a r g a i n i n g  p o w e r .
(iv) The
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( i v )  T h e  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  o f  S t a t e  a c t i o n  a s  a  p o w e r  f a c t o r  f o r  
o b t a i n i n g  t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  t e c h n o l o g y  o n  b e t t e r  t e r m s  t h r o u g h  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  m a c h i n e r y :
-  P r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  p u r c h a s e r ¡ u n d e r  l i c e n s i n g  c o n t r a c t s
/■, a n d  o t h e r  f o r m s  o f  a g r e e m e n t i n  r e s p e c t  o f  w h i c h  i t  m a y ,  
f o r  e x a m p l e ,  e s t a b l i s h  r e g u l a t i o n s  w h i c h  p r o h i b i t  c e r t a i n  
c o n t r a c t u a l  c l a u s e s  c o n t r a r y  t o  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t .
- T e c h n i c a l  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  u s e r  i n  t h e  s e a r c h  
f o r ,  a n d  s e l e c t i o n  o f  t e c h n o l o g y  ar i d  i n  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
i n v o l v e d  i n  i t s  t r a n s f e r .
-  D i r e c t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  i n  q u e s t i o n  w h e n  
p r o j e c t s  o f  m a j o r  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  a r e  i n v o l v e d ,  a n d
-  o b v i o u s l y  -  w h e n  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  i n v o l v e s  a  p u b l i c  o r  ¡ m i x e d  
e n t  e r p r i s e . i l /  : n :  >
( b ) D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  c a p a c i t y  f o r  a d a p t a t i o n  arid c r e a t i o n
o f  t e c h n o i o g y  • ~
I t  i s  w i d e l y  a g r e e d  t h a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  p o w e r  o f  d e c i s i o n  m u s t  
b e  i n c r e a s e d  a s  r e g a r d s  t e c h n o l o g y ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e r e  m u s t  b e  a  g r a d u a l  
r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o r  i m p o r t e d  c o m p o n e n t  o f  new t e c h n o l o g y  
i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  t h e  p r o d u c t i v e  p r o c e s s .  T h e s e  a s p e c t s  c o v e r  a  w i d e  
v a r i e t y  o f  q u e s t i o n s  a n d  m e n t i o n  i s  m a d e  b e l o w  o f  s o m e  a c t i o n s  i n  
t h i s  c o n n e x i o n  w h i c h  c l e a r l y  s e e m  t o  c a l l  f o r  p r i o r i t y .
( i )  T h e  p r o m o t i o n  a n d ; s t r e n g t h e n i n g  o f  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  r e s e a r c h  
i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  c o n s u l t a n t  f i r m s ,  e n g i n e e r i n g  e n t e r p r i s e s  a n d  o t h e r  
s i m i l a r  b o d i e s  t h r o u g h  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  i n c e n t i v e s  a n d / o r  t a x  a n d  
c r e d i t  f r a n c h i s e s ,  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  n a t i o n a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  f u n d s  
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  e f f o r t s  d i r e c t e d  t o w a r d s  t h e  a d a p t a t i o n  a n d  c r e a t i o n  
o f  t e c h n o l o g y ,  a n d  t h e  u s e  o f  s u c h  s p e c i a l i z e d  e n t i t i e s  i n  p r o g r a m m e s  
s p o n s o r e d  b y  t h e  S t a t e  ( p r o v i d e d  t h e y  c o v e r  s p e c i f i c  p r o b l e m s  a n d  
c a s e s  d i r e c t l y  l i n k e d  w i t h  p r o d u c t i o n ) .  S i m i l a r l y  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
a g e n c i e s  f o r  d e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  c r e d i t  s h o u l d  p r o m o t e  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t
11/ ' CEPAL, op.cit. , p. 125.
/of funds
- 82 -
o f  f u n d s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s  w h i c h  e n c o u r a g e  a n d  m a k e  t h e  u s e  o f  l o c a l  
t a l e n t  i n  t h e  d e s i g n  a n d  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  i n v e s t m e n t  p r o j e c t s  
c o m p u l s o r y .
( i i )  T h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  m e d i a  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  
m a c h i n e r y  f o r  m o b i l i z i n g  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  i m m e n s e  s c i e n t i f i c  
a n d  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  t a l e n t  e x i s t i n g  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  n a t i o n s  t o w a r d s  
r e s e a r c h  e f f o r t s  d e s i g n e d  t o  c r e a t e  t e c h n o l o g i e s  m o r e  s u i t e d  t o  
n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  t h e  p r o d u c t i v e  f a c t o r  m i x ,  a n d  o t h e r  c o n d i t i o n s  
p e c u l i a r  t o  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .
( i i i )  T h e  p r o m o t i o n  o f  t h e  u n b u n d l i n g  o f  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  
" t e c h n o l o g i c a l  p a c k a g e "  s o  a s  t o  e l i m i n a t e  f r o m  t r a n s f e r  o p e r a t i o n s  
f r o m  a b r o a d  t h o s e  e l e m e n t s  w h i c h  c o u l d  b e  p r o v i d e d  o r  p r o d u c e d  
l o c a l l y  ( e n g i n e e r i n g  s e r v i c e s ,  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r e  o f  p a r t s  o r  
c o m p o n e n t s ,  e t c . ) ,  a  p r o c e s s  w h i c h  w i l l  s i g n i f y  a  g r a d u a l  i n c r e a s e  
i n  n a t i o n a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .
( i v )  T h e  p r o m o t i o n ,  i n  v i e w  o f  t h e  h i g h  c o s t  a n d  f r e q u e n t l y  
i n a p p r o p r i a t e  n a t u r e  o f  t e c h n o l o g y  f r o m  t h e  a d v a n c e d  c o u n t r i e s ,  
o f  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  f l o w  o f  i n t r a - r e g i o n a l  t e c h n o l o g y ,  t h e r e b y  
t a k i n g  a d v a n t a g e  o f  t h e  p r o g r e s s  a l r e a d y  a c h i e v e d  b y  n a t i o n s  s u c h  a s  
A r g e n t i n a ,  B r a z i l  a n d  M e x i c o .
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  w h i l e  a d m i t t i n g  t h a t  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  t h e  
i n c o r p o r a t i o n  o f  t e c h n o l o g y  a n d  t h e  a d a p t a t i o n  a n d  d o m e s t i c  c r e a t i o n  
o f  k n o w - h o w  a r e  o f  n o  m e a n  i m p o r t a n c e  i n  t h e  e c o n o m i c  a n d  s o c i a l  
e v o l u t i o n  o f  o u r  c o u n t r i e s ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a n  a p p r e c i a b l e  
r e s e r v o i r  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  o n  t h i s  m a t t e r ,  t h e  p r o p e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
o f  i t s  t e n d e n c i e s  a n d  m o d a l i t i e s  i s  s t i l l  l a c k i n g .  T h i s  i s  t h e  
p o s i t i o n  a t  a  t i m e  w h e n  t h e r e  a r e  u n m i s t a k a b l e  s i g n s  o f  f a r - r e a c h i n g  
c h a n g e s  o c c u r r i n g  i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  e c o n o m i e s .  T h i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
r a i s e s  t h e  b a s i c  q u e s t i o n ,  I s  t h e  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  p r o c e s s  i n  t e r m s  
o f  i t s  s i z e  a n d  m a i n  t e n d e n c i e s  a  h e l p m a t e  i n  t h e  f o r e s e e a b l e  
d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  o u r  e c o n o m y ?  D o e s  i t  i n t r o d u c e  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  w h i c h  
c o u l d  h o l d  up t h i s  d e v e l o p m e n t  o r  e m b a r k  i t  o n  p a t h s  o f  f r u s t r a t i o n ?  
T h e  a i m  o f  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s  i s  t o  s t r e s s  t h e  n e e d  t o  c o n t i n u e  a n d  
s t r e n g t h e n  c e r t a i n  t y p e s  o f  b a s i c  s t u d i e s  t h r o u g h  w h i c h  a  p r o f i l e
/of the
o f  t h e  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  p r o c e s s  c a n  b e  t r a c e d  w i t h  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  
p r e c i s i o n  f o r  i t  t o  b e  o r i e n t e d  a n d  r e g u l a t e d  o n  m o r e  e m p i r i c a l  
b a s e s  t h a n  t h o s e  w h i c h  s t e m  f r o m  a b s t r a c t  a n d  v e r y  o f t e n  i n o p e r a b l e  
c o n c e p t i o n s .  T h e  p r o p o s a l  a s  r e g a r d s  t h e  s t u d i e s  m u s t  n o t  b e  
c o n s i d e r e d  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  e f f e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  b u t  o n e  w h i c h  
c o n s t i t u t e s  p a r a l l e l  a c t i o n  a n d  a  p o s s i b l e  m e a n s  o r  e n r i c h i n g  ' 
t h e  p r a x i s .
( c )  T h e  p r o b l e m  o f  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  e c o n o m i c  s e c t o r s  a n d
l o w  p r o d u c t i v i t y
w 1 1 M l -Hill*» . I» ' 1
T h e  p r e c e d i n g  p a r a g r a p h s  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  r e f e r  m a i n l y  t o
t h e  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a s p e c t s  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n  t h e  l a r g e r  
a n d  r e l a t i v e l y  m o r e  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a ,  a n d  
i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t o  A r g e n t i n a ,  B r a z i l  a n d  M e x i c o .
H o w e v e r ,  s o m e  o f  t h e  r e m a r k s  m a d e , p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h o s e  w h i c h  
r e f e r  t o  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  a n d  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  c a p a c i t y  
f o r  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  arid a d a p t a t i o n  o f  t e c h n o l o g y ,  a r e  a l s o  a p p l i c a b l e  
t o  a  l a r g e  e x t e n t  t o  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  c o u n t r i e s  o f  
t h e  r e g i o n .  One s h o u l d ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  m a k e  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  t h a t  i n  t h e  
c a s e  o f  t h e  s m a l l e s t  n a t i o n s ,  a n d / o r  r e l a t i v e l y  l e s s  d e v e l o p e d  o n e s ,  
i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  i m a g i n e  s u b s t a n t i v e  p r o g r e s s  i n  t h i s  f i e l d  i f  i t
i s  n o t  f o u n d e d  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  s y s t e m s  o f  c o - o p e r a t i o n  w h i c h  p e r m i t
t h e  j o i n t  u s e  o f  t h e  s c a r c e  h u m a n  a n d  m a t e r i a l  r e s o u r c e s  a v a i l a b l e .
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  i n  m o s t  o f  t h e  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  n a t i o n s  t h e  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r  c o n t i n u e s  t o  a b s o r b  a  h i g h  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  
l a b o u r  f o r c e ,  a n d  i t  i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i n d i s p e n s a b l e  t o  g i v e  
p r i o r i t y  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  c r e a t i o n  a n d  a d a p t a t i o n  o f  t e c h n o l o g y  
f o r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p u r p o s e s  w i t h  e m p h a s i s  o n  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  
a p p r o p r i a t e  t e c h n o l o g i e s  f o r  m a i n t a i n i n g  g i v e n  l e v e l s  o f  e m p l o y m e n t .  
A n o t h e r  t a s k  o f  m a j o r  i m p o r t a n c e  i s  t h a t  o f  t h e  d i f f u s i o n  o f  
t e c h n o l o g i e s  w h i c h  a r e  k n o w n  a n d  a v a i l a b l e ,  b u t  w h i c h  a r e  n o t  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  u s e d .  T h i s  c a l l s  f o r  a  n u m b e r  o f  a c t i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  
t r a i n i n g ,  p i l o t  e x p e r i m e n t s ,  t e c h n i c a l  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e ,  e t c .
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In particular, traditional agriculture, which develops on 
the small family farm or in farms set up under agrarian reform, 
shares some of the features' of small industry as regards inadequate 
levels of education, lack of management skills, lack of financial 
resources and difficult access to markets. In addition, a cultural 
dichotomy, geographical dispersion of the productive units, and 
possible structural limitations of soil, climate and size, normally 
more unfavourable than those which the commercial type of agricultural 
enterprise has to face, also exist, not to mention the dramatic 
situation created by the minifundia.
In such a context where more appropriate types and methods of 
cultivation are needed, agricultural research and the diffusion 
of its results acquire special importance. What is clear is that, 
with the exception of some commercial enterprises, the initiative 
for technological change comes from the "technological supply", the 
research institute and extension services being the principal 
agents of change.
In those countries in which the rural population still 
represents an appreciable percentage of the population, the. challenge 
faced is to increase productivity while retaining the maximum number 
of the labour force in agricultural work, in view of the limitations 
to the absorption of the surpluses in industrial activities and 
other urban occupations.12/
The above-remarks refer,.indeed, solely to a particular aspect 
of the general problem affecting low productivity small-scale economic 
activities with its own inherent features.
A development strategy designed primarily to resolve the 
problems of abject poverty and of employment and to improve the 
distribution of' wealth and income will also have to give priority 
to the problems presented by the technological change the sectors 
require to increase productivity and raise standards of living.
12/ CEPAL, Ibid. , p. 134.
/Most of
Most of the literature on technological change and the debates 
which take place in the various international forums cover, expressly 
or implicitly, the medium-sized and large manufacturing industry, 
and, in the final analysis, attempt to determine the most appropriate 
development strategy for the "modern sector" of the economy.
There is no doubt that, even assuming a high and sustained 
rate of growth in this sector, a major proportion of the active 
population of Latin America will continue working in the traditional 
low-productivity sectors for a long time. In other words, the 
dynamic growth of the "spearhead" sector will not be capable, in 
the near future, of resolving, on its own, development problems of 
such priority as income distribution and employment. Of course, 
if individual cases are studied, a wide variety of situations appear, 
since in a few countries forecasts in this connexion show rather 
encouraging figures, which on the other hand, mean, that at the 
other extreme there will be situations which will in fact be much 
less favourable than the regional averages.
In sum, the modern sector is the important and decisive one.
The acceleration of its development and its adaptation to the needs 
of Latin American countries is a necessary task, but this is far 
from sufficient, particularly if it is borne in mind that the 
fundamental objectives of development are the improvement in the 
distribution of income and an increase in employment opportunities.
There is, therefore, need to analyse the other sectors of 
economic activity and determine the policies and mechanisms needed 
for raising productivity and standards of living, a process which 
also involves constant technological change, and calls for human 
and financial resources in greater amounts than normally assumed.
In agriculture, the small manufacturing industry, handicrafts, 
small mining works, and other similar activities, the problem, of 
course, is not one of access to world technology nor the negotiation 
of licensing contracts. It is mainly one of the diffusion in the 
sector in question of already known technologies often utilized 
in the country itself; determining which fields of production could,
/with suitable
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with suitable adjustments, face the competition of the products in 
the expanding modern sector;' which of them have to be re-oriented 
within the same strata in which they are established, making full 
use of technological capacity and installed plant, and, finally, 
which of them will have to go into other activities.
Further education, training in management and financial skills, 
the understanding and management of market mechanisms, special 
channels of access to credit on special terms are, in the traditional 
sector of the economy, fundamental problems which must be dealt with 
before tackling technological change. In this area, too, the 
problems of standards and quality control are of special importance. 
The fact that it is in this sector where there is the greatest 
dearth of management skills clearly indicates the public 
responsibility for laying the bases for greater progress in the 
future through programmes which tackle problems such as those 
described, channelling towards them resources in keeping with the 
size of the task and, no doubt, higher than those of any programme 
of this kind undertaken so far in Latin America.
However, one must not rely on the State for everything. The 
small industry sector which manufactures intermediate goods tends 
to establish links through sub-contracting with enterprises in the 
modern sector, for which it manufactures parts and components. In 
such a situation, the more advanced enterprise exercises pressure 
on the small firms and induces changes in organization and quality, 
and in technological processes, in addition to providing a guaranteed 
market and providing it with financial support. Incentives for this 
type of relationship are of the highest importance for it is in line 
with the current trend of the division of labour in industry, as the 
case of Japan shows. The introduction of taxes on value added, 
instead of purchases and sales taxes, which affect all transactions 




A somewhat similar situation arises in respect of maintenance 
and repair services which, to a large extent, work for the 
manufacturing industry, and tend to absorb a relatively high 
proportion of skilled labour (31-8 per cent in Ecuador).13/
In order to develop programmes of this type on the scale 
required and with the appropriate orientation, one must create 
specialized extension, training and technical assistance services 
and, bear in mind, the particular conditions of the sector in 
question in the formulation of economic and social policies and 
national development plans.14/
13/ Victor Tokmatt, Distribución de ingreso, tecnología y  
empleo, Cuadernos del ILPES, N2 23, Santiago de Chile, 
February 1975»
14/ CEP AL, .Ibid. , pp. 143-146.
/IV . ECONOMIC
1. The rate and structure of economic growth
(a) The rise and fall of the growth rate. Signs of recovery in 1976.
Within the context of the development process whose nature and 
scope were examined in the previous chapter, during the present decade 
there has been a tendency in Latin America towards greater economic 
growth and productive and technological change, and an appreciable 
growth of production capacity. At the same time the region has broadene 
and diversified its external financial and economic relations while 
becoming increasingly inserted in the international system, although 
in a very different position than in the past.
This growth was neither uniform nor continuous in the countries 
of the region. The rate of economic development varied considerably 
among the countries, and the differences increased in the relative 
position of the countries in respect of product and income levels, 
degree of industrialization and population size. In addition, the 
growth rate of production fluctuated sharply in a cyclical movement, 
with accelerated economic growth in the early years of the decade 
weakening in the last two years. This was the case in most of the 
countries, although with appreciable differences among them in terms 
of the extent and length of the fluctuations.
A comprehensive overview should distinguish three facts of 
particular significance and importance in this development of the 
Latin American economy. These are the changes introduced in economic 
policy and, particularly, in areas related to external affairs; 
international economic development; and the rise in oil prices. The 
differences in growth rates and their fluctuations may largely be 
attributed to the different policies followed in the countries, and 
more obviously to the varying situations resulting from the varied 
impact of external factors on national economies with different 
development potential and resource endowment, as is the case in the 
countries of Latin America.
- 88 -
IV. ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE PERIOD 1970-1976
/Since the
-  89 -
Since the middle of the past decade, the Latin American countries 
progressively adopted policies and measures to speed up economic growth 
in the, context of greater external trade. To this end they promoted 
the expansion and diversification of exports and external investment 
and financing, as well as the reduction of tariffs and other measures 
designed to liberalize imports to some extent.
At the same time a succession óf enormous changes werè occurring 
in the international setting because of the cycle in the industrial 
countries and the rise in petroleum prices: a boom which culminated 
in 1 9 7 3; the economic recession in the industrial countries; and the 
slow recovery which.set in during 1976» Commodity prices followed 
a similar trend, although with significant differences for some types 
of product. The rises began in 1972 and lasted until some point in 
197^; they were then followed by a steep slide until the beginning 
of 1976 when world prices began to improve to some extent. During 
the first stage (until 1 9 7 3) this movement led to a favourable change 
in the terras of trade for Latin America, despite high inflation in 
the industrial countries. Subsequently, the persistence c>f this 
inflation, together with the effect of higher oil prices, led to a 
sharp decline for the non-oil exporting countries iirhich only came tò 
an end in 1976.
To summarize, the changes in national policies and the behaviour 
of these key external variables explain at least in part the progress 
made by Latin America in finding a new place in thè world economy 
and the sharp fluctuations in its growth rate, swinging from intense 
growth to sharp decline in the non-oil exporting countries; as well 
as the high balance-of-payments deficits and the accumulated foreign 
debt. The situation and prospects of the Latin American oil-exporting 
countries are different. Their real income grew considerably and 
their development capacity was strengthened.
It is worth making a more careful study of these developments 
over the last six years and assessing the fluctuations of the growth 
rate and their links with the external variables.
/ ( i  ) The
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(i) economic boom of 1972-1973» In these two years economic
growth increased and the gross domestic product of the region as a 
whole rose at an annual rate of a little over 7 per cent. In general, 
most countries improved their economic situation and rate of growth, 
but the size and extent of this improvement varied. (See tables 
1 and 2.)
Brazil, Ecuador and. the Dominican Republic had exceptionally 
high rates varying between 10 and 12: per cent annually. Brazil of 
particular importance in the figures for the region as a whole as 
the country of greatest economic and demographic weight, thus continued 
the intense economic growth it had enjoyed for a. number of years.
The growth rate was also higher than the regional--average in 
other countries such as Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico, as well as 
Venezuela, taking into account the growth of its real income swollen, 
particularly in 1 9 7 3, by the great rise in oil prices.
On the other hand, Argentina, Honduras, Nicaragua and Haiti 
continued to have low growth rates. The situation in Chile and Uruguay 
was even worse, with a drop in the levels of the domestic product.
These developments were heavily affected by external factors, 
whose effects varied from country to country according to resource 
endowment, economic structure and composition of external trade,■as 
was pointed out above.
In many countries exports were one of the most dynamic parts 
of final demand, and their effects were accentuated by the substantial 
improvement in the terms of trade. The volume of exports of the 
region as a whole rose at an average annual rate of 8 per cent, higher 
than that of the domestic product, and the growth of exports in many 
non-oil exporting countries was even higher. Commodity exports tended 
to become diversified, and exports of non-traditional industrial 
products grew considerably, particularly in the large and some medium­
sized countries. This was-a clear demonstration of these countries' 
capacity to exploit the favourable external demand situation stimulated 
by the economic boom in the industrial countries and the rise in 
commodity prices under the effect of higher demand, financial
/T able 1











. Gross domestic 
.... investment ..
Exports 








countries 6.6 4.3 6.2 7.2- 9.0 • -  - Z J -5.7 -3.5«MMM
Argentina 2.7 3.5 3.1 6.2 7.8 -11.7 7.3 ' -5.2
Brazil 11.3 15.5 9.7 14.8 19.6 9.6 -10.8 -2.2
Colombia 5.8 8.6 6.3 6.1 7.4 3.7 -8.8 -5.3
Costa Rica 6.6 9.2-i 3.1 16.3 25.3 6.9 —8.2 >1.9
Chile 7.7 -0.1 8.3 1.1 -3.3 8.5 -21.7 -15.0
El Salvador 1.6 12.8 3.3: 14.4 22.5 7.7 -3.9 3.5
Guatemala 5.6 5.6 4.8 8.5 15.0 2.6 —9.6 -7.2
Haiti 6.5 6.5 4.1 15.4 15.5 24.2 -5.9 16.6
Honduras 3.8 -12.9 2.8 -8.2 -21.9 6.8 -0.9 5.8
Mexico 3.4 -4.8 4.2 -2.8 -3.5 4.4 -0.5 4.0
Nicaragua 5.5 2.3 5.1 2.7 3.1 5.0 -3.1 1.7
Panama 8.7, 7.4 7.4 14.8 14.0 6.3 -0.1 6.2
Paraguay 4.4 3.0 3.2 7.2 7.5 -5.0 0.4 -4.8
Peru 6.5 1.6 6.7 10.1 22.0 -7.5 —8.6 -15.5
Dominican Republic 10.6 6.1 7.1 23.0 16.0 • 16.2 -6.2 8.9
Uruguay -1.0 -8.2 -1.6 4.6 11.5 -16.5 1.0 -15.7
Petroleum-exporting
countries 3.7 5.8 5.4 4.8 6.6 -3.1 10.7 7.2
Bolivia 3.8 4.8 3.1 8.8 -0.6 10.9 -17.6 —8.6
Ecuador 5.7 7.3 0 0CM1 39.2 36.8 9.5 -10.1 -1.6
Venezuela 3.3' 5.6 7â 0 . 0 . 3.5 -5.3 15.4 9.2
Total 6.3 4.6 6.2 7.0 8.7 1.2 -2.7
«■MW MMMM ■ ■ 1
































countries 7.3 11.0 6.7 11.7 10.9 8.8 7.1 16.5
Argentina 4.1- -0.7 3.7 1.3 2.8 6.1 14.6 22.6
Brazil 10.9 22.5 9.6 19.1 17.8 16.6 10.8 29.̂
Colombia 7.4 -1.6 9*3 1.9 -6.6 7.6 9-5 17.8
Costa Rica 8.3 2.1 6.3 6.5 4.6 9.3 0.6 10.0
Chile -1.9 6.9 0.2 -7.5 -6.4 -1.6 1.1 0.6
El Salvador 4.8 13.6 7.9 4.5 0.4 6.2 5.3 12.0
Guatemala 7.1 4.7 6.4 5.2 0.2 13.0 -1.7 11 ¿0
Haiti 4.0 4.9 4.8 9.6 9.6 -4.1 0.8 -3.3
Honduras 4.4 4.8 4.3 5.9 8.6 ' 2.8 1.9 4.*
Mexico 7.4 14.8 6.1 14.2 14.4 11.5 1.6 13.3
Nicaragua 3.3 21.3 2.6 8.1 16.2 16.1 2.6 19.0
Panama 6.4 2.8 5.6 7.1 7.0 3.8 1.4 ■ ‘ 2.3
Paraguay 6.5 12.0 4.3 21.0 25.3 4.4 14.8 19.7
Peru 5.7 7.4 8.2 ■ 8.5 3.8 1 vx « 03 8.2 3.3
Dominican Republic 11.8 7.4 7.4 , 23.2 22.3 14.1 9.9 a.5
Uruguay -1.2 ' 1.7 0.2 -16.1 -10.2 0.3 18.0 18.0
Petroleum-exporting
countries 5̂ 6 6.9. 3.9 18.0, 11.1 5.1 9.1 14.7
Bolivia 5.3 6^2' 3.4 7.8 11.9 8.6 2.9 11.6
Ecuador 10.2 15.2 7.8 5.0 4.4 36.4 3.4 40.9
Venezuela 4.8 5.6 3,3 20.8 12.0 1,0 11.9 13.7
Total 7.1 10.3 M 12.4 10.9- 8.1. 7.6 16.3
Source: CEPAL estimates on the basis of national data*
/speculation and
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speculation and the contraction of supply in agricultural products 
(because of unfavourable climatic conditions in different areas of 
the world).
The rise in world commodity prices occurred first in agriculture 
(fruit and raw materials) and spread very intensely in 1973 to metals 
and other minerals particularly, petroleum.
External demand and the rise in commodity prices affected the 
Latin American countries in different ways and to a varying extent.
This depended partly on the countries’ capacity to increase rapidly 
their exports, promote new types of exports according to the evolution 
of the international market and the traditional composition of exports; 
it also depended on the effect of the higher prices to be paid for 
industrial goods and the importance of commodities and fuels in their 
imports.
V/ith regard to industrial products, it is significant that the 
index compiled by the World Bank on the basis of exports of manufactures 
by the industrial countries showed a 7 per cent rise in the prices 
of these goods in 1972, and a rise of over 15 per cent in 1 9 7 3* which 
indicates the intensity of the inflation prevailing in the industrial 
countries.
The conventional indices of the terras of trade by countries 
show the twin effect of these factors in relation to the capacity to 
import. It is very interesting to study the variations of these 
indexes during the period under consideration, because they show 
the immediate and subsequent effects of external variables on the 
investment process and the growth of product and real income during 
this period (see table 2).
It may be seen that the improvement in the terms of trade was 
widespread, although its quantitative importance varied considerably 
from country to country. Those which benefited most t̂ ere Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela, with average annual 
rates of between 10 and 18 per cent. At the other extreme, Mexico 
and the Central American countries had much smaller increases.
/This improvement
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This improvement accounted for almost half of the increase 
in the region's capacity to import, which had an average annual rate 
of 16 per cent.
Of the nineteen countries considered in table 2, fourteen had 
an annual increment in capacity to import ranging from 10 to 30 per 
cent. In Ecuador the average increase was 40 per cent annually, due 
to new petroleum exports. What is notable is that in many cases the 
improvement in the terns of trade was quantitatively the most 
important factor.
This growth of external purchasing power, further strengthened 
to some extent by greater use of external financing, permitted a flow 
of imports of goods and services which also grew more rapidly than 
the product and domestic income. For the region as a whole, the 
product-elasticity of imports reached the very high level of 1.5, 
and was still higher in Brazil, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua and 
Paraguay.
However, it is interesting to see that the purchasing power of 
exports rose more than the volume of imports, particularly in the 
faster-growing countries. This means that net external financing, 
despite the increase in current values, declined to somewhat in 
importance in comparison with exports and domestic investment.-
In very general terms, it may be said that during 1972-1973 the 
Latin American economy operated without external bottlenecks. The 
real value of exports of goods and services was the most dynamic 
factor; it not only affected domestic demand but also allowed a 
considerable-growth of imports. Domestic supply became highly flexible, 
and was able to satisfy the needs of intermediate products and capital 
goods stemming from the growth of the domestic product and investment. 
The real national saving coefficient tended to rise, although not 
very greatly since the system worked by raising the import coefficient 
of intermediate products and consumer goods, and in some countries 
the imported component of domestic investment.
/ ( i i )  1974.
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(ii) 197**. The growth of the real income of the oil exporting 
countries and the balance-of-payments deficit of the non-oil 
exporting countries. During 197** the Latin American economy 
began to change radically: the oil exporting countries benefited
from a further substantial increase in oil prices, which considerably 
increased their real income and strengthened their capacity for 
development. On the other hand, the non-oil exporting countries 
for the most part faced a weakening of external demand, a slide in 
commodity prices and inflation, in the prices of imports, accentuated 
by the higher oil prices, all of which represented a serious balance- 
of-payraents problem which would ultimately harm their economic growth 
rates.
As may.be seen in table 3, the rise in oil prices raised the 
terms of trade of the exporting countries, which thus improved the 
favourable situation they had reached in the previous year. The terms 
of trade rose by 10** per cent in Venezuela, 61 per cent in Bolivia and 
73 per cent in Ecuador. This directly increased both the external 
purchasing power of those countries, since the volume of exports 
Remained constant in Bolivia and dropped in the other two countries, 
and also the growth of real national income, by 30 per cent in 
Venezuela and 20 per cent in the other two countries. Thus the 
oil-exporting countries, particularly Venezuela, accentuated the 
growth rate and growth-oriented structure of their economies which 
their Governments had encouraged in the previous year.
As we have said, the change was very different for the non-oil 
exporting countries. (See table 3») International commodity prices 
reached a peak in the first-half of 197** and began to slide steadily 
thereafter and on into the following year. The rise in world prices 
only continued to the end of 197**, in the case of some foods. At 
the same time, inflation soared in the industrial countries and thus 
the prices of imported industrial goods rose. According to the 
index of the World Bank, the rise in the CIF prices (in dollars) 
of industrial goods exported by the developed countries was about 
20 per cent. This situation was aggravated by the rise in fuel prices, 
to a varying extent according to the importance of these imports in 
each country.
/Table 3
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Table 3


























countries 7.3 20.6- 7.1 11.5 17.0 • h i -2.2 0.1
Argentina 6.6 22.6 7.5 5.0 10.9 1.6 -3.6 -2.0
Brazil 9.6 29.2 10.8 14.1 15.7 1.4 -11.6 -10.4
Colombia 5.9 6.6 -3.5 10.1 52.6 6.6 -2.0 . 4.4
Costa Rica 4.3 11.1 6.2 15.8 8.4 3.4 -8.4 -5.3
Chile *»3 1.5 -0.7 12.1 26.4 11.7 12.9 26.1
El Salvador 6.4 13.2 4.2 14.7 24.0 12.4 -9.3 1.9
Guatemala 5.5 10.7 3.6 *5.3 19.4 9.4 -11.6 -2.6
Haiti 4.4 -9.8 2.3 7.2 7.0 0.7 -11.0 -10.4
Honduras 0.1 21.1 0.8 8.9 31.3 .. -0.3 -9.8 -10.1
Mexico 5.9 18.2 5.4 9.7 15.9 0.0 7.1 7.1
Nicaragua 9.2 21.1 12.9 37.0 35.3 -4.4 -1.9 -6.1
Panama 2.6 3.5 4.5 -3.7 -7.5 7.8 -9.7 -2.7
Paraguay 8.3 10.7 8.4 11.2 10.3 7.7 -1.9 5.7
Peru 6.6 43.3 11.4 25.8 29.0 -4.4 15.2 10.2
Dominican Republic 8.9 28.0 14.0 17.9 20.0 -4.6 .18.1 12.6
Uruguay 1.9 -3.8 0.8 1.5 -1.8 6.8 -34.1 -28.3
Petroleum-exporting
countries 5.9 26.8 18.1 -1.5 0.6 -6.2 97.9 65.7
Bolivia 5.7 29.2 10.9 18.0 18.0 . . 0.2 60.8 61.2
Ecuador 6.3 29.7 13.3 20.1 18.9 -7.1 72.5 60.4
Venezuela 5.9 26.0 19.9 -5.4 -2.6 -6.7 104.1 90.5
Total 21.6 " 8.0 10.0 15.0 0.9 • 16.4 17.4
Sourcet CEPAL estimates on the basis of national data.
/Thus in
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Thus in most of the non-petroleum-exporting Latin American 
countries there was a significant decline in the terms of trade.
Only the indexes of Chile, Mexico, Peru and the Dominican Republic 
improved.
The unfavourable evolution of relative prices was accompanied 
by a slackening in the growth rate of exports in many countries and, 
in some, a reduction in the absolute levels of exports. Thus most 
of the countries of this group experienced a significant reduction 
in their capacity of external purchasing, which increased to a limited 
extent only in Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and the 
Dominican Republic. For the non petroleum-exporting countries as 
a whole, the purchasing power of exports remained similar to that 
of 1973.
The contraction or standstill in real income derived from 
exports of goods and services was not accompanied by an adjustment in 
the rate of imports, as might have been expected. Instead these 
tended to rise at a much higher annual rate which was double that of
the previous year. This occurred in most of the countries, and for
the group as a whole the rise of imports of goods and services
amounted to 20 per cent, almost three times the increase in the
gross domestic product.
In the face of the balance of payments problem which arose 
with the slackening of external demand and the deterioration of the 
terms of trade, the countries did not at this stage adopt restrictive 
measures to contain imports or diminish domestic demand; thus the 
growth rate of investment and of the product was maintained and the 
countries covered the external deficit with an intensive use of 
external financing and utilization of monetary reserves.
The deficit on the current account of the balance of payments 
thus rose from ^ , 3 0 0 million dollars in 1973 to 1 3 , 0 0 0 million dollars 




It should be noted that the balance of payments deficits and 
flows of external financing were concentrated mainly in Brazil and 
Mexico, but also increased in other countries of the group.
. In brief, it may be said that the process continued to operate 
and was mainly stimulated by domestic investment and demand, that 
the dynamism which had been recorded since the previous year was 
maintained, and that foreign capital performed the function, of 
covering the enormous deficit of external resources originating from 
the stagnation in the real value of exports. Thus foreign borrowing 
coincided that year with an increase in the product and an even greater 
expansion in domestic investment. External financing thus acquired greater 
relative importance compared with investment and the coefficient of real 
national savings, compared to the product, tended to be maintained at the 
levels of the previous year or to diminish slightly in some cases.
(iii) 1975» External bottlenecks and the drastic decline in
the growth rate of the non-petroleum-exporting countries. In 
1975 the unfavourable trends of the external sector for the non­
petroleum-exporting countries became acute, as can be seen in table **.
The general evolution of these countries can be illustrated 
with the added figures of the group. The volume of exports tended 
to diminish and the deterioration in the terms of trade intensified.
This last factor was the main cause in the decline of over 10 per 
cent in the purchasing power of exports. In these circumstances the 
most severely affected countries adopted restrictive measures to 
control imports and contain domestic demand. The growth rate of 
fixed investment slackened considerably, to the extent that in some 
countries it reached absolute levels, and the growth rate of the 
domestic product fell drastically to only 2.2 per cent, which was 
less than the increase in population. The imports of goods and 
services diminished in absolute figures in almost all the countries 
































countries 2.2 -6.1 2.4 3.3 . t i 8 !*• -2.0 -8.6 -10.4
Argentina tl -6.5 2.8 ; -6.9 -12.5 -20.1 -14.4 -31.5
Brazil 4.0 -8.4 2.1 5.7 3.6 -3.8 3.8
Colombia 4.1 -8.9 8.3 -3.9 -19.0 8.4 -13.9 —6o7
Costa Rica 2.6 -5.9 -2.5 3.2 9.3 1.5 0.2 1.7
Chile -14.7 -22.7 -13.3 -31.0 -44.9 —0o6 -31.5 -31.9
El Salvador 3.4 -2.7 4.6 14.1 -11.2 1.0 -0.3 -0.5
Guatemala 2.2 0.3 4.6 5.3 -16.4 3.3 -5.8 -2.7
Haiti 3.6 -0.5 4.5 9.7 9.8 -13.3 4.9 -9.1
Honduras 0.0 -15.0 -0.5 9.5 -18.1 -2.2 -12.6 -14.6
Mexico 3.9 -0 .2 4.1 8.5 5.3 -10.3 0.4 -10.0
Nicaragua 1.0 -21.4 1.3 -8.2 -32.1 -1.1 -14.3 -15.2
Panama 3.3 -4.7 3.2 -14.0 -17.8 9.9 -3.4 6.2
Paraguay 8.0 -7.6 2.8 15.2 17.8 2.9 -13.1 -10.6
Peru 0.4 8.3 4.6 18.1 15.7 -8.1 -12.6 -19.6
Dominican Republic 6.2 1.2 7.5 7.0 7.1 -8.7 39.3 27.3
Uruguay 3.6 1.3 1 .2 10.6 0.0 25.0 -24.0 -5.2
Petroleum-exporting
countries 5.9 10.5 9.6 15.7 15.6 -17.5 -14.7 -29.7
Bolivia 6.8 16.7 10.8 24.0 24.0 -11.4 -16.1 -25.8
Ecuador 8.0 4.8 6.8 16.5 16.3 -2.5 -22.1 -24.0
Venezuela 5.5 11.0 10.0 15.0 15.0 -21.0 -12.0 -30.5
Total 2.5 -3.5 3.0 4.5 0.5 -4.5 -12.6 -16.6
Source: CEPAL estimates on the basis of national data.
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Nevertheless, since this reduction was less than the decline 
recorded in the real value of exports, the deficit on the trade 
balance and .the balancarof-payments deficit remained at the .high 
values of the previous year, and in current dollars rose to the 
figure of 16,**00 million,' Which was largely financed with capital 
from private banks. This dèficit was concentrated in three countries 
- Argentina, Brazil and Mexico - but also increased itt other countries 
of this group.
With regard to the petroleum-exporting countries, it should 
be noted that during the year the volume of their exports diminished 
considerably, and at the same time they experienced a sharp decline 
in the terms of trade - in comparison, of course, with the high 
levels which had been attained in 197**. The real value of exports 
diminished by around 30 per cent compared with the value of the 
previous year. Imports, however, continued to grow and this led to 
a reduction in the surplus on the trade balance and the high balance- 
of-payments surplus which had been recorded in 197**, as occurred in 
the case of Venezuela. This process was more marked in the other 
countries of this group, to the extent, that in the year under 
consideration they recorded a deficit on their balance of payments. 
These changes, as is evident, are taking place in a very broad and 
flexible context of external accounts and do not in any way affect 
the economic dynamism of these countries.
(iv) 1976. Trends of recovery of exports and of the growth 
rate of the product. In 1976 the trends towards the contraction of 
the external sector changed and in most of the non-petroleum- 
exporting countries there was a significant rise in the real value 
of exports. In many cases this was achieved by increasing the volume 
of sales abroad and at the same time improving the terms of trade; 
in others it was due to the fact that the rise in the external ratio 
of prices more than compensated for the contraction of exports, as 
can be seen in table 5«
This change in the trends corresponded to an increase in 
external demand as a result of the recovery of the growth rate in
/Table 5
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Table 5


















countries ¿=9 -4.4 10.0 4.4 . 14.9
Argentina -3.0 -21.0 43.0 -15.0 22.0
Brazil : - 8.8 , 0 . 6.0 +9.0 16.0
Colombia 6.0 9.0 -10.0 24.0 12.0
Costa Rica 5.0 3.0 -12.0 27.0 12.0
Chile 4.o, : -10.0 16.0 9.0 26.0
El Salvador 5.0 8.0 -12.0 38.0 21.0
Guatemala 8.0 9.0 3.0 5.0 S.O
Haiti 4.0 6.0 4a0. 34.0 39.0
Honduras 7.0 -1.0 16.0 20.0 39.0
Mexico 4.0 -3.0 7.0 6.0 13.0
Nicaragua 7.0 -13.0 15.0 15.0 32.0
Panama 1.0 -18.0 -26.0 3.0 -24.0
Paraguay 8.0 -11.0 10.0 —6.0 3.0
Peru 3.0 -14.0 15.0 -2.0 13.0
Dominican Republic 5.0 -5.0 -16.0 -31.0 -42.0
Uruguay 3.0 -3.0 65.0 -4.0 58.0
Petroleum-exporting
countries 8.7 Hi® 1.8 -1.3 0.5
Bolivia 6.5 13.0 10.0 -8.0 1.0
Ecuador 8.0 1.0 9.0 6.0 16.0
Venezuela 9.0 18.0 1.0 . -2.0 -1.0




LATIN AMERICA: GROWTH RATE (S’ THE ®OSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT IMPORT EXCHANGE RATSS a/
Country
Previous decade







Argentina 4.3 4.3 2.1 2.7 4.3 3.9 6,6 -1.4 -3 .0
Barbados • • ♦ »« • • • • * ♦ • ♦ • • *• *• • ••
Bolivia 5.5 6,4 : 5.5 3.8 . 5.0 5.4 5.7 6.8 6.5
Brazil 6.0 7.5 9.2 11.3 10,4 1 1 .4 9.6 4.0 8.8
Colombia 5.2 5.8 6.3 5.8 7.8 7 .1 6.3 4.6 6.0
Costa Rica 6,8. 7.0 5.8 6,6 8.8 7.8 4.3 2.6 5.0
Cuba * •• • •• • •• • • • * • * **« • •*
Chile 4 ,5 3.3 -0.4 7.7 -0.1 -3.6 4.3 -13,0 4.0
Ecuador 5.3 5.5 8.0 5.7 7.3 Ì3.1 6 .3 8.0 8.0
El Salvador 5,6 4.5 4.8 4.6 5.8 3.9 6.4 3.4 5.0
Guatemala 5.5 5.8 5.9 5.6 7.4 6.8 5 . 5 ’ 2.2 . 8,0
Guyana «»» • If • • * * • • • • • * . * * • • •f
Haiti 0.6 1.3 4.4 6.4 3.5 4.6 4.4 3.5 4.0
Honduras 4.6 4.1 • 3.3 3.8 3.9 1;• 5.1 P.l 0.0 7.0
Jamaica • •• * • « • • • « • « # ♦ * It» • * • • • * • • •
Mexico 7.0 6.9 5.3 3.4 7.3 7.6 5.5 3.9 4.0
Nicaragua 7.2 4.2 4.8 5.8 2.4 3.8 9.2 1.0 7.0
Panama 8,0 7.7 4,7 8.7 " " 6 .3 6.5 2.6 3.3 1 ,0
Paraguay 4.8 4.2 6.3 4.4 5.1 7.8 8.3 8,0 8,0
Peru 5.4 4.3 5.3 6.5 6.1 5.4 6,6 4.0 3.0
Dominican Republic 5.1 7.6 9 .0 10.6 12,4 11.3 8.9 6.2 5.0
Trinidad and Tobago » • • • t • • • • • •• • • • lei • •# • • #
Uruguay 1.5 2.3 0.8 -1.0 . -3.4 0.9 1 .8 3.6 3.0
V enezuela 5*5 4.5 5.5 3.3 3.° 6.7 5.9 5.5 9.0
Latin America . . 5*2 ii1 M h i , 2*5 1*1
Distribution of countries according to the value of indicator (number of oountries)
N egatlve 0m 1 2 1 2
0 to 2,9 2 2 2 1 1 3 4 1
3.0 to 5.9 12 11 11 10 7 7 7 9 9
6.0 and more 5 6 5 7 9 10 9 4 9
a/ At market prices.
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If this study is carried out on the basis of the statistical 
estimates of real domestic income which results from adding to the 
product the positive or negative effect of the variation in the terms 
of trade, the pattern of the economic'evolution of the region changes 
in a more favourable way. As can be seen in table 7, the growth 
rate of the region as a whole rose somewhat more than 6 per cent a 
year and eight countries recorded a rate above this average. These
were the countries already mentioned, and also Costa Rica, EX'Salvador
and Venezuela.
The evolution of the gross per capita domestic product was 
also unfavourably affected, as is natural, by the reduction in the 
growth rates of the last two years.
The 1976 levels, compared with, those of 1970, show an average 
increase of 2.9 per cent a year, while during the period 1971-197*+ *
the average annual increase fluctuated between 3»2, per cent and
*+.*+ per dent. Table 8 shows the figures for each* of the countries 
considered and the significant differences recorded among the 
countries as a result of the evolution of the domestic product and 
of the population in each of them. ,
(b) Changes in the sectoral composition of the product
In the first three years of the 1970s the tr„end towards 
industrialization that has characterized the production changes in 
the Latin American economy was intensified. In this as in other 
respects Latin America is repeating, although under different 
conditions, the overall trends recorded in the developed economies.
The share of manufacturing in the product'grew from 23 per cent 
in 1970 to 2k. 2 per cent in 1 9 7 3» and the volume of production 
increased at an average annual rate of 8.6 per cent during that 
period (see table 9)* Especially noteworthy'are the cases of Brazil, 
the DothTniea'A 'Republic "and Colombia, which reached growth rates of 
13.7, 12.2 and 9*9 per cent, respectively. The growth of agricultural 
production, in contrast, was much slower and its share of the product 












Argentina 4.3 4a 2^ 3.3 4.9 6.0 6.0 -3.5 -3.8Barbados
Bolivia 6.3 6.4 5.8 -0.2 ; .4.3. . 7.0 . 18,8 l.o 4.9Brasil 6.0 7.5 9. 2 10.5 11.1 12.2 8.6 3.7 9.5Colombia 5.2 5.7 6.5 4.5 8.6 v 9.0 :• 5.6 ■ 2 .7 8.6Costa Rloa 6.7 6.6 6.0 4.1- ,7.8 9.0 ; . 1*9- 2,9 10.5Cuba **• • • • • ** «•. • «« • •I • •* • •#
Chile 4.9 ' >4.8 -1.5 ' 4,2 ■ ■ -0.5 - -3.0 5*9 -17.8 4.3Ecuador 4.7 5.0 9.2 , 4,1 .. 5.8 15.2 21,4 o.7 9.5
El Salvador 5.2 4,o 6,0 3.5 6,4 6.1 3.6 3.4; 13.2Guatemala 5.2 5.4 5.2 3.8 5.8 7,4 . 3.3: 1.1 10.4Guyana . »*• ■ «it • * * - • « • « • • • * *Haiti o.7 1.9 4.7 5.5'' 3.5 4.8 3.3 '4.2 7.3Honduras 4.5 3.0 3.1 3.6 ■ 3.1 6.7 >2.7 ■ -3.1 11.8Jamaica *«• ' - • •• .• • •• -. «M »•»Mexico 7.0 7.0 5.5 3.4 7.3 ’ 7.9 6.6 2.2 5.5Hioaragua 6.9 3.6 4.5 4.6 4.6- 3.2 : 8.6 -3.5 10,0Panama 8.0 7.5 4.0 ; 8.7. , 6.9 4.9 -0.9 0.2 4.6Paraguay 4.7 3.8 7.1 4.5 ..5.8 11.4-— *..8,0 5.7 7.4Peru 6.0 5.2 5.5 5.0 5.1 8.8 8.7 2,0 3.4Dominican Republic 5.7 8.1 • 9»2 9.3 13.7 12,2 12,2 12.4 -3.4Trinidad and Tobago ... • « •• • • • • • • • ••
Uruguay 1.6 2.8 -0.3 -0.9 -2,5 3.9 -2,8 0,3 0.4Venezuela 3.9 , 3.6 8.6 6.9 3.1 12.4 3U7 . -5.3 7.3
Latin America' ■ . ¿a2 : 6a . r h l Zsl 8*8 2s2 0.4 ¿*8
' . • ■ Distribution of countries according to the value of indicator (number of countries)
N egative mm mm 2 , 2 2 1 3 5 2
0 to 2.4 2 1 1 - - - ■J 1 7 1
2.5 to 3,4 2 1 2 1 1 2 3 1
3.5 to. 5.9 10 10 , 7 11 9 3 3 3 4
6.0 and more 7 ’ 6 8 4 7 14 < 10 1 11
a./ At market prices.
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' ■ Table 8 '




Decade half of 
decade
1970-
1976 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Annual rates,, percentages
Argentina 2.9 2.8 0.8 1.3 2,9 2.5 5.2 -2.7 -4.2Barbados • •• • • • • • • *• * • • • • • » • • * • • • ...
Bolivia 3.1 3.9 2.9 1.4 2.3 2.7 3.1 4.3 3.7Brazil 3.0 4.5 6.0 8.1 7.3 8.3 6.6 1.1 4.9C olombla 1.8 2.3 , 2.9 2.5 4,2 3.8 3.1 1.4 2.7Costa Rica 3.3 3.8 2.9 3.7 5.8 4.8 1.5 -0.3 2,3Cuba ♦ • • #«• • •• • •• • • « * • * • » « *«*
Chile 2.3 1.9 -2.1 5.7 -1.9 -5.3 2.5 -14,6 2,0Ecuador 1.8 1.9 4.6 2.4 4.0 9,6 2.9 4.6 4.6
El Salvador 2.2 0.9 1.5 l.o 2.7 0.7 3.3 0.3 0.9Guatemala 2.6 2.8 2.9 2.8 4.3 3.6 2.5 -0.7 5.1Guyana • •• • • •• « • • * • • • •• • «» ... ...Haiti -1.7 -0.4 1.8 3.4 ia 2.2 1,1 l.i 2.1
Honduras 1.5 1.2 -0.2 0.4 0.4 1.4 -3.1 -3.6 3.4
Jamaica • •• « •• «•è #•* <•« • • • . . . ...
Mexico 3.6 3.6 2.0 0.2 3.7 4.2 2.6 0.4 0.7Nioaragua 4.1 1.2 1.5 2.3 -0.9 0.7 5.7 -2.2 3.3Panama 4.8 4.6 1.8 5.7 3.4 3.7 -0,2 0.4 -1.7Paraguay 2.0 1.5 4,0 1.5 2.3 4.8 5.3 5.1 4.8Peru 2.4 1.3 2,2 3.3 3.0 2.5 3.5 1.0 0.0
Somini can Republic 1.8 - -4.2- ■ - 5.5... 7.0 8,7 7.8 5.8 2.2 , 1.5Trinidad and Tobago • •• • • * • • • *• • • « m . . .  . . . .
Uruguay 0.3 1.2 -0*2 -2.0 -4,3 -oa 0.8 2.6 1.97 enezuela 2.5 1.4 3.0 0.4 oa 3.6 2.8 2.4 5.9
Latin America h i M h ä h i h i M M -0.2 2.0
Blstributlon of countries according to the value of indicator (number of countries)
N egatlve l 1 3 2 3 2 2 6 2
0 to 2,4 9 10 8 8 5 4 4 8 8
2.5 to 3.4 6 2 4 4 4 4 7 1 33.5 to 5.9 3 6 3 3 5 6 5 4 6
6,0 and more — - 1 2 2 3 1 - -
a/ At market prices*
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Table 9
LATIN AMERICA: SHARE OF AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY IN THE FORMATION 
OF THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
"■ (Percentage of the gross domestic product at 1970 prices)
Country
Agriculture industry
I960 I P 1973 1975. I960 1970 • 1973 1975
Argentina . 15.6 13.1 - 11,9 12.0 26.3 30.2 32.7 32.2
Bolivia 24.4 16.9 16.1 15.8 11.6 12.9 13.0 13.6
Brazil 16.5 14.5 12.4 12.2 22̂ 3 24.8 26.2 25.6
Colombia 33.0 28.6 26.5 26.8 16.4 17.5 18.9 18.8
Costa Rica 29.3 25.0 24.5 23.2 12.4a/ 15.1a/ l6«la/ 17.2a/
Chile' 9.8 7.9 6.4 8.3 24.9* 27,2” 29,r 23=8~
Ecuador 38.1 29.2 24.0 22.1 17.0 19.0 18.6 20.3
El Salvador 35.7 30.6 28.6 28.1 13.8 17,6 18.2 18.1
Guatemala 32.6 30.1 3d,8 30.1* 11.7, 14.6 14.8 14,5
Haiti 48.8 50.8 47.4 45.2 8.8 9.8 10.8 11.7
Honduras 32.7 34.6 34.9 31.7 15.2 14.0 15.2 16.0
Mexico 16.1 11.8 10.4 9.7 19.2 23.4 23.9 24.1
Nicaragua ' '26.4 26.3 26.9 26.9 11,9.’ 17.5 17.8 17.8
Panama 25.7 20.7 19.0 18,8 11.6 15.8 15.6 13.9
Paraguay 39.5 34.3 33.4 33.0 15.2 17.3 17.6 17.5
Peru 24.6 19.8 16.4 15.3 13.3 16.8 18.1 18.7
Dominican Republic 33.8 25.8 21.7 19,1 14.6 16.7,.; 17.0 17.5
Uruguay 11.0 12.6 12.1 11.6 24.3a/ 24.2a/ 24.3a/ 25.4a/
Venezuela 7.3 7.5 7.1 7.4 9,2” 11. 4" 12.l” 13.4
Latin America
(19 countries) 18.2 14.9 13.5 13.2 20.3 23.0 ‘ 24.2 23.9
a/ Includes mines and quarries.
/The 197^-1975
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The 19?4-1975 trends show thé influence of industrial expansion 
on the growth ràtès. Thé slewing down of overall growth was associated 
with the sharp contraction in the growth rates of manufacturing.
For agriculture, h o w é v é r 1974 was an exceptional year, and in 1975» 
although the rate was once again fairly low, it grew faster than 
manufacturing, showing léss sensitivity to the overall recession.
On the other hand, the slow growth of agricultural production 
and its consequent loss of influencé in generating the total product 
partly confirm the problems of agricultural supply, the weakness of 
demand from the lower-incorae groups and the limited direct effect of 
external agricultural demand, in general, on the composition of the 
total product, although it has had special importance for some 
commbdities.
(c) Investment, domestic saving and external financing
Gross domestic investment increased by slightly over 10 per 
cent annually between Î971 'ând 1973 and by 15 per cent in 1974, 
compared with averagë rates of 5 per cent in the previous decade. The 
sharp rise in investment stimulated, and to a large extent permitted, 
the rapid growth of the product. This showed a great investment 
potential, which could be utilized thanks to a notable improvement 
in the capacity for the domestic mobilization of resources and the 
flexibility of supply of intermediate products and capital goods 
owing to the availability of imports. This general picture extended 
to most of the region and conspicuous examples are found in some 
countries, particularly Brazil.
The expansion of investment came"to an abrupt halt in 1975 
when external conditions madie supply inflexible and aggravated the 
balance-of-payments problems.
The magnitude of the growth rates recordèd between 1970 and 
1974, must be duly appreciated. In 1974 investment appears to have 
been nearly 55 pei* cent'higher than four years previously. This means 
that in a very few yéârs the region has been able to renew a large 
part of the capital of thé goodé-producing sectors and their 
infrastructure, and Significantly increase its production capacity.
/As a
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As a result of the rapid increase in investment, its coefficient 
in relation to the gross domestic product which had averaged 19.7 per 
cent in the 1960s rose to 2k per cent in 197^» In that year, eight 
countries recorded levels equal to or higher than this average (see 
table 10).
The domestic savings effort was of relative importance within 
the prevailing growth style.
Between 1971 and 197^ the proportion of gross domestic saying 
to the gross domestic product was distinctly above the figure ,of 
18 per cent recorded in the 1960s, and in 197^ it was slightly higher 
than 22 per cent (see table 10). Excluding the oil-exporting countries 
which attained the highest levels in the region, those which most 
raised their savings coefficients were Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.
In Chile, Guatemala, Haiti and Uruguay, on the other hand, the 
domestic savings -co«f ficient'was hever'as high as "Î  per cent in any 
year of the period considered, and in some years it was under 10 per 
cent. If the largest countries in terms of economic size and population 
are analysed, it may be noted that except in 1 9 7 5» the marginal 
savings coefficient exceeded the average coefficient. The ratio of 
domestic saving to investment, which increased in the first few 
years of the quinquennium/dropped in the last two years and, 
particularly1in 1 9 7 5. It should be noted, however, that the situation 
was not the same in tlie oil^exporting countries, at least some of 
which managed to increase domestic saving more than domestic investments 
Venezuela was an extreme case since from 19?3 onwards it became a 
net capital exporter (see table 11).
The proportion of external financing to investment, which 
tended to decline in the early years of the quinquennium, rose,sharply 
in 197^ and 1 9 7 5» reaching 15 per cent in the latter year which more 
than doubled the average for the 1960s.
This proportion of 15 per cent was due, as explained above, 
tb‘ the intensive use of external financing essentially in response 
to the need to maintain certain levels of production and consumption, 
and was not associated with an expansion of domestic investment that 
year.
/T able 10
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Table 10
LATIN AMERICA: INVESTMENT COEFFICIENTS
Country i960 1965 1970 1971 1572 1973 1971* 1975
Percentages of the gross domestic produot at 1970 prices
Argentina I?.? 18.0 20.4 21.4 22.1 20.9 21.7 I9.3
Barbados • •• • •• • •• • M • •• • •• • •• • ••Bolivia I2.3 16.4 15.6 14.9 13» 9 ■ 16.8 18.8 21.8Brazil 21.0 20.6 20.6 22.1 23*1 24.9 26.3 26.2Colombia 22.7 19.7 22.0 22.3 20.3 16.9 24.3 18.9Costa Riaa 15.1 21.7 20.5 24.1 20.2 22.5 23.4 24.9Cuba
. • »• • •• ••• • »* • • • • • • • «* • ••Chile 14.9 15.8 15.6 i4.o 11.2 12.7 15.4 9*9Eouador 13.1 ll.l 20.3 26.2 21.9 23.6 26.4 28.4El Salvador 16.6 16.7 13.2 15.5 12.8 14.3 16.6 14.3Guatemala 11.5 13.2 12.8 14.0 11.1 12.2 13.9 11.4Guyana • *• • •• • *• • •• • •• • ••Halt! 5*3 <5.2 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.4 8.6 9.1Honduras * 13.0 21.9 16.4 15.I 17.8 23.4 19.1Jamaloa • • • ... ... • •• • •• • ••Mexico 20.5 20*2 21.5 20*1 21.1 22* 8 24.9 25.2Nicaragua 13*2 19.0 17.3 16.9 12.5 21.5 2 6.6 17.9Panama 16.0 17.8 26,4 27.6 31.4 27*9 25.2 20.0Paraguay Ì2.5 14.9 14.7 15.2 15.6 21.0 21.4 23.3Peru 15.3 15.9 12.2 14.0 I3.2 13.5 16.3 18.1Dominican Republic 10,1 9.4 19.1 2<?.l 22.6 24.0 26.5 26.7Trinidad and Tobago • • • • •• • •• • •• '••• • •• • •• • *•Uruguay 13.4 9.0 11.4 12.9 11.2 10.7 10.3 9.9Venezuela 26.0 25.8 27.7 27.9 3O.O 32.0 29.8 32.1
Latin Amerloa iiiZ 1 2 il 22jà 20.8 m .1 22il 24.0 22sl
Distribution cf countries aooordlna to the value of the indioator
(number of countries)
Less than 10.0 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 3
10.0 - 14.9 9 3 5 5 7 5 2 2
15.0 * I9.9 5 9 4 4 2 3 4 5
20.0 and over 4 4 9 9 9 10 12 9
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Table 11
LATIN AMERICA: SHARE OP GROSS NATIONAL SAVINGS IN THE FINANCING OP INVESTMENT








1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Argentina 90.2 99.7 96.9 93*3 96,6 109.8 101.5 87« 2
Barbados . ••• • •• • •• • •• • •• • ••
Bolivia 63.4 69.6 84.9 • 72.8 68.5 87.1 118.4 59.6
Brazil 96.O 94.8 93.1 88.5 89.5 91.1 79 .7 82.1
Colombia 8*+i3 02.5 78,9 72.2 88.0 95.8 97.6 97-3
Costa Rloa 63.6 61.9 62.1 54.9 59.6 67.9 50.3 64.7
Cuba Mt •. ••• • •• • •• • •• • •• • ••
Chile 86.3 92.9 94.8 82.3 54.6 63.I 87.6 54.4
Ecuador 75.̂ 66.8 66. 2 68.1 67.9 85*3 101.6 80.8
El Salvador 85.0 83.2 105.1 91.1 106.3 77.5 » 60.2 58.8
Guatemala 80.8 84.5 96.7 83.6 96.2 102.3 88.4 81.7
Guyana . • •• • •• • •• • •• • •• • ••
Haiti 58.1 77*7 83.6 86.6 lo4.7 54.8 62.8 65.2
Honduras 73-8 68.5 56.8 79.1 90.5 7 8.3 58.7 47.5
Jamaica • •• • •• • •• • •• • •• • ••
Mexico 89.6 88.5 85.1 88.3 89.1 86.6 81.6 78.9
Nicaragua 69,7 61.1 71.1 70.8 92.2 78 .3 41.3 36.6Panama 75.4 79.3 74.2 74.6 74.1 73.0 53.4 52.5
Paraguay 71.4 67.1 77.6 73.5 91.7 89.3 *5.9 86.1
Peru 88.7 86.8 117.5 92.6 93*5 82.9 56.« 37.5Dominican Republlo 68.1 59.8 63.4 70.5 86.3 87.2 75-8 94.4
Trinidad and Tobago . • ** ••• *•• • •• • •• •••
Uruguay 9̂ .5 97.4 80.7 78.1 102.5 105.8 68.3 59.7
Venezuela 107.0 97.4 95.9 100.9 98.2 116.9 206.0 138.5
Latin Amerioa 93.3 2 h l 22sZ 88*2 89.8 94.0 94.» 85.4
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(a) Characteristics of recent inflation in Latin America
The inflationary process in the region in the period 1970-1975 
had some, features that clearly distinguish it from the two immediately 
preceding five-year periods..
Of course, in most of the countries (20 out of the 22 considered) 
inflation reached much higher levels than in the reference periods 
(see table 12).
Another notable feature is the spread of inflation throughout 
the region. Whereas in the period between 1960 and 1969 the number 
of countries with annual two-digit price increases was not more than 
five, in the period 1970-1975 it had risen to 14. In other words, 
in the previous decade inflation of a certain magnitude was confined 
to only a few countries - Brazil and those in the southern zone of 
South America - while in the period analysed the great majority of 
the Latin American countries suffered active inflationary pressures 
in differing degrees. For some this meant an intensive recrudescense 
of their chronic inflation. For others it meant a fairly sudden 
transit from virtual stability to declared inflationary processes.
Be that as it may, in 1970-1975 there was not a single country that 
was not affected by the wave of inflation, although, as noted earlier, 
in differing degrees.
The regional average estimated for Latin America does not 
adequately reflect the course of the process. Inflation in Brazil, 
because of the importance of this country within the whole group, 
decidedly influenced the figures for the 1960s, both owing to the 
proportions reached by its inflationary' process and because of its 
unsynchronized performance with respect to the rest of the countries 
in the region. Therefore, the average excluding Brazil more accurately 
reflects the course of the Latin American inflationary processes in 
the period concerned (see table 12).
2 . The in fla tio n a ry  p rocess
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Table 12




Argentina 23.3 22.3 55.3
Chile 24.6 25.5 167.5
Uruguay 26.3 69.3 59.0
Costa Rioa 2.4 ■ ' 1.5 12.1
El Salvador 0.1 0.7 7.S
Guatemala - ■ 0.9 7 .4
Honduras 1.6 1.8 5.7
Panama 0.9 1.1 6.5
Barbados ’•* 16.6
Bolivia 6.8 5*7 17.6
Brasil 53-8 35.1 21.2
Colombia 12.4 9.4 16.9
Eouador 3.5 4.4 12.0
Guyana 1.5 2.4 6.9
Haiti 2.2 2.0 11.2
Jamaica 3.0 3*9 13.9
Mexioo 2.1 3*4 10,9
Paraguay 6.1 2.2 9.4
Peru 7.4 12.0 11.3
Dominloan Republlo 2.3 0.1 9.7
Trinidad and Tobago 2.2 3*7 11.3
Venezuela 0.7 1.4 5.2
iatltt America âv*5 18.5 24.3
Latin America (excludes Brazil) 8.3 9.4 26.6
Latin America (exoludes Argentina, 
Chile and Uruguay) 25.1 17.2 15.4
Souroe> International Monetary Fund, International Flnanolal Statistics.
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(b) The different phases of the recent inflationary trend
In the 1960s there were two clearly differentiated phases in 
Latin American inflation. In the three-year period 1970-1972» although 
the countries in the southern zone recorded the highest price increases, 
the situation may be said to have been kept under control. In fact, 
during those three years the performance of inflation in the region 
was very similar to that of the preceding decade (see table 1 3).
In 1973 the declining trend of the process in the region was
interrupted. With the exception of Brazil, all the Latin American 
countries recorded bigger price increases than in the three years 
197O-1 9 7 2. The average rise in prices for the whole region more than 
doubled the average for the preceding three-year period.
In 1974 inflation took on unusual impetus; most of the countries 
recorded even bigger price increases than in the previous year. It
may well be said thab the expansive phase of the inflationary
process which the region is still experiencing reached its peak in 
1974. The regional averages for that year far exceeded those for 
the preceding years and none of the countries recorded increases of 
less than 10 per cent in thejlr price indexes.
In 1975 inflation sloped down appreciably. In spite of the fact 
that; the average for the region showed a sharp acceleration, there is 
no doubt that the wave of inflation diminished, since most of the 
countries recorded smaller increases than in the previous year. 
Inflation in Argentina, whose rate of increase in prices in 1975 was 
eight to nine times the 1974. rate, decisively influenced the, regional 
average. Therefore,-the average excluding the countries o.f the 
southern zone would.seem tp .reflect more accurately the course of 
the process in a major part of the region.
Available data for 1976 indicate that the region as a whole 
apparently experienced a certain upsurge of inflation. The average 
increase for the region was over 67 per cent, which is slightly higher 
than in the previous year and considerably higher than in the period 




LATIN AMERICA! CGNSUMER PRICES (DECEMBER TO DECEMBER) 
(Average annual rates)
1970- . 1972 1973 197** 1975 19768/
Argentina ¡+0.8 43*9 39.9 334.8 4oi.o November
Chile 60,6 507.7 373.9 340.7 179.5 November
Uruguay ¡+7.0 77.1 107.2 66.8 52.8 Ootober
Costa Rioa ¡+.1+ 16.0 30.5 20.U -0.2 September
SI Salvador 1.9 7.9 21.0 15.0 5.1 September
Guatemala 0.8 17.5 27.4 0.8 17.5 September
Honduras 2.8 5.1 13.0 6.5 4.3 July
Panama 3.4 9.5 16.7 1 .7 1,5 August
Barbados 9.9 26.0 36.6 12.5 2.2 September
Bolivia 9.8 34.7 39.1 6.0 2.2 September
Brazil 17.2 13.6 3I+.I 30.8 44.1 November
Colombia 11.1 25.0b/ 26.9V 17.9V 25.8V November
Souador 7.3 20.6 21.2 13.2 11.2 August
Guyana 3.6 15.2 11.6 5.5 10.2 August
Haiti 6.7 20.8 19.5 19.9 15.6 March
Jamaica 7.3 9.6 20.7 12.3 I0.3 September
Mexioo 5.7 20.2 2O.9 13.3 22.4 November
Paraguay 6.« li+.l 21.9 8.8 2.3 August
Peru 5.9 13.7 19.1 24.0 ¡+0.2 September
Dominican Republic 5.5 17.2 10.5 I6.5 2.7 ¿September
Trinidad and Tobago 5.0 25.8 18.6 12.5 9.6 September
Venezuela 2.7 5.1 12.2 7.3 8.2 Ootober
tat In America 0/ 15.5 36.5 >+1.2 60.1 67.8
Latin America (excludes 
Argentina« Chile and 
Uruguay) 10.7 16 .3 27.1 20.6 29.4
Sourne! International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statlatloa. 
a/ Variation In ooaparison vlth the same month of the previous year*
V  Souroe DANE (Colombia)
0/ The regional averages have been estimated by using the 197° population as a weighting faetor.
/ob vio u sly  r e f l e c t s
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obviously reflects smaller variatons, but at the same time shows 
greater acceleration with respect to the same average for the 
previous year (see table 1 3).
A typical feature of the inflationary situation in 1976 is the 
dissimilar performance of two groups of countries. In most of the 
countries with advanced industrialization processès and a relatively 
high per capita income, such as Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Peru and 
Argentina, the rate of inflation accelerated. In the rest of the 
region, composed of medium and small countries with a lower per capita 
income and a more recent industrialization process, a moderate 
controlled inflation was observable. Although this kind of 
stratification would also, mutatis mutandi, be valid for the. previous 
decade, the level reached by the inflationary processes in 1976 
reflects far more virulence.
Clearly, the period of inflation starting for most countries 
in raid- 1 9 7 3 has not yet ended, although there are signs that the 
situation is losing some of the coverage it had in the period of 
greatest inflationary pressures. The perspective of a complete 
period is therefore lacking. Thus, any forecast or. estimates regarding 
the subsequent development of the situation are not, of course, free 
from all risk.
(c) The impact of imported inflation
The recent inflationary process has been accompanied by a 
situation which in a sense has never arisen before in the region, 
namely, imported inflation. Understood as a group of pressures 
created in the field of foreign trade which either directly and 
immediately or through intervening stages and channels set off or 
accelerate price increases within the economies, there is no doubt 
that it clearly typified Latin American inflation in the 1970s. 
Exogenous pressures pushed, many countries, within a brief span, from 
stability to the eruption of inflation of differing intensity, while 
processes which were already active in others were stimulated by 
fresh impulses from abroad.
/CEPAL, in
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CEPAL, in its Economic Survey of Latin America, 197^, the year 
when world inflation reached its peak, identified three fairly 
homogeneous categories of countries from the point of view of inflation. 
The first category comprises countries where exogenous impulses 
predominated in the inflationary process;i/ a second category consists 
of countries in which fairly equal influences of internal and 
external factors account for the course of i n f l a t i o n a n d ,  lastly, 
the countries of the southern zone where internal factors prevailed 
in their inflationary trends. The fact that in only three countries 
was imported inflation not a determining factor of inflationary 
outbreaks, although it did influence them, shows how far the region 
was affected by this situation. Moreover, if price increases in 
the years 1973-1976 are compared with those in the reference periods 
it will be realized just how far the region was affected by world 
inflation.
The main and most obvious mechanism for the internalization of 
exogenous inflation has, of course, been import prices. While in 
the past the annual increases in import indexes never exceeded 5 per 
cent, in 197^ they were over 40 per cent. Price increases of this 
magnitude necessarily altered the countries* real and financial 
equilibrium, unleashing pressures on both costs and demand.
Export prices constituted another important channel for thé 
internalization of world inflation. The high prices offered on the 
external market, obviously favouring the balances of payments, in 
many cases attracted a significant share of production at the expense 
of domestic supply, with the resulting pressures on domestic prices.
y  Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, 
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.
Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia and Costa Rica.
/The volume
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The volume of imports and exports also had certain inflationary 
repercussions, although less directly than prices. The broadening 
of the imported base further widened the channel for the entry of 
external prices, and the concentration of surpluses in the centres 
operating in foreign trade also stimulated demand and, therefore, 
inflationary pressures.
In the domestic economy area, some of the effects of imported 
inflation are worth noting. The accumulation of reserves in many 
countries led to currency issues which expanded the liquidity of 
their economies. At the same time, there were exceptional increases 
in public spending, as a result of income which in its turn expanded 
owing to the rise in export and import prices. The demonstration 
effects and sympathy established between price increases, in a 
highly sensitive atmosphere ripe for gaining advantages in the price 
race, represented another factor stimulating the inflationary processes 
which was very difficult to control.3/
(d) Some consequences of recent inflation
An important point to be noted in connexion with recent inflation 
concerns the marked changes in the price system, which were much 
more pronounced than in earlier situations. In fact, with the single 
exception of Argentina, throughout the region food'prices recorded 
bigger increases than the general price index in the period 1970-1975»
As will be readily understood, the persistence of this situation has 
a decided influence on the structure of consumption of the broad 
masses in the various countriesi
Furthermore, most of the countries adopted traditional-style 
stabilization policies, whereby much of the cost of the anti-inflationary 
measures was borne by wages and salaries. With very few exceptions, 
adjustments of wages and salaries do not include mechanisms to
In CEPAL, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1974, and H. Assael 
and A. Núñez del Prado, "La inflación reciente en América Latina", 
Dos estudios sobre inflación, Cuadernos de la CEPAL, No. 9, 
Santiago, Chile, 1976» the various channels through which world 




protect their real level. Thus, most increases observed in the region 
during the period considered were in the nature of a concession by 
the governments, with evident effects in terras of the fall of real 
wages. ‘
Obviously, the changes in the price system and the lag in 
wage and salary adjustments accentuated the unequal distribution of 
income in the region, still further emphasizing the existing social 
disparities.
From a different angle, it is worth noting the symmetry and 
; difference in sign of some changes which took place in the recent 
period. The inflationary process in the years 1972-1974 coincided 
with an acceleration of the growth of the product and a significant 
expansion of the external sector. In 1975» there was a slowing 
down in the rate of price increases, which coincided with a fall in 
the growth of the product and a relatively restricted external sector. 
In 1976 again the three variables presented the same sign as in the 
period 1972-1974, with accelerated inflation, a recovery in the growth 
rate of the product and a relative improvement in the external 
sector. ■
3. Foreign trade, balance of payments and 
external borrowing
(a) The fluctuation and diversification of exports
The instability of the export markets of the region was again 
a feature in the 1970s. It is difficult to detect stable trends in 
most of the countries. Almost all of them were affected by severe 
oscillations, both in the volumes exported and in prices. If the 
period 1970-1076 is analysed, it can be seen that during this period 
only Brazil recorded growth in the volume of goods and services 
exported in all the years. In the rest of the countries there was 
usually an alternation of positive and negative growth rates of these 
volumes, with particularly marked oscillations in Argentina and 




jiTH RATE OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS AND PURCHASING 
RTS OP GOODS AND SERVICES, AT 1970 PRICES
Exports of goods and services Purchasing power of exports of goods and services
>71 1972 1975 1974 1975 1976 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 W T g
Annual rates, percentages
.7 -1.8 14.7 1.6 -20.1 27.6 0.5 -5.2 6.1 39.1 -2.0 -31.6 5.9 -0.1
o9 9-7 7.6 0.2 -11.5 5.7 3.5 -8.7 7.1 16.2 61.2 -25.9 -2.6 4.8
i.6 12.5 20.8 1.4 7.9 6.1 9.5 -2.2 25.0 33.4 -10.4 3.8 15.6 9.8
.7 12.4 3.0 6.6 8.4 -6.1 4.5 -5.3 19.2 16.5 4.4 -6.7 12.2 6.2
-9 17.2 2.0 3.4 1.5 -10.3 3,1 -1.9 14.1 6.0 -5.3 1.7 9.6 3.8
i.5 -10.2 7.7 11.7 —0.6 16.4 5.2 -15.0 -16.1 17.2 26.1 -31.9 26.9 -1.6
.5 37.2 35.6 -7.1 -2.5 6.7 12.0 -1.6 29.3 52.6 60.4 -24.0 14.8 18.1
.7 16.0 -2.7 12.4 1.0 -12.4 3.2 3.5 18.7 5.4 1.9 0.5 17.9 7.7
:.6 15.1 10.9 9.4 3.3 -1.2 6.5 -7.2 6.8 15.1 -2.6 -2.7 9.5 0.5
.2 -5.6 -2.6 0.7 -13.3 2.8 0.4 16.6 -7.1 0.5 -10.4 -9.1 42.3 4.0
>.8 3.6 2.1 -0.3 -2.2 19.8 4.7 5.9 1.1 8.3 -10.1 14.6 43.5 4.2
>.5 15.5 7.7 0 -10.3 6.8 3.7 4.0 16.1 10.5 7.1 -10.0 4.5 5.0
.0 15.5 16.7 -4.4 -1.1 18.3 8.0 1.7 25.0 12.9 -6.1 -15.2 30.4 6.9
-.3 1.3 6.3 7.8 9.9 -8.3 3.7 6.2 3.0 1.6 -2.7 6.2 -4.4 1.6
>.0 6.6 2.3 7.7 2.9 4.9 3.1 -4.8 12.3 27.1 5.7 -10.6 1.0 4.5
.5 7.5 -14.0 -4.4 -8.1 20.8 -1.6 -15.5 1.6 4.9 10.2 -19.6 24.2 -0.2
>.2 25.5 3.8 -4.7 —8.7 -5.4 3.8 9.0 34.2 8.8 12.6 27.3 -39.9 5.4
».5 4.8 -4.0 8.8 25.0 56.7 10.2 -15.7 15.2 22.8 -28.3 -5.1 52.1 3.3
».3 -4.2 6.4 —6o7 -21.0 2.3 -5.2 9.2 -3.0 30.4 90.5 -30.5 0.5 10.7
¿ 2 7.0 -4.5 8.1 3.6 -1.3 H 22.8 17.4 -14.9 6.4 5.9
n of countries aceo"d .Rg to the value
indicator (number of cocttifcriss)
4 4 6 11 6 2 11 3 - 9 13 3 3
1 4 6 4 2 5 1 3 2 1 2 2 3
3 3 1 - 5 8 4 2 3 2 2 2 9




During the six-year period considered, the biennium 1972-1973 
and the year 1975 are noteworthy as periods in which extreme 
fluctuations can be detected which affected mo3t of the countries.
The biennium 1972-1973 was the period of the greatest surge in 
exports, as a major increase in the volumes exported was combined 
with an improvement in the ratio of the terms of trade. For the 
region as a whole the volumes grew at an average annual rate of just 
over 8 per cent which, combined with an improvement of 7*6 per cent 
in the terms of trade, determined an increase in the purchasing 
power of exports of over 16 per cent a year. In 1975, however, the 
volume exported fell in about half the countries, and for the region 
as a whole it diminished by 4.5 per cent.
If the results of the six-year period are analysed it can be 
seen that in the region as a whole there was an increase in the 
volume exported of about 3*5 per cent a year and that the purchasing 
power improved by around 6 per cent. From 1973 onwards there was of 
course a clear differentiation between the petroleum-exporting 
countries and the other countries. The former experienced a slackening 
or decline in the volumes exported which was more than offset by 
the increase in prices. Most of the other countries experienced a 
decline in both volumes and prices in 1 9 7 5, and a recovery of both 
variables in 1976.
Excluding the petroleum-exporting countries, the countries 
which secured the greatest rates of increase in volumes exported 
during the period were Brazil, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Uruguay. 
Guatemala and Uruguay, however, lost almost all the benefit of this 
effort because of the unfavourable evolution of prices. On the other 
hand Argentina, Chile, Peru, Barbados, Guyana and Jamaica experienced 
a decline in their purchasing power, despite the fact that Argentina 
and Chile increased the volume of their exports, since they were both 
affected by the evolution of prices.
In contrast to what occurred in the case of growth rates, the 
composition of exports shows stable trends of change which constitute 
one of the most noteworthy factors of foreign trade.
/During the
-  12 3
During the five-year period 1970-1975 there was a major 
diversification of exports in the countries, involving the incorporation 
of new agricultural products, a greater degree of manufacture of 
basic products and an increasing participation of industrial products.
Agricultural exports were diversified in most of the countries, 
particularly in Brazil, the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica. They 
also applied policies designed to broaden the degree of manufacture 
of their products, as a result of which the percentage of agricultural 
exports with a low degree of manufacture diminished, and that of many 
sectors of the food, drink and tobacco industries rose. Thus, for 
example, in the three countries of greatest economic and demographic 
size, the proportion of exports of agricultural products with a low 
degree of manufacture fell from around 50 per cent to 33 per cent.
This decline was largely offset by exports of semi-manufactured or 
manufactured agricultural products.
A similar trend to that of agricultural products was observable 
in the mining sector. Thus, for example, in Chile, Mexico, Venezuela 
and Bolivia, the degree of manufacture of mining and petroleum products 
increased*
The inclusion of petroleum in the export products of Ecuador and 
Bolivia brought about an appreciable change in the composition of their 
exports. In Ecuador, the share of agricultural products, which in 1970 
had represented around 90 per cent of exports, declined to 50 per aent 
in 1973» In the same year in Bolivia the exporta of petroleum came to 
represent around 20 per cent of the total.
The inclusion of industrial products in the list of exports was
a very dynamic process and included sectors of both intermediate 
industries and the metal-working and machinery industry. The region 
managed to export goods with an appreciable degree of manufacture and
technology. Most of these products went to developed countries in 1973>
and this constitutes an indicator of the potential market for these 
types of exports. Naturally the largest countries, which are also those 
which have a greater degree of industrialization, were those which 
exported the highest proportion of the. regional total. Similarly
/in te r re g io n a l  trad e
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interregional trade intensified, without hov/ever securing rates similar 
to those of trade with the developed countries.
The participation of the transnational enterprises, the 
international situation and the export promotion policies had a 
determining influence on the results of the diversification of 
industrial exports. As a result of these factors the annual growth 
rate of industrial exports, expressed in 1970 dollars, was nearly 
20 per cent for the period 1970-1974.
(b) The improvement and deterioration of the terms of trade
The terms of trade in Latin America have varied significantly 
since 197O, following the course of the international situation and in 
particular the variations in the price of petroleum. The evolution 
offers marked contrasts depending on whether the petroleum-exporting 
countries or the other countries are considered.
If the year 1970 is taken as a basis for comparison (see table 
15), it can be seen that the petroleum-exporting countries enjoyed a 
consistent rise in their external price ratio until 1974, when the 
index recorded a level of approximately 260 as a result of the rise in 
the prices of fuels. This increase greatly exceeded the rise which 
had been recorded in the unit value of imports of these countries.
In 1975 the index diminished to 222, and in 1976 it again fell to 218 
because of the continuous rise in the prices of imports of these 
countries.
Despite the methodological and conceptual problems which arise 
in • connexion with the significance and extent of these indices when 
they are applied in order to study the evolution over long-term periods, 
at a distance from the base index, it is interesting to note that the 
petroleum-producing countries were afflicted by a continuous 
deterioration in their foreign trade ratio from the beginning of the 
195°s onwards.
Because of the magnitude of its exports and imports, Venezuela 
has a predominant influence in this group of Latin American countries. 
The other two countries, Bolivia and Ecuador, are relatively small and 
have a different structure of foreign trade to that of Venezuela, so 
that the evolution of their particular indices does not resemble that
/Table 15
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LATIN AMERICAS INDEX OF THE RATIO OF THE TERMS OF TRADE
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1950-1954 179.9 124.0 134.7
1955-1959 182.6 104.6 121.5
1960-1969 122.6 95.9 101.5
1970 100.0 100.0 100.0
1971 110.7 94.3 97.3
1972 110.1 97.9 99.9
1973 131.7 108.2 112.3
1974 260.7 105.8 121.0
1975 222.3 96.7 114.2
1976 c/ 218.9 98.7 114.6
a/ Includes Bolivia, Ecuador y Venezuela, 
b/ Indexes calculated with data from 19 countries. 
o/ Provisional figures.
/reco rd ed  by
- 126 -
recorded by the latter country, although in recent years they also 
reflect the movement of rise and fall which has been discussed.
The evolution of the trade ratio, in the non petroleum-exporting 
countries has of course been very different. The aggregate index of 
this group of countries, still with base 100 in 1 9 7 0, declined in 1971 
and tended to recover in 1 9 7 2, reaching a maximum level in 1973 as a 
result of a higher rise in the prices of the basic export products.
The figure for this last year amounted to only 108* however, and was 
thus significantly lower than that recorded on average during the 
first years of the 1 9 30s (see table 1 5).
In 1974 the readjustment which began to operate in the prices 
quoted for basic products and the rise in the prices of petroleum, 
industrial products and other goods which these countries import 
influenced the process of deterioration which became acute in 1975 with 
the persistent rise in the prices quoted for imported industrial 
products. This deterioration was of such magnitude that in 1975 the 
trade ratio of the non-petroleum-exporting countries showed an index 
which was lower than that of 1 9 7 0.
The declining trend extended to all the countries of this group, 
and was particularly intense for Chile and Uruguay which recorded an 
index of 60 in 1975« Moreover, Costa Rica, Chile, Guatemala and Haiti 
were below the 1970 level throughout the five-year period.
In 1976 a certain improvement was registered in the trade ratio 
of many countries of this group, which corresponded to the rise in the 
prices quoted for particular primary products at the beginning of that 
year - particularly in the prices of coffee - a greater rate of 
inflation in industrial imports and the maintenance of the prices of 
fuels. Changes in the composition of exports and imports naturally had 
an influence too. Other countries of this group, particularly the 
sugar-exporting countries, experienced a decline that year which in 
some cases reached considerable magnitudes.
The index of the group as a whole showed a slight rise (2 per 
cent) in 1976 so that it continued to be below that of 1 9 7 0. with an 
even more unfavourable position for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Uruguay.
/(c) The
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(c). The evolution of imports and their composition
In previous pages the evolution of imports in relation to the 
rate of economic growth, the purchasing power of exports and the use 
of external financing were studied. It is considered useful here to 
synthetise some general features of their evolution during this 
decade and to review aspects relating to the nature of their 
composition by sectors of goods.
During the first four years, the growth rate of imports of goods 
and services consistently increased to such an extent that, for the 
region as a whole, the increases passed from a rate of k.S per cent in 
1971 to 20.7 per cent in 197*+» (See table 1*0. This dynamism covered 
nearly all the countries, although there were major differences in 
magnitude and at least until 1973 it was related to the expansion of 
the purchasing power of exports and, in some cases, a greater use of 
external financing.
In 197^ the petroleum-exporting countries and the other countries 
began to develop in different ways. When in that year the purchasing 
power of exports from many of the non petroleum-exporting countries 
fell, the growth of the imports of these countries continued to 
accelerate and this led to an increase in the deficit of their belance 
of payments or a decline in their positive balances. Thus Argentina, 
Brazil, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and the Dominican Republic 
recorded increases approaching or. exceeding 20 per cent. In other 
countries, however, the growth rate of imports declined; this was 
particularly marked in Chile, where they amounted to only 1.5 per cent, 
and Haiti and Uruguay, where the absolute levels of flows of goods 
and services from abroad contracted.
In 197^ the petroleum-exporting countries had the highest rates 
of the period, amounting to 30 per cent in Bolivia and Ecuador and 
26 per cent in Venezuela.
As a result of this evolution, the coefficient of imports of 
goods and services in comparison with the domestic product rose in 
most of the countries. For the region as a whole this coefficient 
rose from 11.6 per cent in 1970 to 1 3 . 6 per cent in 197^«
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In 1975 the evolution changed radically for the non petroleum- 
exporting countries. The balance-of-payments problems which affected 
them and the slackening in the rate of investment and of the domestic 
product were largely related, in both respects, to the decline in their 
imports that year. On the other hand the petroleum-exporting countries 
again increased their purchases abroad.
In 1976 these trends were maintained, although with some variation 
of certain significance. The imports of the vast majority of non- 
petroleun-exporting countries remained stationary or again diminished 
in absolute figures, and those of the petroleum-exporting countries 
continued to rise. Among the countries of the first group, special 
note should be taken of the increases in imports recorded in Colombia 
and in some Central American countries which benefited from an 
improvement in the purchasing power of their exports as a consequence 
of the volume of their sales, the improvement of their terms of trade, 
or both at once.
In chapter I the past trends of the composition of imports of 
the Latin American countries were studied and the main factors which 
determined that composition were outlined. It needs only be added 
here that during this decade no basic modifications were recorded in 
the trends, particularly if the analysis is limited to the share of 
the major sectors of goods in total imports and not extended to a 
detailed study of more specific goods or groups of goods.
It is, however, important to note that if this study of the 
composition of imports is carried out in current values, it is possible 
to appreciate changes of some importance as a result of the effects 
of the price fluctuations recorded during this period and, especially, 
at the beginning of 1973 in respect of the cost of fuels. The countries 
which are not self-sufficient in these products experienced an increase 
in the value of their imports of fuels, and in the share of this externa: 
expenditure in the total value of imports. In 197^ ten »ountries 
devoted more than 15 per cent of the value of their imports to this 
sector. Among them, Panama, Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil recorded a 
proportion varying between 35 per cent and 25 per cent of the value 
of their imports.
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(d) Balance of payments, financing and external debt 4/
The behaviour of the various elements in the balance-of- 
payments situation was discussed when studying both the relationships 
between fluctuations in the growth-rate and external variables, and 
also external trade flows and terms of trade. The overall effects 
of these elements in terms of balance-of-payments deficits, financing 
and the external debt are presented below.
Most of the Latin American countries had deficits both on 
current account and on the trade account. With the exception of 
Venezuela, Argentina, and the other oil-exporting countries between 
1973 to 1975, the countries had large trade deficits, whereas until 
1973 these deficits had remained within relatively low limits. The 
trade gap widened enormously in 1974-1975, from an average of nearly 
1,500 million dollars in 1972-1973 to 10,000 million dollars, in the 
case of the non-oil-exporting countries. On the other hand,
Venezuela and the other oil-exporting countries had record surpluses 
in 1974: in the case of Venezuela, over 6,000 million dollars. In 
1976, by holding down imports and thanks to a rise in the real 
value of exports for most countries.of the region, the non-oil- 
exporting countries reduced their trade deficit to 6,000 million 
dollars. The trade balances of Venezuela and the oil-exporting 
countries worsened. Venezuela's surplus dropped to 1,600 million 
dollars, while the remaining countries again had deficits similar 
to those of the early years of the decade (see table 1 6 ).
Net factor payments under the heading interest and profits 
in respect of external investment and debt did not reflect the 
fluctuations in the trade deficit, and instead continued to grow 
steadily, except in the case of the oil-exporting countries, particularly 
Venezuela. For the non-oil-exporting countries these payments grew 
from 2,000 million dollars in 1970 to 6,500 million in 1976.
it/ We shall only consider overall trends here, to round off the
study of economic developments, because financing and external
debt problems are studied m,ore extensively, in Part Two, Chapter I.
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Table 16
LATIN £  SBICA (19 COUNTRIES): BALANCE OP PATiENTS 
(Millions of dollars)
Oil exporting countries Non oil exporting countries
Other oil Other non Latin
Total Vene­zuela exporting Total Argentina Brazil Mexico
oilexporting Americacountries countries
Trade balance
1970 478.7 596.0 -II7 .3 -837.9 67.0 -229.0 -429.0 -24'/.9 -$9.2
1571 53I.3 760.0 -236.I -2 091.6 -I3O.O -905.O —157 * 0 -899.6 -1 559.7
1972 230.5 436.6 -206.1 -1 650.5 U5.1 -974.0 -117.2 -674,4 -1 420.0
1973 1 530.9 1 548.5 42.4 -1 228.6 1 100,4 -1 07 2.9 -415.1 -841.0 362.3
1974 7 017.5 6 300.9 716.6 -9 188.2 488.1 -6 I35.I -1 423.0 -2 I28.2 -2 I7O.7
1575 2 756.5 2 707.6 48.9 - -11 032.7 —8C0.7 . -5 II7.9 -2 037.4 -2 988.7 -8 276.2
1976 1 437.0 1 629.0 -192.0 -6 249.0 636,0 -3 932.O -1 813.0 -1 i4o,o -4 812.0
Met payments of profits and interest
1970 -675.5 -560.0 -II5 .5 -2 159.1 -223,0 J428.0 -695.0 -813,1 -2 8 $ .6
1571 -733.3 -685.O -114.3 -2 235.1 -256.0 -518.0 -738.0 -78 3.1 - 3 094.4
1972 "¿0 7.7 -493.0 -174.7 -26 51.9 -333.3 -618.8 -857.Ü -842.0 - 3 319.6
1573 -1 060.7 -851.2 -205.5 -3 365.8 -394.6 -811,9 -1 137.2 -1 022.1 -4 4 26.5
1974 -1 039.9 -507,4 -532.5 . -4 154.8 -3^*3 -993.2 -1 619.7 -1 207.6 -5 194.7
1575 -363.3 37.6 -406.9 - -5 682,2 «426.6 -1 O2O.I -1 920.7 -1 512.8 -6 051.5
137̂ -150.0 69.0 -213.0 - -6 483.0 -445.0 -2 396.0 -2 204.0 -1 $ 6.0 -6 633.0
Balance on current aooount
1370 -#1.7 -50;0 -22I.7 • -2 8OO.7 -157.O -0+4; 0 -1 O75.O -924.7 -3 072.4
1371 -334.3 4,0 -338.3 -4 183,7 -387.0 -1 412.0 -845.0 -1 539.7 -4 518.0
1372 -511.4 -145,4 -366.O -4 065 .6 -2I9 .3 -1 591.7 -920.7 -13 3 3 .9 -4 577.0
1373 444-.Ô 592.4 —147.6 -4 291.6 708.2 -1 862.1 «1 489.1 -1 0+8.6 —3 846,8
1974 5 857.5 5 663.6 193.9 -13 027.5 151.4 -7 127.1 -2 954.1 -3 117.7 - 7 170.0
1375 2 293.7 2 016.8 -347.I -16,376,8 -1 319.7 -6 9 23. 0 -3 887.7 -4 ¿+6.4 -14 077.1
1376 1 200,0 1 599.0 -339.0 -12 421,0 195.O »6 320.0 -3 992.0 -2 3*.0 -1 1 221,0
Movement of capital
1370 357.6 140.0 217.6 4 260,2 4^.0 1 # 8.0 1 150.0 1 395 .2 4 617.8
1371 763.9 433.0 324.9 4 245.9 -72.0 2 026.0 1 027.0 1 20+.9 5 009.8
1372 817.3 357.2 460,1 6 470.O 170,4 4 104.8 1 140.9 1 053.9 7 287.3
1373 249.2 16.8 232.4 7 460.6 -43.0 4 254.8 1 629.7 1 619.I 7 70?.8
137̂ -1 015.9 -1 394.3 378.9 12 151.0 -119.2 6 AO.2 2 964.1 3 057.9 11 i$.i
1375 438.3 -143.2 5C1.5 14 063.6 529.4 5 3 27.7 4 052.8 3 654.0 14 501.9
1376 -1 810.0 -2 $9.0 589.0 14 900.0 455.0 7 420.0 3 642.0 3 383.0 13 090.0
Balartoe of payments before compensation
1370 85.9 90.0 —4*1 1 459.5 280.0 634.0 75.0 470.5 1 545.4
1371 429.6 443.0 -13.4 62.2 -4-59.0 6l4.o 182.0 274,8 491.8
1372 305.9 211.8 94.1 2 4C4.4 -48.9 2 513.1 220.2 -280.0 2 710 .3
1373 694.0 609,2 84.8 3 169.0 665.2 2 38 2.7 140.6 —28.9 38 6 3.0
1374 4 841.6 4 268.8 572.8 -876.5 32.2 -878.9 30.0 59.8 3 965.1
1375 2 738 .0 , 2 503.6 224.4 -2 313.2 -790.3 - 1  095.3 I65.I 592.7 424,8
1376 -610.0 -800,0 190.0 2 479.0 650.0 1 100.0 -350,0 1 079.0 1 869.0
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As a result of the trade deficit and the payment of profits 
and interest, the deficit on current account of the non-oil-exporting 
countries rose from an average *f,000 million dollars in the three- 
year period 1971-1973 to 13,000 million in 197k and 1 6 , 0 0 0 million 
in 1975« As mentioned above, it then dropped to 12,000 million in 
1976. Venezuela.was the only major exception, with a particularly 
large surplus after 197^* On the other hand, it is significant that 
the other oil-exporting countries again had high current account 
deficits in 1975-1976, mainly because of the rapid growth of imports.
These current account deficits were offset to a large extent 
by external financing flows. Given the differences among the countries, 
Brazil and Mexico received almost 75 per cent of the external financing 
of the non-oil-exporting countries, particularly after 1973* The 
other countries in this group also received abundant external 
financing, although with lower growth rates. Argentina, was an 
important exception, and even had a surplus on current account, 
except in the last biennium.
The rise in net external financing may be appreciated more 
easily if compared with the value of exports of goods and services.
This ratio, in the order of 13«5 per cent in the second-half of the 
1960s for the region as a whole, rose to 31*5 per cent in 1975* At 
the country level, the changes and levels are even greater; for 
example, in 1975 the -ratio was 66. per centjfqr. Mexico, 71 percent 
for Brazil, and 92 per cent for Peru, as opposed to 2^.1** and 9 per 
cent respectively for the same countries in the 1960s. (See table 17*)
Considerable changes took place in the movement of capital 
during this period. Private sources became more important than 
official national or international sources. Private foreign banks, 
to a large extent, and suppliers' loans and direct foreign 





w m - m s i c k i  RELATION BETWEEN NET EXTERNAL FINANCING AND EXPORTS 
(Percentage cf exports of goods and services)
Country
Decade 1960-1970




Argentina 3.5 0.9 7.4 18.3 9.5 -19.1 -2.4 36.9
Barbados 25.9 31.5 43.5 43.7 33.3 34.2 28.4 15.8
Bolivia 29.7 23.3 11.4 22.2 23.5 10,6 -11.1 35.9
Brazil 13.5 16.7 21.0 43.1 36.4 27.8 84.2 71.0
Colombia 23.7 27.4 33.0 49*2 17.5 4.9 20.3 9.9
Costa Rica 27.0 26.9 27.3 41.6 29.6 26.7 47.4 36.6
Chile 13.2 4.5 2.0 16.8 45.7 33.8 17.5 38.4
Ecuador 23.2 31.8 47.3 62.0 23.2 2.2 -1.3 ».0
El Salvador 8.3 9.2 -2.6 5.7 -2.8 11.5 26.3 20.9
Guatemala 13.3 11.2 2.3 14.2 2<>6 -1.6 14.5 14.1
Guyana 11.5 16.2 14.2 4.1 8.5 40.0 2.7 5.8
Haiti 19.5 11.3 9*6 7.9 -3.2 34.2 35.4 38.5
Honduras 16.6 20.4 34.4 12.2 5.3 13.7 38.2 44.0
Jamaica 14.1 20.7 28.5 30.6 30.9 38.1 8.0 22.6
Mexico 23.5 27.5 37.5 27.2 24.8 30.0 46.4 66.3
Nicaragua 19.7 25.9 19.7 20.2 3.3 14.4 58.9 42.1
Panama 14.8 13.2 18.6 19.6 23.3 22.8 37.5 16.1
Paraguay 30.4 38.2 22.1 29.5 9.0 13.3 27.6 36.1
Peru 9.2 9.6 -11.9 6.5 5.5 22.3 40.8 92.2
Dominican Republic 26.8 39.1 40.7 34.8 15.2 15.5 33.5 6.3
Trinidad and Tobago 8.4 5.0 12.7 19.5 20.6 2.1 -11.3 1.6
Uruguay 3.0 2.6 19.1 28.7 -2.4 -4.5 32.5 43.6
Venezuela -4.9 2.0 1.8 -0.1 4.4 -12.0 -49.1 —28.1
Latin America 11.0 13.5 16.2 23.2 19.9 12.0 15.4 31.5
/In the
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In the case of the gross financing required for 1975» official 
sources accounted for Ik per cent, private sources 63 per cent, 
direct foreign investment 11 per cent, and the remaining 12 per cent 
were accounted for by running down reserves. Banks were by far the 
most important source of private loans, more than seven times greater 
than suppliers' credit, the next most important entry.
The inflow of autonomous capital into the non-oil-exporting 
countries in 1971-1973 was greater than the current account deficit, 
which enabled them to built up reserves. It should be stressed that 
in many cases this growth of reserve was the result of deliberate 
government policy designed to establish credit worthyness on the 
international financial market and also to hedge against unfavourable 
external situations, like those of the biennium 197^-1975« In 1976, . 
as was pointed out above, autonomous capital flows enabled this 
policy to be resumed, and reserves again increased.
In external financing, the amounts and type of borrowing changed. 
The external debt of 17 Latin American countries (see table l8) rose 
from 35,000 million dollars in 1970 to 62,000 million in 1975« The 
share of Brazil and Mexico rose from 39 to 57 per cent in that period, 
showing the effect of the large percentages of external financing 
absorbed by those countries. Likewise, the Central American countries 
increased their share in the debt, particularly after 197^ as a 
result of the unfavourable changes in the terms of trade, among other 
factors.
The nature of the debt also changed with the increasing 
participation of private financing. It is estimated that at the end 
of 1975, the guaranteed and non-guaranteed bank debt with foreign 
banks of eleven developed countries stood at **3,500 million dollars, . 
while the total debt of seventeen countries was estimated at about 
62,000 million dollars.
The relation between real external debt (deflated by the import 
price index) and the product tended to remain at the same level until 
1975: about 18 per cent for the group of seventeen countries 
considered. However, at the country level the situation varied greatly.
/Table lo
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Table 18
LATIN AMERKAî EXTERNAL DEBT AT 51 DECEMBER®/ 
(Billions of current dollars)
Country 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Argentina 5 543=3 5 677.3 5 605=3 5 907.1 6 366=4 6 476.4 6 977=8
Bolivia 410=1 524.4 592=2 680=8 797.8 786.2 929.4
Bra ill 4 403=3 5 295=2 6 621=6 9 521=0 12 571.5 17 165=7 a  171.4
Colombia 1 822=7 2 102=7 2 424=7 2 652=6 2 838=5 3 319=4 3 528.3
Costa Rica 329»? 377=1 479=7 565=8 629=8 832.0 985.1
Chile 2 358=0 2 451=0 2 467.0 2 894=3 3 202.8 4 087=5 4 633.9
Ecuador 262=9 299=3 332=0 395=7 423=8 413=5 508.6
El Salvador 221=8 219=9 245=4 250=4 275=8 437=7 536.0
Guatemala 316=6 307=6 337=6 367=9 415=4 462.7 570.2
Haiti 69=0 66=5 65=7 73=8 79=4 102=8 156.1
Honduras 141=6 186=2 211=4 243=1 286=7 404.4 581.6
Mexico 3 852=0 4 291=0 4 783.0 5 636=3 7 405=3 10 400=6 14 607.7
Nicaragua 269=5 301=2 341=3 370=6 511.0 760=0 929.9
Paraguay 198.5 223=7 243=9 260=9 302.0 381.0 477.9
Peru 1 460=0 1 427=0 1 465=0 1 599=6 1 913=1 3 048=3 4 133.8
Dominican Republic 281=4 318=6 389=4 408=0 427=9 608=7 ; 652.8
Uruguay 541.6 571=9 671=2 730=1 719=8 897.6 1 058.6
Latin America
(17 countries) 22 502=0 24 640=6 27 276=4 32 608=0 39 167=0 50 584=5 62 439.1
Sources CEPAL, on the basis of national data and data supplied by the World Bank and the IMF.
&J For each country the external debt was estiisated in a particular year for which relatively full information was 
available» The total annual loans (autonomous and compensatory, short and long term, guaranteed or not) accumulate 




While in Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua the ratio was about kO per 
cent, the three countries of greatest economic and demographic weight 
had ratios below 20 per cent. In the course of the present decade, 
the ratio has changed significantly in many countries, increasing 
in approximately half of them, while falling in the other half (see 
table 19).
The burden of the debt in the balance of payments - unlike the 
situation with regard to the domestic product - has increased, and 
the situation may grow worse if export earning do not rise rapidly.
The change in the composition of the external debt, has an 
unfavourable impact on the financial costa, length and rates of 
interest of external borrowing. Debt service, which represented 
22 per cent of exports in the 1960s, rose to 28 per cent in 1975»
If the oil-exporting countries are excluded, where for obvious 
reasons this coefficient dropped to nearly 5 per cent, the result 
would be even higher. , Thus, for example, it was over 50 per cent 
in Peru, and well over 40 per cent in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay.
(See table 20.) The percentages are even higher if remittances 
of profits on foreign investment are included. In that case, in 
1975 in Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru the ratio was close to or 
over 50 per cent, and for the region as a whole it reached 33*5 per 
cent. (See table 21.)
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Table 19
LATIN AMERICA? RELATION BETWEEN THE EXTERNAL DEBT AND THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT^ 
(Percentages of the gross domestic product at 1970 prices)
Country 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Argentina 24.59 22.69 20.69 20.28 18.36 13.57 13.07
Bolivia 44.31 51.57 54.41 56.25 55.06 41.39 41.13
Brazil 11.06 11.61 11.93 14.56 15.00 12.87 14.36
Colombia 28.41 29.57 31.06 30.27 27.52 24.89 22.83
Costa Rica 36.61 38.29 44.27 44.88 40.58 38.58 39.63
Chile 30.49 28.81 25.90 28.75 28.03 26.45 32.73
Ecuador 15.88 16.79 16.98 17.66 15.17 11.10 10.87
El Salvador 23.65 21.38 22.65 20.64 19.47 22.68 24.02
Guatemala 18.74 16.16 16.09 14.93 13.51 10.35 11.05
Haiti 16.18 14.60 13.00 13-30 12.11 10.42 13.71
Honduras 22.19 26.05 27.59 23.55 28.29 31.15 40.02
Mexico 12.55 12.81 13.25 14.18 15.22 16.25 19.49
Nicaragua 35.01 35.61 37.29 38.24 43.97 46.52 ' 49.68
Paraguay 37.28 37.53 37.45 •36.13 34.77 30.95 30.67
Peru 27.32 23.38 21.64 20.97 a . 26 25.66 29.84
Dominican Republic 21.76 21.45 22.62 20.15 16.51 17.11 15.41
Uruguay 23.66 22.79 26.15 27.08 24.67 18.96 19.90
Latin America 
(17 countries) 18.09 17.70 17.45 18.48 18.10 16.45 18.04• ■r ■ r
Source? CEPAL.
ai/ The external debts have been deflated by the relevant indexes of prices of imports of goods and services.
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Table 20
UOTkAMERICA» RELATION BETWEEN THE AMORTIZATIONS AND 
INHERES! OF THE EXTERNAL DEBT AND E2P0RTS
(Percentages of exports of goods and services)
Country
Decade 1960-1970




Argentina 31.3 31.8 29.0 48.4 33.8 29.6 31.3 32.5
Barbados 5.5 3.3 4.9 2.7 2.8 7.8 11.6 4.8
Bolivia 19.7 17.4 15.4 24.8 30.2 28.1 19.5 4.8
Brazil 41.5 38.6 40.2 40.8 43.1 44.4 39.5 46.9
Colombia 31.5 31.9 32.2 30.5 30.5 30.6 26.0 32.0
Costa Rica 23.6 25.5 13.2 16.7 18.1 23.4 22.6 25.0
Chile 31.3 26.9 26.1 32.1 45.9 40.6 24.5 47.1
Ecuador 13.4 14.2 17.8 19=6 21.7 11.6 8.1 6.4
El Salvador 9.2 9.7 11.2 13.4 16.2 - 12.7 16.6 , 19.8
Guatemala 18*7 22.5 22.3 15.9 14.9 11.3 9.7 7.6
Guyana 5.3 5.7 5.0 6.8 5.5 11.4 5.5 9.2
Haiti 10.0 10.1 8.9 6.0 7.7 5.4 6.2 3.8
Honduras 6.1 5.6 6.1 11.2 8.1 10.3 11.5 13.3
Jamaica 4.0 3.6 2.6 6.3 4.6 7.4 9.6 10.5
Mexico 27.9 31.4 30.2 28.1 26.7 30.4 24.1 34.5
Nicaragua 11.1 12.4 16.7 13.6 18.4 12.1 13.6 20.3
Panama 5.7 6.8 13.3 17.7 ' 21.5 34.2 60.6 53.3
Paraguay 15.3 16.7 17.1 25.6 20.4 16.8 18.4 40*0
Peru 17.5 22.1 30.7 38.8 • 29̂ 6 46.4 30.0 54.4
Dominican Republic 17.1 16.3 17.2 11.4 14.1 14.9 14.0 14.9
Trinidad and Tobago 1.8 2.1 3.6 4.1 2.0 5.4 8.3 8.2
Uruguay 29.8 37.0 29.1 43.5 31.0 57.5 25.7 43.6
Venezuela 5.2 2.8 2.9 3.9 5.1 4.1 4.9 4.9
Latin America 21.9 22.3 23.4 26.1 25.7 27.2 ™ H d 27.9
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Table 21
LATIN AMERICAS RELATION BETWEEN AMORTIZATION AND INTEREST ON THE EXTERNAL 
DEBT AND REPAYMENT OF PROFITS ON DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT, AND EXPORTS
(Percentages of exports of goods and services)
Country
Decade




Argentina 35=5 36.4 32.4 50.7 36.4 31.7 32.3 33.1
Barbados 6.0 6.6 9.2 7.4 8.1 13.2 20.3 8.5
Bolivia 24.2 24.8 23.5 29.0 32.9 30.3 20.2 a .9
Brazil 47.2 45.0 46.3 46.6 47.9 47.8 42.7 50.4
Colombia 37.6 39.0 41.6 37.9 36.3 35.3 29.1 35.2
Costa Rica 27.7 29=3 14.6 17.9 24.2 28.5 26.2 26.3
Chile 42.9 39=9 37.6 38.4 A6.2 40.6 24.9 48.7
Ecuador 22.6 22.9 25.2 29.2 55,8 31.6 23.6 20.6
El Salvador 11.8 12.4 13.8 15.8 18.2 15.0 18.6 22.1
Guatemala 25.3 30.4 30.8 24.7 23.1 18.2 16.4 14.0
Guyana 18.6 ; 18.5 14.6 16.8 9.9 14.8 10.1 11.2
Haiti 17.0 16.2 14.9 11.6 14.2 11.1 12.1 11.0
Honduras 14.9 16.1 16.2 20.5 17.3 19.2 11.4 19.9
Jamaica a.7 24.4 22.8 25.9 24.8 27.3 14.2 15.2
Mexico 41.6 46.5 47.0 44.0 38.3 42.6 36.9 50.0
Nicaragua 18.3 22.0 27.4 23.6 26.8 20.3 a.8 26.5
Panama 11.6 13=5 18.2 21.8 24.5 36.7 62.5 55.1
Paraguay 17.4 19-4 19.9 28.2 22.7 18.0 19.3 40.9
Peru 26.6 31.1 36.7 43.5 33.6 52.3 34.6 60.0
Dominican Republic 25.6 -24.6 24.8 18.3 22.7 25.3 20.4 19.8
Trinidad and Tobago 15.5 13.9 13.6 13.1 10.9 13.9 12.9 18.6
Uruguay 30.1 37.4 29.7 43.5 31.0 37.5 26.5 44.3
Venezuela 30.3 28.1 22.8 24.7 20.0 a.7 11.5 8.9
Latin America 33.5 34.4 33.9 36.2 33.5 35.1 26.8 33.5“■ 1 " “ ■ IL—r ~
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V. TRENDS IN SECTORAL PRODUCTION DURING THE
PERIOD 1970-1976
1. Agricultural production 
(a) Growth-rate fluctuations
The most striking feature of recent trends in agricultural 
production is the manner in which the results of successive harvests 
have varied. Annual differences in production have been highly 
marked. The average growth rate, on the basis of FAO figures, of 
2.5 per cent per year 1/ during the period 1970-1975 conceals annual 
variations such as the poor harvests of 1972 - the worst agricultural 
year in many years, because of its adverse climatic conditions - and 
those of other years which showed rather large increases, such as 
the 6.2 per cent increase in production in 1974. (See table 1.) In 
1975 the growth rate fell to just about 1.4 per cent, the main causes 
being the frosts which affected coffee production in Brazil and the: 
reduction in the use of fertilizers owing to the high prices of this 
input. On the basis of preliminary data, 1976 is expected to be an 
encouraging year for agriculture, in view of the sharp increases in 
the harvests of wheat, sugar, rice and soya beans which would appear 
to have attained higher than average levels for the five-year period 
1 9 7 0-1 9 7 5, and which more than make up for the reduction in coffee
• Iproduction, which is expected to be the lowest for this decade, and 
other minor reductions in the production of maize and other products. 
This is probably reflected in the food production index for the region 
which increased by 6.5 per cent in 1976; at the same time total 
production increased by 5 per cent. Nevertheless, the average for 
the period 1970-1976 is likely to be less than 3 per cent.
1/ National accounts statistics which refer partly to value added 
at constant prices show a somewhat more favourable trend, since 
the growth rate for this period is approximately 3*5 per cent 
per year. This difference arises from the use of different 
statistical series and the fact that the periods of production 
taken by FAO are not the same as those recorded by the countries 
in the national accounts in question.
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Table 1






1975 1971 1972 1973
1974 1975 1976^
Argentina 2.1 2.3 2.4 -0.2 -0.5 9.2 6.4 3.3 8.1
Barbados e/ 2.6 2.0 -1.1 -10.9 -10.9 5.3 -8.0 0.0 -1.1
Bolivia 5.5 3.1 3.9 5.0 5.2 8.1 -0.2 6.4 -1.2
Brazil 4.4 3.7 3.4 2.4 5.5 -0.8 7.5 -1.3 8.0
Colombia 2.7 2.9 3.7 3.2 1.7 4.7 6.4 4.1 5.3
Costa Rica, 3.5 6.0 3.0 6.7 4.5 -2.0 0.4 13.8 5.0
Cuba 1.7 1.7 0.6 -19.5 -2.9 10.0 4.9 4.0 -4.7
Chile 1.6 2.2 -0.8 4.3 -1.6 -16.4 16.9 2.5 -5.2
Ecuador . 5.8 3.9 2.5 3.0 -3.6 6.0 3.3 -0.6 1.3
El Salvador 3.5 3.8 3.0 a.o -14.0 8.6 2.5 7.4 -1.9
Guatemala 4.5 4.8 3.7 6.8 3.4 2.8 1.5 -0.6 7.9
Guyana 6.0 1.3 0.2 2.7 -7.2 12.7 -4.4 5.0 8.8
Haiti 0.7 2.0 2.1 3.4 1.1 1.9 0.8 0.8 1.6
Honduras 2.8 3.9 2.2 12.8 -2.0 6.3 -5.9 4.6 6.2
Jamaica 5.3 0.5 0.3 4.6 -0.9 —8.0 5.1 0.8 2.5
Mexico 5.1 4.5 2.3 4.1 1.3 1.8 1.0 -0.6 1.3
Nicaragua 2.5 7.0 4.1 5.1 0.7 0.7 2.1 5.3 1.8
Panama 3.2 5.1 1.3 9.2 -4.8 4.3 5.3 5.6 0.6
Paraguay 1.9 3.7 1.4 '1.4' -6.3 7.2 6.9 2.8 6.9
Peru 3.3 2.9 0.9 -0.4 -1.7 -1.9 -4.2 3.2 3.8
Dominican Republic 4.1 1.5 3.9 6.0 3.6 -0.2 7.9 -4.9 3.5
Trinidad and Tobago 3.4 1.9 -2.9 -1.3 5.0 -7.6 2.7 -2.5 9-4
Uruguay 0.6 2.0 -0.1 , 24.3 -24.0 10.0 9-9 -3.1 10.5
Venezuela 5.3 5.2 4.0 0.8 -0.9 7.1 6.1 9.7 -2.6
Latin America 3.7 3.0 , . 2.5 0.8 0.8 2.3 6.2 5.0
Source; Estimates of the CEPAL/FAO Joint Agricultural Division, based on FAO, Production yearbook, 1974. 
a/ Includes changes in head of livestock.
b/ 1976 rates are not strictly comparable with earlier years, and are based on FAO preliminary estimates of
the total gross production indices, 
c/ Changes in stocks not included because of lack of data.
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The performance of agriculture in Latin America has not been 
exempt from the effects of the changes, at times drastic ones, taking 
place in prices for agricultural commodities in world markets. From 
the end of 1972 to 1974 there were marked increases in world prices 
for several products wich together cover more than 60 per cent of 
regional agricultural production. The sharp increase in production 
in Latin American agriculture in 1974, particularly as regards those 
crops with a higher response rate, is a clear indication of the 
sensitivity of agriculture to real market incentives. The expansion 
of wheat production in Argentina and that of soya beans in Brazil 
are clear examples of this flexibility. However, as regards several 
other products, the price increases were followed by sharp'falls. 
Perhaps the most marked examples, and those which had serious 
consequences for some countries were those relating to the prices of 
beef in 19?4, sugar in 1975 and 1976, and wheat in the current year.
Another development which had serious consequences in the 
recent past for Latin American agriculture was the increase in the 
prices of energy and fertilizers and pesticides. Its immediate 
impact was not marked, since this coincided with the increase in 
prices for a number of agricultural products. However, in some 
countries and* in particular those in which agricultural production 
is frequently geared to the needs of the domestic market, the rise 
in costs of production had a serious effect on productivity. This 
meant in the short term a relative reduction in the grwoth rate in 
the use of agro?*chemical inputs and mechanical equipment: a rate of 
consumption of phosphatic and potassic nitrogenous fertilizers as 
low as that which occurred in 1976 was not recorded for more than a 
decade. The consumption of fertilizers in 1976 was a little more 
than 1 million metric tons.
Some products or groups of products showed greater sensitivity 
to the changing conditions of markets and prices. Production directed 
mainly towards domestic markets showed greater growth rates in the 
medium and long term than traditional exports. The pressure of
/dom estic markets
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in recent decades have contributed to a better understanding of the 
functional relationship between the agrarian structure, the 
appropriation of income, the performance of the agricultural sector 
and national development. However, the overall growth in production 
was slow, compared with the process of agricultural modernization 
which took place, the relative position of the large majority of the 
population of the sector which was not incorporated into this process 
deteriorated, and the gap between rural urban income ,has not been 
narrowed.
According to the Sixth Report on Progress in Land Reform 
prepared jointly in 1976 by the UN, FAO and ILO, progress made in 
land reform in the region occurred at the planning level, and was 
administrative and institutional in nature rather than economic. 
Expropriations amount to just about 15 per cent of the land available 
for expropriation, and the beneficiaries of land reform actions amount 
to approximately 22 per cent of the total of possible beneficiaries. 
Very little progress has been made in solving the problem of the 
hundreds of thousands of minifundia farmers, landless farm labourers 
who, in general, are not among the beneficiaries of change in land 
ownership.
(d) Consumption, exports and imports
In several countries, the sluggisfc growth in agricultural 
production has had an adverse impact on.their export position. This 
can be seen by looking at trends in world agricultural trade;and the 
rate of growth in regional agricultural exports. While the volume 
of world exports increased by approximately 3*7 per cent per year 
between 1971 and 197^, those of Latin America increased by hardly 
1 per cent per year and in addition to this the region's share in 
world agricultural market continued to decline. This fell from 
17 per cent in 1950 to 13 per cent in 197^-1975, with sharp drops 
in respect of important produçts such as coffee, cocoa, wheat, and 
to a lesser extent bananas and sugar (see tables 2 and,3)* The 
marked increases in.exports of soya beans are the main exception 
to this trend.
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Table 2
LATIN AMERICA: VOLUME OP SPORTS AS A PERCENT AGE OF TOTAL PRO DUCT 101 
AND VOUJIE OP IMPORTS AS A PERCENTAGE OP SUPPLY FOR CONSUMPTIONS/
(Percentages)
1951 1961 1971 1974
A 3 A B A B A B
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico " '17.7. 6 .3 16 .1 5 .2 14.1 4.2 12.4 7.4
Andean Group ,, 1 1.0 9.6 12.5 12 .4 9.7 1 3 .3 15.3 9.8
Central American Common Market ' 39*8 6.7 4o.8 9.7 39.5 5.7 t 48.6 10.7
Caribbean Islands 0/ #•9 ' î h è 54.7 ,  ¿+.6 ' 43.7 39.6 $ .2 Z A
Other oountries d/ 20.6 h i & Ü 10.8 22.8 10.3 20.3 S £
Latin America 22.9 10 .1 a.6 8.8 18.3 10,2 17.4 12.2
Source: Estimates of the CEPAL/PAO Joint Agricultural Division, based on statistics of FAO and
official bodies of countries of the region.
Note: A : VoIùe» of exports as a percentage of total production.
B : Volume of imports as a percentage of supply for consumption.
a/ Domestic production and quantum Of exports valued and aggregated at 1969 regional prices of
products.
b̂  Quantum of irports valued and aggregated act 1970 CXP prices.
c/ Includes: Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Granada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaloa, Domini can Republlo and
Trinidad and Tobago, 
ç/ Ino3u.dea; Panama, Paraguay and Uruguey,
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Tabi* 3
LATIN AMERICAS PHYSICAL BALANCE OP EXTEFNAL TRADE OF Bffi 
Mi IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
(Thou«anda of tons )
Wheat/
S













Export 18 8 7 737 395 76 6 977 1 535 2 007 I83 108 454 -
Import 3 1 7 7 83 595 3 353 39 173 16 45 36 59
Balance -12 9 0 654 -200 73 6 624 1 496 1 834 167 *3 4l8 -59
1960̂ 1962
Export 2 154 2 631 397 4l8 9 960 1 869 3 242 190 128 654 -
Inport 4 383 230 300 24 329 43 258 15 98 76 113
Balance -2 229 2 4oi 97 394 9 631 1 826 2 984 175 30 578 -113
137*137*
Export 18 1 3 6 063 534 1 815 11 111 2 018 5 129 225 226 1 085 8
Inport 6 346 1 142 671 453 258 51 260 25 3II 193 248
Balance -4 533 4 921 -137 1 362 10 853 1 967 4 869 200 -85 892 -240
¿2*127!»
Export 2 344 4 839 452 2 164 11 559 2 034 5 258 209 336 971 12
Import 8 191 2 166 76 3 891 388 55 224 21 445 200 285
Balance -5 847 2 673 -311 1 273 11 171 1 97? 5 034 188 -109 771 -273
Sources CEPAL/FAO Joint Agricultural Division, based on FAO figures* 
a/ In terms of grain* 
b/ Including millet* 
o/ In terms nf sugar* 
d/ Beans*
e/ Inoluding oilseeds in terms of oil*
f/ Inoluding fresh, chilled, frozen and preserved meat, in terms of carcasses•
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The region has been affected with particular severity by the: 
restrictions imposed by the main external markets, as a result of 
the protectionist measures of developing countries and in particular 
the barriers faced as regards access for its meat in the market of 
the European Economic Community, by subsidized exports, of products 
which compete with regional production, and by the preferential 
treatment given to other regions.
The decline in the growth of regional agricultural exports is 
partly due to the strong pressure of domestic demand on production, 
which has led to certain changes in the composition of production.
In fact, cereals and oil-seeds are becoming more important, while 
coffee and tubers have a smaller share in regional production. Beef 
recorded an important relative reduction,' which was offset by the 
increase in the share of poultry. There’ was competition for soil use 
as a function of the markets, prices, and costs of production. The 
proportion of the production exported fell from 22 per cent in I96I 
to 17 per cent in 197*+.
During the five-year period, and notwithstanding some major 
examples of diversification, the high degree of concentration of 
exports over a small range of products and high dependence on a 
few markets (United States and Western Europe) continued. In 
1972/197^ the six main export products accounted for 82 per cent of 
total exports, 65 per cent of which corresponded to sugar, coffee 
and meat. At the beginning of the 1970s 60 per cent of Latin American
* ‘1 ■agricultural exports were to the United States and countries of the 
European Economic Community, 17 per cent to other developed countries, 
1^ per cent to other developing areas and the socialist countries, 
and the remaining 9 per cent represented intra-regional agricultural 
trade. The figure for the latter is almost the same as that recorded 
in the 1950s. ;*
Although food production increased from 70 to almost 80 per 
cent of regional agricultural production between 1950 and 1976, the 
failure of domestic supplies of some "critical" products to meet 
demand brought about a major increase in imports from outside the
/r e g io n . As
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region. As a result of this, the growth of exports is sluggish 
compared with the rapid increase in agricultural imports. These 
increased from 6 per cent per year during the 1960s to more than 
10 per cent per year on average for the first half of this decade.
The increasing dependence on extra-regional imports for domestic 
supplies is limited to wheat, edible oils, and dairy products, which 
together represent at present 60 per cent of total imports. They are 
supplied by a few countries, mainly the United States and other 
developed countries.
2. Industrial production 
(a) Expansion and decline in the growth rate
During this decade the industrial development process was 
intensified, although there were notable differences of degree between 
countries, and the rate of production was strongly influenced, in 
one way or another, by the impact of developments in the international 
economic situation, variations in the terms of trade, and, in 
particular, the increase in oil prices, and the pattern of investment 
and national income. Therefore, as is to be expected, the variations 
in industrial activities are to some extent related to the growth 
rate of the domestic product.
The figures for the region as a whole show a marked growth rate 
for the two-year.period 1972-1973» when the annual growth rate of 
production was 9*3 per cent, a figure well above that recorded in 
previous years (see table 4).
Balance-of-payraents problems, the increase in oil prices, the 
decline of external demand and the adjustments inevitably dictated 
by the new external conditions were directly or indirectly responsible 
for the drop in the growth rate recorded in 197^, which was only 
S.k per cent; and the even more drastic drop in 1975 when the increase 
recorded for the region as a whole was only 1.5 per cent.
/T ab le  k
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Table 1*
LATIN AMERICAS ANNUAL RATES 07 GROUTH OF THE GROSS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT
Country 1?65-1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1970-197:
Argentina 5a 5.8 6.7 6.8 7.2 -3.6 4.5
Bolivia 6.4 2.8 5.4 6 ,5 6.0 11,3 6.4
Brazll 10,4 11.3 14.1 15.8 7.1 3.7 10.3
Colombia 6.4 8.6 9.5 11.6 6.6 3.4 7.9
C osta Rica 9.5 9.9 , 8.7 7.4 8.7 5.0 7.9
Chlle 3.6 13.7 2.8 -4.5 -1.4 -27.0 -4.3
Ecuador 6 .3 . 8.6 • 7*3 7.8 11.6 12,6 9.6
El Salvador 5.7 7.° 3.8 6 .7 6.0 3.4 5.4
Guatemala 8*2 7.2 5.5 8.1 4.7 1.5 . 5.4
Haïti 6.0 8,6 10.8 .9.8 4.8 8.0
Honduras 4.7 5.5 ' . 7.8 8.1 -0,4 6.2 5.4
Mexioo 8.8 3.2 8.5 9.0 5.7 4,4 6.1
Nicaragua 8.1 4.8 6 ,5 1.8 9.5 0.6 4,6
Panama 9.6 8.2 4.4 4.6 , -4.4 -2.0 2.1
Paraguay 5.6 5*6 7.° 7.5 8.9 7. ° 7.2
Peru 5.8 8,6 7.3 7.4 8.0 6.0 - 7.5
Domlnican Republic 13.9 13.2 10.4 13.0 U .2 7.2 11.0
Uruguay 2.4 -1.8 -0,4 -0.8 3.6 6.7 1.4
V enezuela 5.2 6.1+ 8.3 , 5.8 9.0 12.8 8.4
Latin America 7.5 7.2 9.5 6.4 1.5 6.7
Source* CEPAL, based on official data of the countries.
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Although these figures are, to no small extent, the result of 
trends in industrial production in Brazil, it is nonetheless true 
that those fluctuations affected a large number of countries. Apart 
from the oil exporting countries, there are few other exceptions, 
as can be seen further, on.
The preliminary figures available show that during 1976 there 
was some recovery in the rate of growth of industrial production. 
However, it seems clear that for the region as a whole, the figure 
for preceding years were not matched, although in general the 
increase in production in most of the countries is likely to be higher 
than that of 1975* This is again largely due to the improvement 
which occurred in external conditions and variables. This upswing 
is more marked in Brazil, where industrial growth is estimated at 
approximately 10 per cent, and also in Colombia, to judge from the 
consumption of electricity. However, in Argentina there was a further 
drop in production which together with the drop recorded in the previous 
year (1975) places the level of activity well below that of 197^-
As table ^ shows industrial growth in Latin American countries 
as a whole was highly disparate. On one hand, there are Brazil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and 
Venezuela, which increased their production at a rate of approximately 
8 per cent and more during the period 1970-1975« On the other, 
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay showed definitely sluggish rates of growth 
and even contractions in levels of production. In other words, the 
decline of the relative share of the countries of the Southern Cone 
in total regional production in thepost-war period continued and the 
same can be said as regards the domestic product.
In conclusion, for the region as a whole, the unfavourable 
effect of the year 1975 was such that the average annual growth rate 
did not compare with the 1970 levels of 7 per cent; that is, a figure 
lower than the 8 per cent set in the International Development 
Strategy. Five countries succeeded in achieving or surpassing this 
target (Brazil, Ecuador, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela) 
and another two (Colombia and Costa Rica) just fell short of it.
/ ( b )  The
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The participation of the industrial sector in the formation of 
the domestic product continued to increase during the period 1970-1976. 
For the region as a whole, its share increased from 23 per cent in 
1970 to approximately 2h per cent in 1975, a figure which was 
maintained throughout 1976.
In table 5 it can be seen that, generally, the degree of 
industrialization of national economies tended to increase to a 
greater extent in the large countries, which is a further indication 
of the widening of the gap existing between those countries and the 
others as regards industrial development.
A further quantitative indication of the extent of their 
advance in industrialization is that provided by trends in the 
industrial product per capita, which increased at an average annual 
rate of 3*9 per cent. Expressed in 1970 dollars, this figure 
increased from 133 to 167 dollars per capita during the period under 
review; Although these figures show an advance of some importance, 
they are far below the levels of the more developed industrializad 
countries.
The changes produced in the structure of manufacturing 
production in the region followed the known patterns. The share of 
the branches producing consumer goods continued to fall, whereas that 
of the branches producing intermediate goods and, mainly, capital and 
durable consumer goods continued to increase.
Table 6 shows the variations in the productive structure of 
Latin America and of some countries of the region, grouped according 
to size.
In the large countries, the share of the traditional industries 
in total production fell more than in the medium-sized and small 
countries, and the relative importance of the engineering and metal 
products industries also increased in the former to a greater extent 
than in the latter, as can be seen by comparing the corresponding 
structures for each group of countries in 1970 and 197^« It can
(b ) The degree o f in d u s tr ia liz a tio n  and in d u s tr ia l transform ation
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T able  5





Weighted average 25.6 26.6
Colombia 17.5 18,7
Oille 27*2 23.7
Peru I 6.8 18.2
Venezuela 11,4 13.6
Weighted average 17.4 17.7
Costa Rioa 15*2 . 16*6
El Salvador 17*6‘ 18.1
Guatemala 14.6 14*5
Honduras 14,0 16; 1
KLoaragua 17*5 17*7
Panama 15,9 I 3.7
Dominican Republic 16,6 17*5
H aiti 9.8 11.6
Bolivia 12*9 13.5
Ecuador 19*0 20,3
Paraguay 17,2 17 »7
Uruguay &*2 25*5






LAI IN AIEHICAî STHJCTUPJS OP KANUFACTüimO DiDOSTRY 
(Per cant ages)
1370 1374
A B C A B C
Latin America 44.? 33.3 21.8 4o*3 34.1 $ .6
Large countries 40.8 CO0 24.4 # .2 35.2 28.6
Medium countries 52*7 31.4 15.3 43.5 33.0 17.5
Small oouiitries ¿3.8 22.5 7.7 68.1 23.8 8.1
Sour oe: CEPAL,
Notes: A : Branches mainly producing oonsumer goods: food, beverages, tobacco, textiles, foot,
wear and clothing, wood and cork, furniture and accessories, printing and publidi-
ing, leather and leather pro diets, miscellaneous industries,
B : Branches mainly producing intermediate goods: paper and peper products, rubber and
rubber products, chemical products derived from petroleum and ooal, non-metallio
minerals, basic metal industries,
C : Branches mainly producing oapital goods and oonsumer durables: metal pro ducts,non» 
electrical and eleotrioal machinery, tranq>ort material*
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also be seen that the medium-sized countries showed the more important 
changes, as regards their share in the total production of the branches 
producing intermediate goods.
(c) Exports of manufactures
The share of Latin American manufactures in total exports 
continued to increase. In 1970, it was 15 per cent of total exports; 
in 1973, it increased to almost 20 per cent, and in 1975 and 1976 it 
was approximately 18 per cent.
The growth in exports of industrial products shows the advance 
made in industrial development, particularly in the large countries, 
and is the main feature of the structural modifications which have 
taken place in Latin American economic growth.
The volume of these exports increased at a yearly average of 
20 per cent over the first k years of this decade, thereby intensifying 
the already very high rate of expansion, estimated at approximately 
17 per cent, which had begun in the mid-1960s. This trend v/as 
sharply interrupted'in the last two years, when export levels fell, 
as a result of the economic recession in the industrial countries 
and the decline in the rate of growth of investment and income in 
the countries of the region.
The three largest countries (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) 
account for approximately 70 per cent of Latin American industrial 
exports, which, in the main, are exported to countries outside the 
region. (See table 7»)
Brazil and Mexico export to countries of the region approximately 
25 per cent and 13 per cent respectively of their exports of 
manufactures; whereas the figure for Argentina is 44 per cent. In 
the case of Mexico, the marked orientation of its exports of manufactures 
to the rest of the world is explained, to a large extent, by the 
marked development in subcontracting (maquila) activities with firms 
from the United States.
/Table 7
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Table 7
LATIN AMERICA: (ROWTH OF EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES 
AND RELATION TO TOTAL EXPORTS OF GOCBS
(Millions of ourrent dollars and percentages)
1970 1973 1975 1976
Exports of manufactures
Argentina 420 978 928 1 20%/
Brazil 580 1 672 2 700a/ 3 000a/
Mffld.00 444 1 200 1 02%/ 1 1803/
Other countries 731 1275 l 952a/ 2 220^/
Latin Amerioa 2 175 5 125 6 60%/ 7 600a/
Total exports of goods of 
Latin America 14 853 25 996 37 202 42 352
Exports of manufactures as a 
percentage of total exports 




The countries which make up the Andean Group also export most 
of their exports of manufactures (mòre than 80 per cent) to countries 
outside the region. In contrast, for the countries which make up the 
Central American Common Market, the regional market is the most 
important, absorbing almost 90 per cent of their exports of industrial 
products.
There-are marked differences in the composition of exports of 
manufactures to the regional markets and to the rest of the world. 
Among the exports of Latin American countries to other regions, in 
order of importance, are traditional industrial products (42 per 
cent), engineering and metal products (33 per cent) and intermediate 
goods (21 per cent). In contrast, as regards the intra-regional 
trade of manufactures, engineering and metal products take first place 
(43 per cent), followed by intermediate products (30 per cent) and 
by those of the traditional industries (22 per cent).
(d) The perspectives of the industrialization process
The expansion of domestic markets is no doubt the principal 
growth factor in the region's industrialization process.
Latin American countries contain, to a greater cr lesser extent, 
broad sectors of the population which owing to their lew income form 
weak markets for industrial products or represent no demand whatsoever 
for them. Approximately only that half of the Latin American 
population with a per capita income of more than 500 dollars a year 
may be considered an important market for non-food industrial goods. 
This, apart from being indicative of a serious and distressing social 
problem, gives an idea of the size of the potential market which still 
remains to be exploited by the industrial sector.
The implementation of policies designed to extend the domestic 
market of the countries, in addition to helping in the achievement of 
greater equity in the distribution of the benefits of development, 
would facilitate, particularly in the large and medium-sized countries 
the expansion, on a significant scale, of the manufacturing sector 
and in addition more efficient production. The narrowness of the
/national markets,
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national markets, together - to a large extent - with the existing 
pattern of income distribution, not only impeded the exploitation 
of economies of scale, specialization, and the mass production of 
industrial goods, but also had a marked effect on the productive 
structure of the sector in almost all of the countries« In general, 
the pattern of the structure tends to be one of horizontal 
diversification and very limited verticâl integration as regards the 
number and types of consumer goods prodticed. As regards intemediate 
and capital goods, they have developed on a relatively smaller scale 
in most of the countries for the same reason*
However, the re-emerging importance of the domestic market does 
not mean that the attempts being madé to promote thé exports of 
manufactures, the substitution process, and industrial complementarity 
through integration schemes, specific agreements, and other forms of 
associations among Latin American countries, have lost their importance 
or that they are not being intensified in every way possible. Quite 
the opposite, the impulse stemming from the domestic market will of 
necessity have to act in conjunction with those provided by external 
markets - regional and extra-regional - not only because of the 
importance of their role, but also and, mainly, because the 
intensification of exports both within and outside the region, and 
an increase in the selective and efficient substitution of imports 
will be, indispensable if the external restrictions on the 
industrialization process itself are to be overcome, for they will, 
no doubt, be maintained during the years ahead even if their scope 
or intensity may vary.
The region has achieved a degree of technological maturity and 
development in the productive processes which enables it to aspire 
to higher export levels, not only of products with a high labour 
content, which can compete favourably with international costs, but 
also new products with a high technological content. Some recent 
experiences in Latin American countries as regards non-traditional 
exports are instructive as regards the type of highly sophisticated 
products at which regional exports may aim.
/Of course,
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activities.6/ Estimates show that exploration expenditure in 1973 
was more or less similar to that of I960 in terms of dollars at 
current prices, which was probably the result of expectations that 
cheap imported oil would continue to be available. In this respect, 
it should be mentioned here that with the exception of Trinidad and 
Tobago and Venezuela, the remaining oil-producing countries increased 
their domestic production in 1960-1970 by only 82 per cent, whereas 
at the same time they increased their imports of crude by 100 per cent.
However, the new price structure of fuels, and the increases 
in crude in 1973» reversed these trends; it is for this reason that 
investments in exploration in the region increased from 100 million 
dollars in 1973 to 180 million in 197^ and investments in production 
from 775 to 1,215 million dollars.7/
The problems raised for many non-oil-producing countries or 
those with low levels of production makes it necessary to study the 
role to be played by energy resources in regional development; all 
the more so if it is borne in mind that the concentration by countries 
indicated as regards production is also true as regards reserves.
Thus, it is estimated that 90 per cent of oil and natural gas 
reserves are located in only five countries, Vene2ucla accounting 
for the largest share.
Proven oil reserves in Latin America represented at the 
beginning of 1976 a volume equal to 22 times that of production in 
1975, whereas those of natural gas were approximately .Gk times its 
volume of production in 1975« If in the case of oil a more flexible 
concept of reserves is accepted, such as that of "expanded proven 
reserves", this volume could increase fourfold.
Furthermore, the identified volume of carboniferous reserves, 
estimated at 20 billion tons, represents a volume equal to one 
thousand times the annual consumption recorded recently.
6/ The number of wells drilled per square mile (0.002) in Latin
America represented 2 per cent of the corresponding figure for 
the United States and 13 per cent of that of the Soviet Union.




(b) Long-term consumption trends
The total consumption of energy in Latin America increased 
during the period 1950-1975 at an annual rate of approximately 7 per 
cent. This rate is higher than that recorded by the developed 
countries (4.5 per cent) and the world average (5 per cent), but 
lower than that of the developing countries outside of Latin America 
(8.9 per cent). Relatively, the region's position ih terms of the 
annual growth rate of per capita energy consumption - 3*9 per cent - 
was similar. Nevertheless, during the period under review the 
developed countries-Latin ihnerica per capita energy consumption 
ratio fell from 7*1 to 6.2:1, and the corresponding ratio for thè 
world as a whole vis-à-vis Latin America fell from 2.7:1 to 2.1:1.
As a result of the trends indicated, thé share of Latin 
America's consumption of energy in world consumption increased from 
2.5 per cent to 3-8 per cent; nevertheless, considering that at 
present the population of the region is approximately 8 per centi of 
the world population, the extent of the gap referred to previously 
can once again be appreciated.
Over the last five years the consumption of modern energy 
continued to show a decrease in the degree of product elasticity, 
recorded in previous periods, a trend similar to that experienced 
by the more developed countries or regions. The elasticity of energy 
consumption compared with that of production tends to fall.■' In the 
case of Latin America this process has intensified since it began in 
the 1970s and it is becoming more marked as a result of the increase 
in oil prices. The elasticity in question for the region as a whole 
fell from 1.2 in the period 1960-1970 to 1.04 in the period 
1970-1974, which indicated some relief for the deficit countries 
of the region.
(c) Institutional changes in the energy industry
The ownership and control of oil industry has undergone , 
significant changes, particularly in recent years. In general, a 
tendency has been observed in all the countries to strengthen State
/participation in
participation in all stages of the oil industry. Around 1974,
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador and Venezuela produced 9 0 cent 
of the region's oil production and accounted for 75 per cent of crude 
refining capacity. In addition, the first three countries controlled, 
through State enterprises, the ¡entire production of oil and natural 
gas, whereas Ecuador and Venezuela showed no State intervention ' :?-
whatever. However, this situation changed radically from i9?6 onwards-, 
for Venezuela completely nationalized its oil industry, and Ecuador 
bought a large share of the equity of foreign companies. If it is 
also taken into consideration that apother exporting country, Bolivia; •' 
controls its entire Oil industry, it can be seen that the region has 
achieved a high degree of control over the production of hydrocarbons.
As regards the ownership of the oil. refineries, important 
changes have alsoOccurred. In 1957.-the eight main foreign companies 
handled 64 per cent of the refining capacity, and in 1974 42 per cent; 
if Venezuela's refineries are excluded this percentage falls to 
23 per cent, of which lo per cent is accounted for by Aruba, Curasao, 
and Trinidad arid Tobago*
The changes in the ownership of the means of production of 
electric energy is reflected in the marked increase in State control 
of electricity production. Thus, whil,e ip 195.0 its share of 
production amounted to only 10 per cent of the total (excluding that 
produced by self-suppliers), in 1974 it increased to 78 per cent. 
Integrated planning at national levels was mainly responsible for 
such trends. IP this connexion, it is interesting to note that at 
the beginning of the 1950s 99 per cent of electricity supplied was 
provided by private enterprises most of which were foreign.
Since these firms were moved by the profit motive, they usually- 
brought in plant which varied in accordance with their interests and 
the features of the areas under concession, but which were heterogeneous 
even in their essential; featuresf such as type of current,•frequency,, 
voltage, etc. ' v r. ■/?
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Lastly, the initial policy adopted by most of the countries 
is that the expansion of the integrated electric system is a task 
for the country itself, and one from which the private sector, 
particularly the foreign private sector, should be excluded.
/Part Two

THE EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF LATIN AMERICA
Part Two
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INTRODUCTION
Latin America’s place in the world economy is undergoing a 
profound change. The countries of the region are ceasing to be 
specialized in the production of commodities alone; although 
commodities still account for most of external sales, manufactures 
are being exported and strongly influence the growth rate of total 
exports, as a result of a considerable level of industrial development 
and a domestic technological effort which, while still insufficient, 
has already become significant. The region's domestic market has 
grown as a consequence of this process of industrialization, and is 
very attractive to private investment; the transnational corporations 
have been drawn to produce for this market, bringing with them mainly 
technology and organization. The economic policies of¡many countries 
of the region have for over ten years been adapting to the needs of 
more open and competitive economies, reducing protection and making 
it more selective, and formulating a series of instruments to win 
external markets for non-traditional products.
These developments in industry, technology., trade and financing 
open new development opportunities for the countries of the region. 
They also raise new problems, however.
In the first place, the differences among the countries of the 
region are growing greater. One group of countries, which will be 
described below as semi-industrialized and possess the abovementioned 
features more clearly, is gradually entering a stage of intermediate 
development as a result of which they are becoming a case sui generis 
in the Third World. Many of the remaining countries of the region, 
however - numerically the majority - are still passing through stages 
which resemble those of many other developing countries.
/In addition
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In addition, even these semi-industrialized countries still 
have features and problems specific to developing countries, as well 
as others which correspond to their new conditions. Their industrial'I'’;'. ■ t "development is uneven and their trade structure unbalanced, both of 
which factors have an unfavourable effect on their development. Their 
technological dependence on the exterior remains fundamental. Despite 
the advantages they have because their labour costs are lower - in 
absolute terms - than in the developed countries, a more rapid and 
widespread growth of their exports of manufactures runs into obstacles 
not only because of the remaining shortcomings in their industries and 
the fact that their protection .has not yet been fully rationalized, 
.but also because of the restrictive practices of the transnational 
enterprises and problems of access to the markets of developed 
countries.
• The region's external financing has changed profoundly, and now 
stems to a very high extent from private sources, above all banking, 
instead of being predominantly from public sources.
The accumulated external debt is high both in absolute terms 
and in relation,to exports. Its structure has also changed, partly 
as a result of greater borrowing from private sources; the loans have 
become shorter and costs higher. Service payments would not conflict 
, with the-; increasing impprt needs inherent in a development process if 
the growth, of exports were sufficiently dynamic.
The large deficits on current account recorded in recent years 
in many non-oil-expprting countries of Latin America underline the 
need for international co-operation for both the semi-industrialized 
and the other countries. They also point to the pressing need to 
design and implement a co-operation policy adapted to the new 
circumstances, with the active participation of the Latin American 
countries, the other countries of the Third World and above all the 
developed countries.:
The main basis of this international co-operation would be its 
important contribution to the development both of the Latin American 
and of'the developed countries. Latin America is an important ally
/of the
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of the industrialized economies of the world, because of its 
significant imports, primarily of intermediate goods and equipment, 
and also because of its contribution to the growth of the 
transnational enterprises of those countries, much of whose world 
production is based in Latin American countries for the domestic 
markets of the region, and also in future for export to other markets, 
it is to be hoped.
The main purpose of Part Two of this document is to shed light 
on the more significant features of Latin America's present stage of 
development and its needs for. the. future, examine more thoroughly the 
progress and problems in its relations with the main developed areas, 
above all the United States and the EEC, analyse regional economic 
co-operation and suggest a selection of practical ideas whose 
discussion could provide useful background materia.1 for the design of 
suitable instruments. .. .
/I. LATIN
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1. The world setting
(a) Trade trends in the centres
Since thé end of the Second World War there has been intense' 
growth in the developed countries with market economies. A broad 
group of these countries is in the process of reaching the stage of 
the post-industrial economy. They have high per capita incomes, 
increasingly predominant tertiary sectors, rapid technological 
progrès'è which continuously creates a large variety of new products, 
and mass industrial production Which places those products within 
the reach of very wide sectors of the population.
There has also been a diversification of the centres. In this 
25 year period the relative importance of the European Economic* 
Community and Japan increased in comparison with the United States, 
both in the gross domestic product and in trade and international 
investment; the relative importance in world trade of the European 
countries with centrally planned economies also increased. Between 
1950 and 1975, the United States' share of the world imports dropped 
from 14.6 to 10.7 per cent, that of the EEC rose from 31*7 to 33*1
per cent, and that of Japan from 1.6 to 5*9 per cent. The
diversification of the centres, and the greater vigour of the new 
ones, suggest the advantages of a multilateral approach to 
international relations to enable the developing countries 
-particularly those of Latin America - to take advantage of the 
greater dynamism of some of them.
Trade, production, financial and investment relations among 
the centres have also grown very greatly. The internationalization 
of the economy and the creation of a vast economic area comprising 
the developed market economies has been consolidated. Besides the 
absolute and relative growth of the trade flows within groups of
countries (EEC, EFTA, Canada and Japan with the United States) trade
among the different groups has greatly increased at the same time as 
the barriers to trade of industrialized products have been reduced
I. LATIN AMERICA’S NEW PLACE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY
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(by the GATT negotiation rounds). Thu-s the developed countries 
increased their share of world exports- from 60; 2 to 66.3 per cent 
between 195° end 1975* (See table 1.)
-Each of the industrialized countries became specialized in 
order to attain a competitive scale of production, while the average 
scale throughout the world increased in size. Specialization occurred 
basically within each productive sector, with the countries exchanging 
goods of a similar kind with each other. In this way the bigger 
production scales were reconciled with each country’s achieving a 
diversified productive structure and-.a symmetrical composition of 
trade, with' similar imports and exports. Thus, for example, all the 
developed countries export and import products of the mechanical and 
electronics industries, each with a-certain amount of specialization 
within those sectors. For example,,”the United States has a particularly 
important place in the world market for aircraft construction, computers 
and calculating machines, office machines, building and mining machinery 
and non-electric generating.machinery; the Federal Republic of Germany 
has greater weight "in the world market for ; electrical generating 
machinery and machine-tools;, while the United Kingdom devotes itself 
relatively more to. non-electrical generating machinery and agricultural 
machinery.!/ T ‘
(b) The changing structure of world trade
The composition of world trade by types of goods changed 
profoundly between 1950 and 1975. The relative importance of 
manufactures increased from 4-3.7 per cent in 1950 to 60.4- in 1975»
1/ Source : Ministère de l'Industrie et de la Recherche de France, 
Etudes de politique industrielle, La division internationale du 
travail, volume I . la Documentation Française, Paris, 197é, 
pp. 52 and 53. Table prepared on the basis of OECD, Foreign 
Trade Statistics, sériés C and Groupe de Réflexion sur les 

























A* Developed market economy 
countries 60*2 66.3 U&L Çésl 11.4
1* United States 16.6 12.2 9.9 14.6 10.7 10,0
2* Canada 4*7 3.7 10.1 4.6 3.5 10*2
3* EEC (? countries) 26.5 33.9 12,3 31.7 33.I 11.5
4, EFTA (8 countries) 5.6 6.1 U.7 6.1 7.0 11.9
5* Japan 1.3 ' 6.4 18.4 1.6 5.9 17.2
6» Others 5.6 3.8 9.5 5.9 6.1 11.0
B* Centrally planned 
countries 8.1 ìA 12.1 M 10.4 12.5
Eastern Europe 6,8 9.0 12.5 6.3 9.4 13.1
Asia 1.3 0,8 9.3 1.6 1.0 9.0
C* Developing countries n * 2 J M ¿hi 22.6 10.5
1» Oilvexporting 7.3 13.4 13.9 4.2 6.5 13.3
2. Non»oll exporting M . 10.5 7.6 22.9 16.1 9.7
2*1 Afrloa 4.0 . 1.8 7.7 4.4 2.7 9.1
2*2 Latin Amerioa 10.4 , 3.9 6.8 9.0 5.7 8.2
2*3 Asia 9.1 4.3 7.9 8.3 5.7 9.6
2*4 Middle East 0.8 0.4 7.8 1.0 1.7 13.8
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics!
I«M»P*> International Financial Statistics*
/The fastest*-
The fastest-growing trade in this sector was that of the technologically 
more advanced manufactures. Food and ;raw materials, on the other hand, 
dropped from 46.4 to 19.1 per cent in the same period. Fuels rose 
from 9-9 per cent to 18.6 per, cent, ab.ove all because of price changes. 
These trends occurred systematically throughout the period, as may be 
seen from the figures for the years 1950 to I960. (See table 2.)
This great transformation contrasts with thé stability of the 
structure of world trade in the first half of ; the century, in the 
course of which primary products followed roughly the same overall 
trend as world trade.2/
The change which has occurred since the Second World War is 
linked with the faster growth of income ,¿/ the much faster rate of 
technological change (with new manufactures constantly appearing) and 
the trend towards mass industrial production, all of which caused a 
change in the structure of demand.
(c) The developing countries in world trade
The share in world exports of the non-oil-exporting developing
countries dropped from 24.4 per cent in 1950 to 10-5 in 1975» (See
table 1. ) The Latin American members of this group were those whose 
relative share declined most, from 10.4 to 3*9 per cent in the samé 
period. There was also a fall in imports: here the loss of ground 
was proportionally smaller, and was reflected in the trade deficits 
and the build-up of debts. In contrast, the importance of the oil- 
exporting countries grew considerably.
A number of factors have contributed to this decline of the non- 
oil-exporting developing countries: the abovementioned change in the 
composition of world trade (lesser importance of the non-fuel primary 
products in which they specialize); the lower growth-rate of their 
production of raw materials in comparison with the developed countries 
(caused in turn by the economic policy of•the developing countries 
themselves, their limited financial capacity to invest and their 
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United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1969.
World industrial production grew by 3*4 per cent annually in 
the first half of the century and by 7.4 ;pet cent annually in 




STRUCTURE OF WRLD TflAD E
Constant values 
(billlpns of 1Jdollars) Current values Percentage distribution a /
Growth during the period
;.>■ 1950-1975
Number Annual Annual 
■ of . rate rate
1950 I960 1973 1974 1975 1950 i960 1973 1974 1975 1950 i960 1973 155* 1975 times 4>er oentj fcar ont)y  y  y
Food and raw 
materials 55.0 82.2 158.1+ 15^.0 155.3 25.7 38.3 123.2 154.0 151.0 46.4 34.8 23*8 20.1 19.1 5.9 7 .3 4.2
Fuels 27*2 50.2 160.9 I60.O. l4o*8 5.5 11.0 59.4 160.0 147.0 9.9 9.9 11.5 20.9 18.6 26.7 i4.o 6.8
Manufaoturas 8.0 118.0 401.6 442.0 421.1 24,2 61.7 329.4 442.0 .  447.0 43.7 . 55.3 $3.5 57.8 60.4 19.7 12.7 8.3 i
Total (inoludlng
non-olassifled I
produots) l4o»2 252.4 723»! 764.4 737*0 55.4 113*1 518*5 764«** 790*0 1 0 0 ,0  1 0 0 ,0 100*0 100*0 100*0 14.3 11*2 6*9
Souree: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1959, I967 and 1#4, Vol. 1; Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, June 197$.
¿ /  At ourrent values, 
b/ At current values* 
c/ At constant values*
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The developed countries replaced imports of basic products and 
semi-manufactures from renewable natural resources in the course of 
these 25 years. Their own production of food and agricultural raw 
materials increased, as did trade among them in those products, at 
the expense of imports from developing countries. They adopted 
domestic support price policies, which contrast with their opposition 
to the attempts to apply support prices at the world level in favour 
of the exports of primary products of the developing countries. In 
this way they stimulated their own supply and gave their producers 
the necessary means to increase capitalization and technological 
innovation. At the same time they imposed tariff and non-tariff 
barriers on imports. In contrast, such barriers were reduced among 
important groups of developed countries with the progress of 
integration (as in the EEC). In food, the United States diversified 
its sources of supply and from an importer became a net exporter; 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand increased their share of world 
exports; the EEC and EFTA relatively reduced their imports and tended 
to direct them towards other developed countries. Likewise, in 
agricultural raw materials the developed countries proportionally 
increased their sales (United States, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand) and reduced their purchases from the developing Countries 
(in the case of the EEC and EFTA). Japan alone greatly increased its 
purchases of food and of agricultural riaw materials.
In the case of primary products or semi-manufactures based' on 
non-renewable natural resources the import subsitution of the 
developed countries was relatively smaller than in the case of 
agriculture. In the special case of fuels, their purchases from 
developing countries increased relatively. Sure supplies of minerals 
and fuels have become an important consideration for the developed 
countries.
Relations of the developing countries with each other and with 
the socialist countries remain limited, with a few exceptions.
/As a
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As a ; result, the developing countries'- share in the world trade 
of food and ’agricultural raw materials declined, as did their 
importance in mining products (although it increased in some, such as 
iron), and their share increased in fuels.
The developing countries,* excluding OPEC members, had a 
considerable deficit throughout the last 25 years in their trade 
relations as a whole with the developed countries. For the developing 
countries, this meant incorporât! h-g external resources and achieving a 
somewhat higher economic growth rate than their own exports would 
have permitted. For the developed countries, it represented more 
active promotion of their exports and production, and a better 
balance-of-payments position. In the case of the Latin American 
countries, in recent years the big trade balance and payments deficits 
were the result of their efforts to maintain as far as possible their 
economic growth rates and their policies of openness towards the 
outside world. If they had chosen to reduce their imports more 
severely - mostly purchased from developed countries - they would have 
harmed the recovery of the developed countries. A report of the 
United States Government Development Co-ordination Committee states 
that over 90 per cent of the cumulative trade surplus of the United 
States occurred in its trade with developing countries, most of it 
in agricultural products. The same report adds that while the United 
States' trade balance with developed countries deteriorated at the 
end of the 1960s, the .trade surplus with the developing countries 
cushioned the fall.4/
(d) The transnational corporations '
The activities of the transnational enterprises at the national 
and interhational levels is of long standing. However, their rôle 
has currently acquired new features,. since they now operate in a; 
unified international economic space. This globalization of thë
4/  Development Issues, Development Co-ordination Committee,
U.S. Government, May 1976, p. 107» Based on the study of the 
Department of Commerce: "U.S. trade with the developing 
economies: the growing importance of manufactured goods",
June 1975.
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market economy area is viable for technical and political reasons. 
Technically, every stage of the productive process - or the entire 
process - can be set up in whatever geographical location economic 
calculations suggest; and at the political level, since the Second 
World War the Western countries have become somewhat unified, 
particularly under the pressure of common security policies. In this 
context, the transnational corporations have become a fundamental 
component of the economic activity and relations of the developed 
countries with each other and with the developing countries. At the 
international level they fulfil the main entrepreneurial functions 
in financing programmes, investment, technological innovations and, 
in general, in organization and economic decisions.
Between 1962 and 1973 the investments of United States 
transnational corporations in continental Europe and vice versa 
increased almost four-fold, reaching some 30,000 million dollars; 
the investments of United States transnationals in Europe accounted 
for about four-fifths of this amount, the remainder flowing in the 
opposite direction.J5/ The number of subsidiaries also increased 
rapidly, particularly those of the chemical and electrical engineering 
industries. The much greater weight of the United States 
transnationals is connected with the special role of the dollar in 
the world monetary system - w h i c h  facilitated their investments 
abroad - and the United States Government's science and technology 
policy, which provided a big advantage in the introduction of 
innovations.6/
These corporations have a very big share of world trade. 
According to United States Department of Commerce figures, in 1970 
the United States transnationals and their foreign affiliates were 
responsible for 24 per cent of world exports of goods, and the
5/ See U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business.
y  See Lawrence G. Franko, The European multinationals, Harper and
Row, London, 1976, pp. 135,136* 162 and 1^3«
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percentages for the United States, Canada and Latin America were 
high.2/ In this respect, it is not only the amount of this trade 
which is important, but also some of its conditions. In particular, 
a large proportion of the exports of transnational corporations 
is comprised of transactions among affiliates of the same companies.
In the case of the United States, intra-company transactions 
accounted for *+9 per cent of exports of manufactures. 8/ These 
percentages -are higher in the case of Brazil (73 Pan cent) and 
Mexico (82 per cent) in 1972. It is important to study the Way in 
which prices are fixed in such transactions, the extent to which they 
resemble the prices which would obtain in competitive conditions in 
an open market, and the implication of this for the country exporting 
or importing goods in such conditions.9/
7/ See United States Senate, Committee on Finance, Implications 
, of multinational firms for world trade and investment and 
for United States trade and labor,~op. cit., p. 2?8 and table 
A-l on page 35̂ ', based on data of the United States Department 
of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, International 
Investment Division.
8/ Ibid.. p. 319.
J ■ ' * . • ' '9/ On intra-company trade, see United States Senate,, Committee on
Financej Implications of multinational firms for world trade; 
and investments-and^for United States trade and labor, op. cit., 
p. 31^ ff. Transfer pricing (and particularly the possible 
undervaluation Of imports and exports) see United States, Senate, 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Multinational corporations in 
Brazil and Mexico: structural sources of economic and non-ecónomic 
power, op. cit.. n. IQ ff.; Constantine Vaitsos, Intercountry 
income distribution and transnational enterprises, Oxford 
University Press, 197^; Daniel Chudnovsky, Empresas multi­
nacionales y ganancias mónop6licas en una economía latinoamericana. 
Siglo XXI Editores,. Buenos Aires, 197^5 Ronald Muller and 
Richard Morgenstern, "Multinational corporations and balahce-of- 
payments impacts in less-developed countries: an econometric 
..analysis of .export pricing behaviour", in Kyklos, International 
Review for Social Sciences. Vol. XXVII, 197*+. This last study 
calculates that the undervaluation of some exports of 
transnational enterprises in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and 
Venezuela averages between bO and b3 per cent of the prices paid 
on the open market.
/In 1970,
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In 1970, about 80 per cent of the production of the foreign 
affiliates of the United States transnational corporations was sold 
on the domestic market of the countries in which they were established 
(including both developing and developed countries other than the 
United States). These sales may be considered ’’indirect exports", 
since they replace the sales previously made from the headquarters 
country. It has been calculated that in 1971 the "indirect exports"
Of the affiliates of United States corporations were almost four 
times the direct exports made from the United States; in the case of 
the United Kingdom this ratio was two to one; in France, the 
Federal Republic of Germany and Uapan it varied between 37 and 
95 per cent.10/ In addition, through these affiliates the developed 
countries induce a significaht current of direct exports from the 
country of- origin of the corporation, particularly in equipment, 
spare parts and intermediate goods.
It has been estimated that in 1972 the profit rate on capital 
invested, after payment of taxes, was apparently 15*3 per cent for 
investment abroad, compared with an estimated 6.4- per cent for total 
corporation investment.11/ For their part, twenty big international 
banks of the United States receive 30 per cent of their total 
deposits from foreign countries in 1972.12/ Clearly, then, it is 
essential for the economies of the developed countries that the 
possibility should exist of operating in the markets of other 
developed and developing countries (bearing in mind that in 1970
10/ See United States, Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
Multinational corporations in world development. New York, 1973« 
International production or indirect export is estimated on the 
basis of the accounting value of the direct investment multiplied 
by a coefficient of 2, which is given by the United States 
data.
11/ See United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Multinational corporations in Brazil and Mexico: structural 
sources of economic and non-economic power, report prepared by 
Richard S. Newfarmer and Williard F. Mueller, p. 164, Table 7«
12/ See United States Senate, Committee on Finance, Multinational
Corporations. Washington, February and March 1973» Table prepared 
on the basis of the Washington Post, 29 December 1972.
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one-third of the total sales of 50 big United States transnational 
corporations Were made by their foreign affiliates).13/ This 
circumstarice could give the developing countries a strong bargaining 
pbisition to negotiate on the behaviour of those enterprises (in 
particular, as will be seen below, in cônnexion with ownership of 
the corporation and access to the markets of the developed countries).
It also seems clear that the transnational corporations have 
a dominant position in technology and foreign trade in the more 
modern dynamic sectors. One of the consequences is the growth of 
intra-company trade, in which the prices of imports and exports are 
"accounting prices" fixed by internal company decisions.
2. Latin America? a semi-industrialized region
There is an increasingly clear division between two kinds of 
countries in Latin America. On the one hand, there are the larger 
countries which have a higher degree of industrial development, 
namely Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, as well as Venezuela,and perhaps 
some other countries of intermediate size and development (such as 
Colombia). These countries retain the features of developing, immature 
economies but are also acquiring some distinctive characteristics by 
having completed some important stages of industrialization. This 
process of differentiation is clear in the three countries mentioned 
first; Venezuela, with its vast financial resources, may catch up 
with them by carrying out some stages of development more rapidly 
and successfully. These countries could be labeled semi­
industrialized.
The other case is that of the remaining Latin American countries; 
because of their stage of development, their characteristics, 
problems and needs more closely resemble those of the typical 
developing country. This is not to overlook the significant differences 
which exist between the countries, which range from those which could
13/ See Report on the Sixth Meeting of members of Congress and of 
the European Parliament, The multinationals? their function 
and future, Washington, 1974. ' '
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come to resemble the above-mentioned semi-industrialized countries 
in the medium term to those which are in a situation of underdevelopment 
close to that of many African and Asian countries- Nevertheless, 
their level of industrialization, structure of foreign trade, 
technological capacity, access to the international private financial 
market and their economic size distinguish them, for the time being 
from the semi-industrialized countries.
The countries of the first group are being shut off from 
bilateral and concessionary multilateral financial co-operation.
A trend also seems to be setting in of giving them less favourable 
treatment than others in official non-concessionary and even in 
commercial financial co-operation. Meanwhile, no international 
co-operation policy is being worked out to deal with these countries 
and help them overcome their present stage of development.
As the countries of the second group pass certain per capita 
income thresholds (300 dollars for some international bodies, even 
lower for others) they too are excluded or given lower priority by 
the concessionary financing machinery. On the one hand, it is 
reasonable to give preference to the countries with very low per 
capita income in the world distribution of concessionary aid. On 
the other hand, per capita income is an important but not a sufficient 
indicator of the degree of development and does not reflect the 
severe problems facing many of the small- or medium-sized countries of 
Latin America. Questions of trade structure, industrial capacity, 
capital markets and balance of payments should be taken into account, 
among other things; if that were done, those countries could not 
be too rapidly grouped with the semi-industrialized countries.
In this section we shall single out some of the features which 
increasingly distinguish the semi-industrialized countries as a 
special case in the third world. The division into the two cases 
described above, however, is not cut and dried. Whatever 
classification is made, useful as a first approximation, does not 
obviate the need to consider each country separately.
/(a) Is
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(a) Is a new international division of labour emerging?
Since the Second World War industrialization has advanced' 
greatly in Latin America. It began by forging ahead in import 
substitution, and gradually spread. The productive structure has 
become quite diversified; national production satisfies a high 
proportion of the deciand for many kinds of product, including 
goods with a high technological input; quality and costs have ' 
tended to grow closer to international levels, although generally 
without reaching them.
This industrial development helped to create a growing 
domestic market. Until thé middle of the 1960s, however, the Latin 
American countries continued to export almost exclusively commodities 
in primary form or with a low level of processing. Industries did 
not include exports as a significant part of their Strategy, and 
economic policy did not promote external sales with the nècéssary 
energy to overcomé this inertia. The export of manufactures was 
instead a sporadic activity which occurred in periods when the 
domestic market contracted because of the short-term economic 
situation.
After the middle of the 1960s, exports of manufactures began 
to thrive, primarily in the more advanced countries of the region. 
Initially they developed primarily within the regional market, and 
then spread towards the markets of the developed countries and the 
developing countries of other areas. Currently, those countries are 
ceasing to be exclusively exporters of primary products. Manufactures 
are not causing a radical change in the structure of total exports, 
but they are strongly influencing their rate of growth.
The present stage of development of the industry allows and 
calls for a future combination of import substitution, to complete 
the stages of development still pending, with the export of 
manufactures, so as to achieve a new form of specialization and a 
new place in the world economy which would in'turn be part of the 
world process of attaining a new international division of labour.
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The wage differential between thè developed and developing 
countries * including those of Latin America - may lead to a new 
division of labour among countries, with the displacement for 
competitive reasons, of industries where labour costs are very 
important, from the former to the latter. Labour costs in 
manufacturing industry, for example, are generally much lower in 
Mexico or Brazil than in the United States. 1*»/ In 1970 in manufacturing 
industry as a whole the average wage for one man-hour was 12 per cent 
that of the United States in Mexico, and 14 per cent in Brazil.
There are also striking manpower differences in the operations of 
a single company in the United States and in developing countries.15/ 
Even if productivity is lower in the developing countries, the 
differences in the unit cost of labour create an important margin in 
their favour. In some cases the wage differential has led to heavy 
emigration, such as the migration from the Mediterranean countries 
to other more developed European countries, or from Latin America 
to the United States. In other cases, however, they are gradually 
causing the displacement to developing countries of highly labour- 
intensive industries, a movement limited by the resistence of the 
corresponding productive sectors in the developed countries.
Another new trend is the transfer to developing countries of 
some of the more labour-intensive parts of the productive process of 
some products, generally known as international sub-contracting.
It is perhaps in Mexico that this procedure has reached the highest 
level in Latin America; sub-contracting exports.in 1975 reached,
See United States Senate, Committee on Finance, Implications 
of Multinational Firms for World Trade and Investment and for 
United States Trade and Labor, United States Government Printing 
Office, Washington, February 1973, Table A-^l, p. 731»
15/ In the case of the operations of General Motors, at the end of
1972 the relative cost of an average hour of work as a percentage 
of that cost in the United States was estimated at 35 in Mexico, 
18 in Brazil and 16 in Argentina. See United States Senate, , 
Committee on Finance. Multinational Corporations. Washington, ' 
February and March 1973« .
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1,021 million dollars, 16/ which represents 85*5 per cent of the 
country’s other exports of manufactures. International sub-contracting, 
frequently used by transnational companies, offers the developing 
countries new possibilities of industrialization, export of manufactures 
and employment; at the same time, it hinders the generation of 
favourable effects to other sectors of the economy (generally known 
as forward and backward linkage) and leads to a situation of 
particularly heavy dependence since at any moment the corporation 
may decide to displace new production to other countries.17/
The decentralization of the labour- and natural-resource-intensive 
industries from the developed towards the developing countries is not 
without its difficulties and lags. These industries are often among 
those with the highest protection in the developed countries,18/ due 
to the fact that they are undergoing a process which has been described 
as "aging". Concerned to avoid problems of unemployment and depression 
in specific areas of the economy, the developed countries cannot 
rapidly dismantle their protection; they can only dc so gradually, 
while simultaneously supporting the modernization of their corresponding 
domestic activities.
Furthermore, the experience of recent years shows that many of 
the countries of Latin America are also in a position to export 
technologically more advanced, goods (consumer durables, capital and 
basic intermediate goods), which have the advantage that they are 
produced with more skilled and better paid labour, that they induce 
greater national technological development‘and that the international 
demand for them is growing with a higher income-elasticity than that 
of the traditional industries. In 197^, Latin American'exports of
Of which *f68 million dollars were value added in Mexico.
1 2 / This is in addition to the dependence on the exterior, effecting 
all indtistrial development, in respect of technical innovation* 
production methods and relative intensity of capital and labour, 
consumption patterns, etc.
18/ See below, the chapters on the relations with the United States 
and the EEC where a number of the more important cases in these 
sectors are discussed.
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electrical and non-electrical machinery and transport equipment 
amounted t o -1,840 million dollars; about 45 per cent of this figure 
was electrical machinery, 33 per cent transport equipment and 22 per 
cent, electrical machinery and telecommunications equipment; these 
exports include technologically quite advanced products, particularly 
in transport equipment which is growing very fast.
The transnational corporations in Latin America are a highly 
important instrument in exports of such products. The technology 
they furnish opens up international markets in which innovation is 
one of the main elements of competitiveness; their world system of 
affiliates could open the door to the markets of the developed countries. 
The restrictive practices of these companies, however, have often 
limited the growth of Latin American exports.19/ To date the main 
interest of these companies in coming to Latin America has been to 
produce the local market and not to export.
The Latin American market has been and is of great importance
to exports, particularly in the more advanced sectors, as will be 
seen below in chapter V.
(b) The beginnings of a domestic technological drive
The domestic technological effort of the semi-industrialized 
countries, particularly Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, is already 
significant and growing. In 1968, Brazil spent a little over 
200 million cruzeiros (at 1975 prices) on science and technology; 
in the present-plan, expenditure under this head is programmed at
6,000 million cruzeiros annually.20/ A group of the bigger Argentinian 
manufacturing firms spent some 30 million dollars annually, or
0.4 per cent of their sales, on research and development at the end
Reference is made below to the new and still incipient but
highly significant kinds of negotiation between governments 
and transnational corporations, through which the latter are 
encouraged to export more; figures are also given on the 
importance of exports of manufactures by transnationals in 
comparison with the total.
20/ II Basic Plan for Scientific and Technological Development, 
Presidencia de la República, Brasilia, 1976.
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of the 1960s.21/ In Mexico recently research and development 
expenditure in industry was estimated at 12 million dollars annually, 
and the Government programme supposes a fast rate £>f growth.22/
These figures are clearly not very high, but they show the beginnings 
of national efforts; Japan at the end of ithe 1960s spent 1.5 per 
cent of its gross product on research and development for civilian 
purposes.
Innovations have been made in many products and processes both 
in the traditional and the metalworking industries. They enable 
better use to be made of local conditions, although on the other 
hand they hinder exports in cases where international services of 
spare parts are based on the original models.23/
There is a growing flow of technology from the semi-industrialized 
countries to the other countries of the region, both in the form of 
technology built into capital goods and as pure technology. "Key 
in hand" factory sales are an important export head for the relatively 
more developed countries. In addition, Argentinian, Brazilian and 
Mexican companies are taken advantage of their technological lead 
to establish subsidiaries in other Latin American countries.24/
This growing domestic technological effort is nevertheless 
still incipient and scattered; it is not sufficiently tied to specific 
objectives. As a result it does not suitably prepare the industry 
to compete both in the domestic market with the reduction of protection 
and in external markets for exports. Thus industrial development 
itself simultaneously generates a rapid rise in the demand for foreign
¿i/ J. Katz, Importación de Tecnología, aprendizaje e industriali­
zación dependiente, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 197¿°
22/ CONACYT, Política Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología, Mexico, 1976.
23/ J* Katz and E. Ablin, Tecnología y Exportaciones Industriales,
IDB-CEPAL Programme, August 1976, mimeo. /
24/ Some studies of this process of internationalization of Latin
American firms are currently underway in the IDB/CEPAL project 
and in INTAL, as well as in Carlos Diaz-Alejandro, Direct 
Foreign Investment by Latin Americans, Nuffield College,
Oxford, 1976, mimeo.
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technological services, which increases the direct investment 
accompanying the new technology. Payments by Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico in royalties for imports of technology grew at annual 
rate of 20 per cent over the last decade.
Technology is one of the fields in which the external dependence 
of Latin America, including even the more advanced countries, is 
most apparent. International co-operation is essential to continue 
the development process.
(c ) The transformation of economic policy
Since the middle of the 1960s, both the semi-industrialized 
and the other countries of Latin America have greatly improved the 
design and use of their economic policy instruments, concomitantly 
with the process of increasing the opening up of their economies to 
the outside world. Export promotion systems made up of a variety 
of instruments have been established and continuously improved with 
experience. Foreign exchange prolicies now provide more stable and 
remunerative conditions for exports, reducing the fluctuations in 
exchange-rate purchasing power generated by inflation. Fiscal and 
financial incentives are provided and an institutional structure exists 
to support exports.
With regard to importsj protection has been reduced and 
rationalized so as to make industry more competitive. Argentina and 
Brazil have reduced the protection provided by tariffs and non-tariffs 
barriers and Argentina is studying a new general reduction. The' 
countries of the Andean group have worked out a common external tariff, 
which, if adopted, would greatly reduce their external tariffs. Chile 
is periodically carrying out overall reductions which will leave 
tariffs at quite a low level at the end of 1978. These reductions 
in tariff and non-tariff protection have led to a buoyant, steady 
upward trend in imports. Between 1965 and 1975 Latin American imports 
as a whole 25/ grew at a rate of l . V p e r  cent for every 1 per cent of 
growth of the product. The elasticity coefficient was 2.1 for Brazil, 
1.3 for Mexico and 2.0 for Ecuador.
2 5 / E x c lu d in g  th e  CARICQM c o u n t r ie s  and Cuba.
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These imports served, inter alia, to modernize the equipment 
of the industrial sectors which began to export, and to purchase 
abroad the inputs needed to produce exportable goods.
It should be noted that these large reductions in protection 
which have been and are being made are a very important reciprocal 
gesture Latin America is making - without saying so at the GATT 
negotiating table - to the developed countries, since this greater 
external openness mainly leads to greater purchases of equipment 
and intermediate goods from the developed countries. This should 
be taken into account in those negotiations, as an answer to the 
frequent criticism that the developing countries do not grant 
reciprocity in the tariff reductions of the GATT rounds and to the 
advantages they receive under the generalized system of preferences.
It should be recalled that the Latin American countries are trying 
to establish rational tariff systems. This is not easy to do in 
multilateral negotiations. The systematic approach they are attempting 
to apply in their tariff reductions, suited to the needs of their 
present stage of development, leads to possibly similar results for 
the developed countries.
(d) Private direct foreign investment
Its semi-industrialized state and the size of its domestic 
market, together with relatively cheap labour, have led to considerable 
private direct foreign investment in Latin America. This has been 
one of the main determinants of its economic structure and activity, 
and of its relations with the exterior. „
Latin America's importance as an investment area can be seen 
from the fact that it received 44 per cent of the 58,200 million 
dollars of total accumulated private investment by the developed 
countries inithe developing ones at the end of 1973»26/
26/ See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Investissements par le secteur privé des pays membres du Comité 
d'Aide au Développement (C.A.D.) dans les pays e n v o i  de 
developpmement, état des actifs a la fin de 1973. Paris, 1975»
The member countries of the DAC are Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, United States, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, 
Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Sweden and Switzerland.
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Looking at-this investment from the angle of the country of 
origin, the highest percentage is that of thé United States, which 
in 1967 accounted for two-thirds of the total. However, since then 
its relative importance seems to have declined, due to the arrival 
of Japanese investments' 27/ and the'nationalization of oil and 
mines in Latin "America“. 28/
From the standpoint of recipient countries, Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico and Venezuela accounted for almost two-thirds of this amount 
(see table 3)»
A substantial change has taken place in the sectors of activity 
to which foreign investment flows, and there is now an absolute 
predominance of manufactures for the supply of the domestic market, 
side by side with the remaining foreign investment which was important 
in the past in the public service, mining and oil sectors. In 1967» 
the three main types of investment of the DAC countries were in 
manufacturing (36 per cent), oil (24 per cent) and raining (11 per cent). 
Subsequently the nationalization of oil and mines caused a great drop 
in the share of the last two headings. In manufactures, the 
outstanding branches are the motor-vehicle and chemical industries.29/
In the transfer to Latin America of long-term assets in 1974 
by OECD countries, the United States accounted for 50 per cent, 
the EEC 25 per cent and Japan 22 per cent (as against a 
cumulative amount of direct investment in 1967 of 2 per cent).
In Trinidad and Tobago the Government bought the Shell Trinidad 
Company in 1974; in Venezuela the petroleum'investments were 
nationalized as of the 1 of January ,1977; ib Ecuador t,he 
Government bought the shares of the main foreign oil companies
at the beginning of 1977* In mining, there were the......
nationalizations of copper in Chile (1971): bauxite in Guyana 
(1975) and various mines in Peru (including the Marcona iron 
ore mine in 1975)»
In Brazil at the end of 1973» of total accumulated foreign 
investment in manufacturing industry 21 per cent was in the 
chemical industry and 19 per cent in transport equipment; in 
Mexico in 1970 these percentages were 30 per cent and 10 per 
cent respectively; and in Argentina in 1969, 28 per cent of 
the industrial production of foreign companies was in transport 
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Table 3
PROVISIONAL ESTIMATE OF THE ASSETS CORRESPONDU© TO THE DIRECT 
INVESTMENT OF THE MEMBERS OF THE DAC IN 23 LATIN AMERICAN . 
COUNTRIES, 1967 AND I973
(Mllllona of dollars)
Country 19# 1973
Argentina 1 821*4 2 450
Brazil 3 727*3 7 **5°
Mexloo 1766*5 3 085






Venezuela 3 495*0 3 600
Sub-total Andean countries 1 2 2 2 s i 6 525
Five eountrles of the Central 




Panama 830.3 1 875
Dominican Republic 157*9 360
Total 19 countries 35.* 2«8 22 812
Guyana 189.0 140
<Jafflaloa 670.9 1 200
Surinam 99.6 130
Trinidad and Tobago 686.8 1 140
4 Caribbean countries 1 M g 2 610
Total 23 Latin American countries 16 896.1 *  422
Sources» Organisation for Economie Development and Co-opération, Les actifb 
correspondant aux Investisse ment 8 directe du aeoteur privé de a paye 
du C.A.D. dans les paye en voie de développement » état a la fin de 
1967. Parle 1972, end Invegtl sseraeirt a par le aeoteur privé des pays 
membre a du comité d’aide au développement dans les pave on voie de 
développement - état des actifs a la fin de 1979, Paris 1975*
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In the specific case of United States investment public services, 
the main heading until 1930» steadily declined while manufactures 
rose from 7 per cent in 1929 to become the main investment sector 
in the 1970s. The latest trend, which dates from the last three 
years, is the drop in foreign investment in petroleum and mining 
which remained at about kO per cent between 1929 and 1972 (with a 
large rise in petroleum and a fall in mining).
Special attention should be given to two aspects of direct 
investment: its real contribution to the development of Latin 
America, and the countries' new terms of negotiation.
(i) The contribution for foreign investment. What, the 
transnational corporations contribute to the,developing countries 
is mainly technology, organizational methods a n d .financing programmes.
At present the main element seems to be technology, mostly linked 
with private foreign investment. (See the section on transnational 
corporations.) In addition, transnational corporations contribute 
their experience and organizational capacity to organize efficiently 
the subsidiaries set up in the developing countries. This is in a 
sense an "organizational technology" introduced by the transnational 
company, which is important for the modernization of industries so 
that they are technically in a position to export manufactures.
Traditionally,.financing was the main element of foreign 
investment which above all consisted of a flow of resources from 
one country to another. It now seems that the nature of this flow 
has changed to become a financing programmes rather than genuine 
resources proceeding from the country of origin of the investment.
Thus the figures for the sources of funds of a sample of affiliates 
of United States' companies in Latin America for the xoeriod 1966-1972,30/
23/  See United States Department of Commerce. Survey of Current
Business, July 1975, pp« 29 to 52, "Sources and uses of funds 
for a sample of majority-owned foreign affiliates of United 
States companies, 1966-1972", a study prepared by Ida May Mantel. 
The sample concerns 763 affiliates of United States companies 
installed in Latin America out of a total of 5,337 for the region 
as a whole (i.e.; 13 per cent); it covers 17 per cent of the 
value of direct investment and 39 per cent of property, plant 
and equipment expenditure.
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indicate that only 12 per cent of those funds stemmed from the 
country of origin: another 22 per cent were financed from the 
undistributed profits of the Latin American subsidiaries,31/ and the 
rest, roughly two-thirds, came from sources which were neither 
the company itself nor in the United States. Thus the main financial 
contribution of the transnational corporation does not lie on its 
own funds or funds from the country of origin, but in the obtaining 
of foreign funds, eithèr from the country in which the investment 
is made or from international sources. To this end the transnational 
corporations and the governments of the countries of origin and
destination of the investment often combine their efforts.
Another weakness of the constribution of foreign investraënt 
has been in access to international distribution channels. In 
general, the international corporations have supplied the domestic 
market of the Latin American countries but they have not likewise 
facilitated access to the external markets in which they operate.
In view of the high propensity to import of these companies, it is 
important that in future the countries of Latin America should be 
able to increase their exports by making greater use of some of the 
marketing channels at the disposal of the transnational corporations.
(ii) Investing and the new terms of negotiation. The operatiohs 
of the main investment agents - the transnational companies - is
conditioned by the bargaining power of the governments of the host
countries. In this connexion, two features of their operations should 
be noted: firstly, their capacity to influence critical decisions 
in the country of origin and the host country; and secondly, their 
flexibility in formulating economic replies to the restrictions they 
are unable to prevent at a political level.
It has been pointed out that their power and growth enable 
them to influence, directly or indirectly, the policies and action 
of the government of the country*of origin and the host government,
31/ Eighty per cent of the net internal income of subsidiaries 
corresponded to distributed^profits, 20 per cent to 
undistributed profits.
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and sometimes to help to place the countries in a position of 
interdependence or dependence»32/ Frequently, then, the transnational 
corporation ensures that government decisions are favourable.
However, when dealing with a firm political decision or an irreversible 
economic process the transnational companies have shown great 
flexibility in preparing and executing suitable replies, from their 
point of view, to the restrictions which may exist. Thus they replied 
to the Latin American substitution policy with a parallel process 
of "export substitution" which consisted in setting up subsidiaries 
in the countries of the region to supply the domestic market; in the 
face of State ownership policies on natural resources and public 
services, they became specialized in external marketing, technical 
assistance and the supply of equipment and spares; and in dealing 
with centrally-planned economies, they carry on a wide range of 
activities, even medium- and long-term ones, without affecting the 
ownership of the companies.33/
32/ See United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Multinational Corporations in World Development, New York,
1973»
Between i960 and 1973, countries with centrally-planned 
economies acquired about 1,700 patents in the market economy 
countries and, reciprocally, the latter purchased about 
500 patents from them. Again, more than 1,500 short- and 
long-term co-operation agreements have been signed, including 
the purchase of "key in hand" factories; what is more, 
agreements have been reached to carry out joint ventures 
in other countries. These joint ventures in western countries, 
roughly 300 in number, primarily concern the distribution 
and sale of Eastern European products, and generally these 
are companies in which the eastern countries have a majority 
holding. (See J. Wilczynski, "Multinational Corporations 
and East-We3t Economic Corporation", in Journal of World 
Trade Law, Vol. 9, NQ 3, May-June 1975, pp. 266-286.)
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3« Can Latin America do without international
co-operation?
The status of semi-industrialized countries attained by some 
Latin American States and in the process of being attained by others, 
which places them in a special position within the third world, does 
not enable them to do without vigorous international co-operation.
These countries, even the most developed of the region, continue to 
have important features in common with the rest of the developing 
countries and they also have problems characteristic of the period 
of transition through which they are passing. They are thus faced 
with requirements which they are unable to meet adequately on their 
own, which makes it indispensable to have regional and international 
co-operation adapted to this stage of their development to supplement 
their own domestic efforts. The following are some of the most 
important aspects.
(a ) Uneven industrial development
Substitutive industrialization may have gone somewhat too far 
in many traditional industries. Each country has tended to produce 
everything, with no kind of specialization and with small production 
scales' and insufficient competition. Such production is adapted 
almost exclusively to small domestic markets, with a large part of 
the population excluded from them for lack of purchasing power.
The small size of plants compared with international plants necessitates 
a high level of protection.
Concurrently, the industries producing capital and intermediate 
goods have lagged behind, with a considerable margin of import 
substitution still to cover. The high external supply coefficients 
and the rapid growth of demand for these essential goods for the 
development process constitute the main cause of these countries1 
balance-of-payments difficulties.
Thus, for example, in 1975 it is estimated that for all the LÂFTA 
countries the imported supply coefficient of demand in the traditional 
industries was 3 per cent, while in the metal manufactures and,machinery 
industry it was 27 per cent. In the latter group of sectors, the
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imported component o.f machinery other than electrical machinery 
represented 51 per cent of demand. Countries with lower coefficients 
were Argentina (31 per cent), Brazil (37 per cent) and Mexico 
(74 per cent).
In addition, the Latin American countries represent a large 
market for imports of equipment and intermediate goods basically 
purchased from developed countries; their purchases of these goods 
from each of the developed areas are equal to or greater than those 
of some of the most important developed areas of the world and, 
of course, are much larger than those of any other developing region, 
(b.) Asymmetrical trade structures
Primary goods still predominate in the composition of exports 
(accounting for about 85 per cent). This composition is completely 
different from that of imports, which consist essentially of 
equipment, parts and components, and intermediate manufactured goods 
including chemicals. This asymmetry contrasts-with the case of a 
mature economy, which has similar export and import structures 
compatible with their inter-seçtoral specialization.37/
Exports of manufactures are still at an incipient and 
undiversified stage. They represent a small proportion of production, 
except in the case of a few isolated sectors., Experience in 
penetrating the markets .is fairly limited. Moreover, as these 
exports increase in volume they begin to encounter considerable and 
increasing barriers impeding access to the developed countries' 
markets. .
37/ United States exports include a larger proportion of primary 
products than those of the EEC countries. However, all these 
countries export, together with basic commodities, highly 
diversified manufactured goods, in contrast with the greatly 
concentrated composition of Latin American exports. Japan is 
a special case since it scarcely exports any basic commodities, 
but they constitute a high proportion of its imports. See 
Gérard Fichet and Norberto Gonzalez, "Production structure and 
the dynamics of development", CEPAL Review, Santiago. second 
half of 1976.  !-----
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(d ) Insufficient absorption of labour
Despite the increase in the product over the past 25 years 
and the vigorous development of industry, which have had the effect 
of incorporating considerable manpower into productive activities, 
in; most countries of the region there is still a serious problem of 
unemployment and unproductive utilization of manpower. The consumer 
pattern imitated from other countries favours a demand for goods 
produced with a high content of imports, capital and highly skilled 
labour. In addition to a modification of this structure of 
consumption, a faster growth of the economy, particularly of 
manufacturing and agriculture, is required if the employment problem, 
is to be solved within a reasonable period. This in turn involves 
requirements, in terms of domestic policy and adequate international 
co-operation.
(e) External instability and bottleneck. . The debt problem
. T h e  external instability and bottleneck which traditionally 
accompanied Latin America’s development were overshadowed for some 
countries of the region by the improvement in the purchasing power 
of exports and external financing as from the mid-1960s, and later 
by the transitory rise in the prices of raw materials in 1973 and 
1974. In recent years, however, the restraint on development imposed 
by the external sector has once again become all too evident. The 
first part of this report and the subsequent section on external 
financing and the debt 39/ analyse the balance-of-payments deficit 
and. its financing. Summarized here are some main points underlying 
the need for adequate international co-operation to accompany domestic 
policy in order to solve the external bottleneck.
(i) The balance*of-payments deficit, on current, account of the 
non-oii-expor.ting; countries increased considerably in absolute terms 
and in proportion to exports. This affects many:countries of the 
region, as may be seen in section 5 of this chapter. The increase 
in the import prices of capital and intermediate goods, the rise in
3 9 /  S e c t io n  5 o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r .
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oil prices, the world recession and the increase in service 
payments on foreign capital are not unrelated to this problem.
(ii) The external financing of these countries, which in the 
mid-1960s was mainly from official sources, now comes predominantly 
from private sources. Private banks provide a major part of this 
financing. The sale of bonds, on the other hand, is still a 
relatively minor source.
(iii) Parallel with the shift from public to private sources 
of financing there has been an unfavourable change in maturity 
periods and costs: the former are becoming shorter and the latter 
are increasing. Many of the Latin American countries tend to remain 
excluded from concessionary resources. Private sources are not 
prepared to provide financing on the terms with regard to maturity 
periods required by developing countries. Many Latin American 
countries are finding difficulty in obtaining access to private 
financing markets.
(iv) The cumulative external debt is high and is growing in 
both absolute and relative terms. For the non-oil-exporting countries 
the State-guaranteed debt (excluding the debt to the International 
Monetary Fund and credit for under one year) amounted to
40,000 million dollars (125 per cent of exports) in 1975»40/ Credit 
from private banks not guaranteed by the State stood at 25,000 million 
dollars in the same year. The two amounts continued to grow rapidly 
in 1976.
4. Basic commodities
About 85 per cent of Latin America's total exports is still 
made up of basic commodities. Their prices have fluctuated greatly 
in the past 25 years, and problems of access to markets have also 
been a source of concern. This point has been the subject of recent
40/ In 1965 the figures were 8,700 and 2,500 million dollars, 
respectively.
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analyses by CEPAL, so that the present study will deal briefly with 
the most important recent trends and some salient aspects of the 
integrated UNCTAD programme.41/
(a) Recent developments and trends
As usually happens in international commodity markets, 1976 prices 
followed very divergent trends. If the index for all the most important 
Latin American exports is taken as a reference, it will be seen 
that in the first two quarters of 1976 it reached higher levels than 
in the last two quarters of 1975 and, that the persistence of this 
trend in 1976 would bring the average for the year to over that for 
1975, though probably without regaining the 1974 levels. This, of 
course, is a simplification, since the overall index reflects sharp 
price increases for two or three commodities of varying importance 
for a certain number of countries, and at the same time drops or 
erratic fluctuations for other commodities also of varying importance 
for countries of the region. The best course, therefore, is to show 
the price trends for some individual commodities, since their 
importance in each country's exports will largely determine the 
total volume of export earnings.
Perhaps the most noteworthy situation in 1976 as regards price 
levels is that of coffee. It should be recalled that this was one 
of the least favoured commodities during the brief 1973~19i?4 commodity 
boom: there were surpluses of production over consumption and various 
problems had led to the suspension of the economic clauses of the 
international agreement on this commodity. In mid-1975» however, 
there were severe frosts in Brazil's coffee-growing areas and the 
considerable shortfall in that country's exportable production set 
off the rises which by the end of 1976 had brought coffee prices to 
higher levels than in any previousyear.
ii/ See CEPAL, "La coyuntura internacional y el sector externo",
Cuadernos de la CEPAL, N2 7, 1975; CEPAL, "Temas del nuevo orden 
económico internacional", Cuadernos de la CEPAL, N2 12, 1976; 
CEPAL, Los mercados internacionales de productos básicos en 
1975 (E/CEPAL/L.134/Rev.l), 1976, mimeographed. — — —
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A fairly critical supply situation is also the main reason-for 
the increases during the course of 1976 in cocoa prices, which by 
the end of the year had reached levels comparable with the peak 
prices recorded in 1974. In the case of cocoa, as in that of coffee, 
the favourable state of the market has rendered unnecessary the 
operation of some mechanisms provided for in the agreements in force 
on these commodities, purchases for the buffer stock (cocoa), or the 
use of export quotas (coffee). In these Circumstances.,, the most 
important functions of the agreements are to serve as entities for 
consultation between exporting and importing countries, and for 
market analysis, and as mechanisms prepared to take measures to 
mitigate the effects of sudden changes in price trends.
The rest of the commodities in the food and beverages group 
showed, on the whole, widely varying trends. Wheat and maize suffered 
price drops in view of the huge stocks available for export and the 
prospects of an excellent world harvest. This also improves the 
position with regard to the world's cereal reserves, which in recent 
years had declined to what were regarded as critical levels. Sugar 
prices, which reached exceptionally high levels at the end of 1974, 
declined steadily in 1975 and 1976, so that by the end of the latter 
year they had fallen below the average for 1973.42/ Forecasts of a 
significant increase in world production in 1976/1977 have been the 
main factor depressing the market, which thus makes.it more urgently 
necessary that the conference to negotiate a new international sugar 
agreement convened for early 1977 should be successful. Banana 
export prices in the first half of 1976 remained at levels comparable 
with the average for 1975 (the peak level reached in the last few 
years), although it'should be noted that this is another of the 
commodities which failed to achieve significant increases during the 
commodity boom period. Lastly, attention is drawn to the fact that
42/ Added to this situation is the fact that at the end of
September 1976 the United States Government decreed an increase 
in the customs tax on sugar imports from 0.625 to 1.875 US cents 
per pound, to come into forcé immediately.
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although in 1976 the severity of the restrictions imposed on imports 
of Latin American beef in the main developed countries' markets was 
partially attenuated, the restrictions are still having adverse 
effects on the level of prices and the volume of exports of this 
commodity. The consultations carried out on this question in GATT 
had not yet, by the end of 1976, led to satisfactory solutions for all 
the interested parties.
In the agricultural raw materials group, the product of most 
interest to Latin America is cotton, the prices of which showed a 
rising trend in 1976 that enabled them to regain the levels reached 
in 197^» As in the case of other commodities, this rise was the 
result of an appreciable fall in production and in the quantities 
available for export, due in its turn to the drop recorded in cotton 
prices during the phase of contraction affecting the textile industry. 
The outcome of this experience,.though not new, was that at the latest 
session of the International Advisory Council on Cotton the possibility 
of an international agreement on this commodity was discussed in more 
favourable terms. The renewed activity of the textile industry (as 
measures by an increase of over 30 per cent in the developed 
countries' consumption pf virgin wool in the first half of 1976 
compared with the same period in 1975), combined with the effects of 
a drought in Australia (the main world producer), contributed to 
the recovery recorded in wool prices since the early months of 1976. 
Towards the end of that year the marked seemed very firm owing to the 
prospects of a ¡smaller world output and the reduction in stocks in 
the major exporting countries*
In the non-ferrous metals sector, the copper market has continued 
to face difficulties on account of excess supply. The slight recovery 
in prices at the beginning of 1976 was of short duration: the 
declining price trend partly reflected the slowness of the industrial 
countries' economic recovery and partly the lack of agreement among 
the member countries of the Intergovernmental Council of Copper 
Exporting Countries (CIPEC) to continue the cutbacks in production 
after June 1976. On the other hand, two meetings of consultation
/b etw een  cop p er
between copper producing and copper consuming countries convened by 
UNCTAD were held in 1976 with the purpose of exploring the 
possibilities of'an international agreement on this commodity. These 
consultations concluded with a decision to request the Secretary- 
General of UNCTAD to convene an intergovernmental group of experts to 
formulate the appropriate recommendations before arch 1977» Tin 
prices, although they also dropped in 1975» managed to remain at less 
depressed levels than copper prices, thanks to the part played by the 
buffer stock and the export restrictions imposed on the member countries 
of the International Tin Agreement.4^/ July 1976 marked the entry into 
force of a new International Tin. Agrément, in which the United States 
have for the first time decided to participate.
Table 5 shows the evolution of price indexes (1970 = 100) for 
a certain number of important commodities among Latin America’s exports. 
In terms of dollars at current prices, some of these commodities have 
reached price levels close to those of the aforementioned boom period., 
but they must be considered in real terms, i.e., in terms of purchasing 
power. For this purpose, the index of unit value of exports of 
manufactures from developed countries is normally used as being 
représentative of the FOB cost of imports of manufactures by the 
Latin American coùntries (that is, excluding freight, insurance and 
other costs). If this index is used to deflate each of the basic 
commodity price indexes, the price index in real terms is obtained*,
For the group of commodities included in table 5 the price index-in 
real terac for the first nine months of 1976 would be equal to or 
slightly above the average for 1975 or that for 1973» but below that 
fo r '3974. As_ noted earlier, however, the overall index has no meaning 
for any country in particular, so that each commodity should be 
considered individually.
43/ According to figures published in the Monthly, Statistical
Bulletin of the International Tin Council, stocks of tin in the 
buffer stock amounted to 2,893 tons at the end of the first 
quarter of 1975? they stood at 20,071 tons at the end of that 
year and fell again to 2,820 tons on 30 June 1976.
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PRIGS INDICES OP COMMODITY EXPORTS # '




n i IV I I I I I I
Sugar b/ 256.1 797.1 544.7 4 5 3 * 362.0 376.1 368* # 8 .4
Sugar o/ 157.5 365.6 578.3 540.3 107.4 1 9 2 * 189,4 * 7 .8
Hfinanns U 0.9 142.3 172.4 130.1 l4l«o. 163* 175.6 179.4
Cocoa 189.8 574.5 201.9 189.1 .198.8 222.4 291.O 339.8
Coffee (M anizales) 128,9 137.9 144.8 162.4 161.5 187.8 277.1 312.6
Coffee (Santos NO if) 122.5 124.7 142.7 167.2 'm ' m # 4 .7
Beef 173.1 190,0 . » m • ; , m.~
Maize 168 .if 223* 185.4 194.8 191.6 191.6 189.9 192.6
Wheat 252.4 330.2 575*8 286.6 201.2 275.3 266.2 241.0
Linseed o il 247.8 497.8 328.3 313.0 267* 242*6 243*4 286.5
Cotton &/ 195.1 247.6 191.7 188.3 205.3 267.7 m m
Cotton o/ ao*4 215.6 182.1 193.4 195.1 223.4 245.0 2B5.3
Fishm eal 230.9 2OO.0 157.0 12B.7 139.9 161.2 178.2 -
Wool 302,1 260,4 220,6 210.4 238.0 266.7 205.4 306.3
Soya 190.3 231.0 I83.8 195.0 165.8 158.1 160.6 a e .o
Aluminium 97.6 124.6 141.4 137 * 133.9 127*0 133.0 * 5.2
Copper 125.8 145*5 87.2 87.3 82.6 83,0 107.8 109.3
T in 133.3 226.6 190.1 185.1 173.3 181.3 206,2 226.6
Iro n  ore 116.6 205.3 251.0 244.9 254.3 243* « 2 .1 255. 0*
Lead 143.4 198.2 139.2 123.0 113.2 119.1 157.6 1& .2
Zlne 290*6 454.9 256.2 ¡48.4 240.6 * 1* 265. I 2 55*
A . T o ta l index 161.6 255.7 210.4 200.7 190.8 203.4 222,4 257.1
B* Index o f u n it value o f exports 
o f m anufactures o f developed 
cou ntries (base 1570 m 100) 133.0 I62.O 182,0 178.0 176.0 178.0 179.0 181,0*
0* T o ta l index d e fla ted  by B' 121.5 157.8 115.5 112.6 108.4 114.3 124,3 155.4
Source» Im port p rice  in d ice s ca lcu la ted  ty  CEPAL cn the b a sis o f data o f the U nited Nations 
M onthly B u lle tin  o f S ta tis tic s , the UNCTAD M onthly Commodity P rice  B u lle tin  and the FAO 
M onthly B u lle tin  o f Economics and S ta tis tic s « The U nited Nations M onthly B u lle tin  of 
S ta tis tic s  was used fo r the index o f the u n it value o f experts o f manufactures o f developed 
countries*
a/ Based on w orld  market prices*  
b/  Free m arket.
U nited S ta te s, _
B ra s ilia n , SSo Paulo type  5 , 
e/ Mexioan S.M,
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(b) Integrated Programme for Commodities
Resolution 93 (IV) adopted at the fourth session of UNCTAD set 
in motion the most serious international co-operation effort thus 
far attempted in connexion with world commodity trade. The resolution 
lists a group of commodities on which negotiating conferences would 
be convened with a view to implementing the measures laid down in the 
resolution, which include the setting up of buffer stocks, and 
another conference to be held not later than March 1977 to negotiate 
the establishment of a common fund to finance these stocks.
The first step towards implementing the Integrated Programme 
for Commodities was taken by the Trade and Development Board at its 
sixteenth session when it adopted decision 140 (XVI) establishing 
the Ad hoc Intergovernmental Committee of the Integrated Programme 
for Commodities, with the functions assigned to it in UNCTAD 
resolution 93 (IV). In the second half of 1976, preparatory meetings 
were held on copper and jute and products thereof, and arother on 
the common fund. The developing countries as a whole approved the 
establishment of the common fund in the Manila Declaration of the 
Group of 77 and in the aforementioned resolution $3 (IV), but 
undoubtedly there still remain substantive questions or points which 
can be settled only in the final phase of the negotiations. Although 
this suggests thnt the negotiations may be long and difficult, it 
seems important that they should be'successfully concluded on the 
date envisaged - March 1977 - since the establishment of the common 
fund will be a truly catalyzing element which will facilitate the 
negotiations on individual commodities.
As already stated, the Latin American countries, as members of 
the Group of 77, have supported the elements of the Integrated 
Programme. The preparatory meetings on commodities were initiated 
with products of interest to Latin American countries - copper and 
hard fibres (sisal and henequen) - and will continue in the course 
of 1977 with other products of interest to these countries such as 
vegetable oils and fats, tropical timber, bananas, cotton, iron ore, 
manganese ore, bauxite and meat. With regard to sugar, as indicated
/earlier, a
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earlier, a conference has been convened early in 1977 to negotiate 
a new agreement. Coffee, cocoa and tin are governed by new agreements 
which entered into force in 1976. Thus, the appropriate machinery 
already exists for consultation and the adoption of decisions in 
connexion with the market trends of each of these commodities, so 
that any problems that may arise can be discussed and solved by the 
respective organizations.
5» Latin America: financing and external debt
The past decade has witnessed very substantial changes in the 
external financing of the non-oil-exporting countries of Latin 
America. The changes have taken place both in the sources of financing 
and in the volume, terms and conditions involved.
These countries' average balance-of-payments deficit on current 
account was just over 1,500 million dollars annually in the period 
1965-1970, or less than 15 per cent of total exports of goods and 
services; it rose to a little over 4,000 million dollars annually 
in the period 1971-1975, or 22 per cent of their exports, and then 
jumped to nearly 14,000 million in 1974-1976, or 45 per cent of their 
exports. In the middle of the 1960s, borrowing was mainly from
bilateral and multilateral official sources. In the mid-1970s t h e ..
bulk of the borrowing was from private sources.
(a) The magnitude of the problem
The figures for the current account deficit indicated above 
only partly reflect the magnitude of the external financing requirements. 
Actually, if the countries' growth rates are not to be sacrificed, 
their external financing needs should be determined by adding to 
the current account deficit the amounts required to increase reserves 
and the service payments on the previously contracted debt. It is 
also necessary to subtract direct investment and medium- and long-term 
capital inflows.
The figures available do not permit the preparation of complete 
and reliable series. While on the one hand the direct investment 
figures are not always accurate, on the other hand the errors and
/o m i s s i o n s  in
omissions in the balance-of-payments estimates also tend to blur 
the picture. However, the changes in the size of the current account 
deficit and the volume of debt servicing are already a sound indicator 
of the increase in the external financing requirements of the non­
oil-exporting Latin American countries.
The figures in table 6 show the.deficits to be heavily concentrated 
in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. Such concentration, however, is 
less than that of the countries' gross (ipmestic product* which shows 
that external financing requirements are also, a serious problem for 
other countries of the region in proportion of their economic size.
In 197^-1975 the sum of the current account- deficits and debt service 
payments of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico represented just under 
75 per cent of the total for all the countries of the region, while 
their gross domestic product was ?6 per cent of the total.
Table 6
LATIN AMERICA: BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS DEFICITS a/ ON'CURRENT
ACCOUNT AND AMORTIZATION OF THE DEBTS OF NON-OIL- 
EXPORTING COUNTRIES
1965-1970 - 1971-1973 197^-1975b/
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico 2 119 5 okk I k  213
Chile, Colombia, Peru and 
Uruguay 706 1 595 2 838
Other countries 567 901 2 0k3
Total 3 392 7 5^0 19 09*t
Source: Prepared on the basis of official balance-of-payments data
' of the countries concerned. The figures represent annual 
averages for the periods indicated.
a/ Including official transfer payments.
b/ The 197^ debt amortization figures were.used for 197^ and 1975.
/The figures
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The figures for external indebtedness also reflect the 
increase in financing requirements. The available figures show that 
this indebtedness rose from 8,700 million dollars in 1965 to 
**2,000 million in 1975*
These figures represent only the State«guaranteed debt and 
exclude both IMP loans and credit extended for less than one year.
They also exclude loans from private sources not guaranteed by the 
State. Credit from private banks not'guaranteed by the State has 
grown from about 2,500 million dollars in 1965 to some 25,000 million 
in 1975i and continued to grow rapidly in the first half of 1976 to 
over 30,000 million dollars in June of that year.
It should be noted that the increase in Latin America's external 
debt has done little to improve the position with regard to the region’s 
official international reserves. In fact, the reserves of the non­
oil-exporting countries of Latin America, which represented 25 per 
cent of their total imports in 1965 and **5 per cent in 1973» stood 
at only 26 per cent in 197^ and 20 per cent in 1975» . Clearly, the 
countries' need to improve their reserves position brings additional 
pressure to bear on their external financing requirements.
The total increase in the financing requirements of the non-_ 
oil-exporting countries of Latin America took place at the same time 
as a change in their composition. As stated above, private bank 
credit has grown much more rapidly than credit from official bilateral 
or multilateral sources. Latin America is now practically excluded 
from official concessionary financing.
Thus, loans from private banks whether or not guaranteed 
accounted for two-thirds of the total in 1975* almost doubling the 
proportion of just over one-third which they represented in 1965»
Loans from official sources normally have a certain grace 
period; they are generally medium- or long-term loans and their total 
cost under the head of interest and other charges is usually lower 
than that of credit from private sources. Therefore, the change in 
the structure of the debt according to its sources means a negative 
change as regards maturity periods and costs: loans for over seven
/years to
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years to developing countries published in the Euro-currency market 
represented 75 per cent of idle total in the years .1973-1974, while 
in 1975 and the first quarter of 1976 they accounted for less than 
30 per centw Loans for more than 10. years, which in 1973 reached 
27 per cent of the total, had'disappeared altogether in 1975-1976.
The charge over and above thfe basic reference rates,44/ for its 
part, rose from 1.25 to 1.78" per cent between the beginning of 
1973 and the beginning of 1976.
Creditor countries and international agencies usually channel 
their concessionary resources as regards maturity and cost to the 
relatively less developed or more seriously affected countries* which 
excludes the major part of Latin America.45/ ' .
(b ) The significance of^external indebtedness .
Any individual country requiring financing has three possible 
lihes of action to follow: to adopt internal' economic policy measures 
to reduce its financing needs, i.e., adjustment measures; to seek the 
additional financing required, i.e., to finance its needs; or,, of 
course, to combine the two possibilities. . <
Taking each country separately, the.choice between adjusting 
and financing appears to be a decision affecting only the, country 
concerned. To adjust means to reduce its growth rate, or even its 
levels«of:living if the fihanoial gap is considerable. To finance, 
on the other hand, means postponing the internal- sacrifice and 
spreading it over a longer, period.
When the problem of a financing, gap arises for a group of 
countries it must not be- forgotten that the, decision adopted will 
have world-wide repercussions., Therefore,, «since the world's economic
44/ London inter-bank offer rate (LfBO) and prime rate in New York.
45/ The definitions used to .classify the developing countries vary
among both donor countries and international agencies. 
Nevertheless, they all exclude the great majority of the Latin 
American countries from the categories to which concessionary 
resources are channelled.
/growth is
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growth is somewhat weak, the decision by a group of countries to 
adjust rather than finance means that it will'be still further weakened. 
The reason is that the countries adopting internal adjustment . 
programmes will necessarily reduce their demand for products from 
other countries and increase their supply directed to them. On the 
other hand, if in these circumstances it is decided instead to finance 
the external gap, the demand from the countries concerned will not 
decline and will thus help to bolster the economies of other countries.
The circumstances predominating in the world economy in the 
past two years made it advisable for the Latin American countries 
to devise a set of policies in which financing would predominate over 
adjustment, thus contributing to a better balance in the world economy. 
This is all the more' so since the main causes of the sharp increase 
recorded by all the indexes of financing requirements in the last 
three years are beyond the control of the countries themselves. These 
causes are the increase in import prices of capital and intermediate 
goods, the sharp rise in oil prices and the fall in the terms of trade 
aggravated by the v/orld recession.
This does not mean that the countries' domestic policies do not 
play an important part in determining their external financing needs. 
Such policies help to mobilize domestic saving and to ensure its 
most efficient use. The emphasis which should be placed on these 
policies, however, should vary according to the factors underlying 
the need for financing and the international implications of alternative 
policies. Co-ordination of economic policies at an international 
level is playing an increasingly important role.
(c) Solvency and indebtedness criteria
The current account deficit of the non-oil-exporting countries 
of Latin America has increased considerably in relation to their 
exports. The Same may be said of the relation between debt servicing 
and exports, whereas official international reserves have declined in 
relation to imports. The average maturity period of the debt has 
shortened and its cost has risen in relation to market costs reflected 
in what are usually considered as reference rates.
/However, the
However, the criteria used to determine the solvency of a 
country, which may be useful when the country is considered separately, 
are useless in assessing a more generalized situation. The reason is 
that, considering the problem as a whole, in circumstances such as 
those prevailing recently it benefits the world economy if specific 
groups of dëfioit countries decide to place the emphasis on financing 
rather than on adjustment.
Of course, if public and private institutions in the financial 
centres and multilateral financing agencies were to allow their 
decisions to be influenced too much by the performance of the 
traditional indexes, some awkward situations might arise. They should 
take into Consideration, however, that all these indexes are static 
indexes which take no account of the future. The continued growth 
of exports would make it fairly easy to maintain a higher level of 
indebtedness, in the same way as an improvement in the terms of 
trade.' These two factors tend to link the future solvency of the 
debtor countries not only with the aforementioned static indicators, 
but also with aspects such as access to the big external markets for 
the sale of the export commodities, arid measures designed to prevent 
any drop and even to improve their terms of trade. This clearly shows 
the close relationship that exists between solvency, trade and 
financing. Similarly, the structure of the future debt is linked 
with the possibility that the debtor countries will have increased 
access to medium- and long-term capital markets, which shows the 
direct relationship between solvency and access to external capital 
markets.
Access to markets for the sale of products and in order to 
obtain Capital depends not only on the policies adopted by the country 
seeking such access, but also on those of the countries whose markets 
are being sought, and on the international or regional machinery 
facilitating such access. In the financial field, any scheme of 
multilateral co-opèration that will improve the solvency of debtor 
countries can help to bring about the1 desired effect. There are 
two noteworthy proposals in this field: the establishment of a 
financial safety net and the setting up of a refinancing service.
/A financial
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A financial safety net would provide a second line of financial 
defence to assist countries in short-term difficulties. A refinancing 
service, to which recourse could be had in special cases in order to 
refinance payments on the external debt, particularly from private 
sources, could provide greater security to lending countries and 
institutions and thus facilitate the transfer of resources.
(d) Differentiated categories within Latin America
In the financial field, as in others, the characteristics of the 
Latin American countries are not identical. The degree of diversification 
of exports in the direction of the manufacturing sector differs 
considerably between one country and another. There is also a 
marked difference in the degree to which other countries have continued 
to be essentially exporters of raw materials. They have strengthened 
their financial links with external markets, but the categories are 
not clearly demarcated.
From a viewpoint that will take the financial aspects particularly 
into account - and also, of course, the external sector as a whole - 
a classification in three groups would perhaps best reflect the Latin 
American position. The first group would, of course, include 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, notable for their industrial expansion.
A second group would include those medium-sized countries which have 
initiated a vigorous process of expansion and diversification of 
their exports. The rest of the non-oil-exporting countries of Latin 
America, although with some differences between them, make up the 
third group. Venezuela could also be included in the first group 
because of its considerable resources obtained from oil and its access 
to capital markets. Market access is a feature common to the 
countries of the first group, which have not only obtained substantial 
loans from private international banks, but have also sold medium- 
or long-term bonds on the world markets. The countries in the second 
group have had a degree of access to bank credit but have not sold 
bonds on external markets in the recent past. The countries in the 
third group have very undiversified economies, their export earnings
/depend on
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depend on one or two commodities and, except in a few cases, have 
only very recently had access to external bank financing. As a rule, 
their indebtedness coefficients are the lowest of all the non-oil- 
exporting countries of Latin America.
The last group of countries requires systematic access to 
concessionary resources. The second group requires some degree of 
occasional access when external circumstances are adverse to them.
Only the countries of the first group can accept for a long period 
the treatment in connexion with access to official financing that 
is currently given to the major part of Latin America,
For the two groups of countries which have had no access to
private medium- and long-term capital markets it is particularly
important to have the means to facilitate such access. These means 
must be developed and put into practice before their access to 
official sources of long-term financing is restricted. Thi6 would 
make the transition to private sources somewhat easier.
(e) Consultation and negotiation machinery
The shift in sources of financing has been so rapid that it
has left the existing international negotiation and consultation 
machinery behind in some important respects. With the swift rise in 
bank financing, the relative importance of the International Monetary 
Fund has diminished. At the same time, with the increase in bank 
loans, the main foreign banks have begun to take increasingly into 
account not only the solvency of the individual debtor but also that 
of his country of residence, thus taking more and more interest in the 
general economic situation of the countries and their economic policies. 
So long as a group of countries continues to show large payments 
surpluses, the international baulking system will play an increasingly 
role, fulfilling the important function of recirculating the 
resources involved. These new circumstances have not been fully 
reflected in the international financial organization, and it is 
therefore necessary to start devising the scheme of a new global 
financial policy.
/II. TRADE
-  2 1 6  -
1. General considerations
Attention is drawn to some of the main trends in Latin America's 
trade relations with the United States in the last few decades. This 
chapter deals with questions related to the Latin American countries 
as a whole, with no attempt to cover details that may be distinguished 
in relation to each individual country.
The emphasis on the free play of market forces which predominated 
on the United States' side in the 1950s gave place in the 1960s to 
its recognition that the market should in specific cases be 
supplemented by some regulation by the State. Some significant facts 
are evidence of this attitude: the establishment of the Alliance for 
Progress which constituted a systematic overall programme of 
government action for the development of the Latin American countries, 
and the backing it brought for national development planning and the 
adoption of overall and sectoral objectives; the emphasis on public 
capital flows ih relation to private flows and the establishment and 
vigorous promotion of official development aid; the support given by 
the United States to the First United Nations Development Decade; 
and the setting up.of UNCTAD. The early 1970s witnessed a return 
to the laissez-faire philosophy of the 1950s, with the accent On the 
removal of obstacles to the flow of goods, investment and technology. 
Any change in the United States' attitude in the near future wili be 
of great importance for international co-operation in the fields of 
trade and financing, because of that country's influence at 
international meetings and because its position may affect that of 
other developed countries, particularly as some have undergone 
significant changes in recent years.
There may also be an important change of emphasis in financial 
and trade co-operation. In the early post-war years, one of the 
main objectives of the developed market-economy countries was the 
reconstruction of the devastated economies of Europe and Japan. 
Considerable financial flows were channelled to those countries,
II. TRADE RELATIONS WI!TH THE UNITED STATES
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among other ways through the Marshall Plan. During the 1950s, while 
the developed countries were continuing to absorb large capital flows, 
the bases for a wider financial co-operation with the developing 
world were established, with the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and: Development playing an increasingly important role. It was not 
until the 1960s, however, that international financial co-operation 
with the developing countries reached significant proportions. The 
Inter-American Development Bank initiated its activities during that 
period. Thus, Latin America began to receive considerable flows of 
public financing. The emphasis in international co-operation was 
mainly on financing and not so much on trade.
In the last few years, official development aid has, relatively 
speaking, shown some signs of weakening. World concessionary aid is 
being concentrated on cpuntries with per capita incomes below certain 
limits. Most of the Latin American countries have per capita incomes 
above those levels and therefore tend to be excluded. At the same 
time, trade problems such as those connected with access to markets 
for basic commodities and the exports of manufactures stage are 
taking on more importance for the region.
In the next few years the possibilities of trade co-operation 
should increase. A particularly important point is better access to 
markets for manufactures and basic commodities. This does not mean 
that financial co-operation would no longer be important, even though 
its share might diminish; access to private financing markets will 
continue to be a basic element and promotion of access to bond 
markets is particularly worthy of attention. Official financial 
assistance, in certain cases including concessionary aid, will continue 
to be indispensable for the medium and small countries.
The degree of multilateralism is another important aspect of 
the relations between the United States and Latin America. The 
bilateral .approach, which was most in force during part of the 1950s 
and which found expression, inter alia, in the many bilateral 
treaties concluded by Latin American countries between themselves 
and with countries outside the region, gradually gave way to an
/increasing strengthening
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may find it better to receive the funds through a multilateral 
mechanism such as this then to obtain them exclusively through 
transnational firms,.which would avoid or mitigate the economic and 
political problems that tend to arise. In considering this proposal 
it would seem advisable to take the following points into account:
(i) The manner iri which a .suitable balance may be achieved 
between supply and demand for each product in the long term, so that 
the promotion of production to which the bank would be contributing 
will riot lead to depressed prices;
(ii) Whether in addition to production based on non«renewable 
natural resources (mining products) the Bank would promote that of 
renewable natural resources (agriculture) in developing countries; 
the production which is shifting from developing to developed 
countries is mainly that of renewable natural resources, while the 
industrialized countries continue to make proportionally larger 
purchases of mining products from the developing world;
(iii) How will the bank's decisiori-making powers be distributed? 
If this is done, in line with the usual formulas, according to the 
amount of capital contributed, the developed countries would have 
control and the producer countries would retain only a minority 
influence;
(iv) Whether the bank would promote public and private national 
and multinational enterprises of developing countries, in comparison 
with the production of transnational corporations of developed 
countries;
(v) Whether it might be possible to achieve a formula whereby 
the bank would also contribute to the financing of buffer stocks, 
and whether various mechanisms would be used concurrently to ensure 
the short-term stability of commodity prices.
/III. RELATIONS
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1. Main reasons for mutual interest and Latin 
A m e r i c a fs grounds for concern
(a) Reasons for mutual interest
The market of the European Economic Community is at present 
the most important for Latin America after'that of the United 
States.' In addition, exports to the EEC increased more rapidly , 
than those to the United States. Thus, the Community played the 
most important role in balancing and diversifying Latin America's 
trade relations.
For its part, Latin America is one of the most- important 
markets for the EEC among those of the different developing regions, 
as regards both volume and composition of its purchases. As 
regards chemical products and machinery, including transport equipment, 
Latin America's purchases from the Community in 197^ represented 
more thah two-thirds those of the United States and almost tripled 
those of Japan. ^
Purchases of all categories of goods by Latin America from 
the Community are considerably higher than those of the AGP countries.,1/ 
For the'period 1973-1975 Community sales to 20 Latin American 
countries - excluding those of the Caribbean - represented 7.2 per 
cent of total exports, while those to the ACP countries amounted 
to 5*6 per cent. :
Latin America is also the most important developing region 
from the point of view of the absorption of private investment and 
the operations of transnational corporations, because of the growth 
of its domestic market and the degree of industrialization achieved.
It is also one of the most important potential sources of strategic
III.: RELATIONS WITH, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
1/ k$ countries of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific which 
are signatories of the Lome Convention.
/raw materials
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raw materials for Europe; for example, in the years 1971-1973 
the region supplied approximately 22 per cent of total EEC imports 
of iron ore and concentrates, 15 per cent of non-ferrous minerals 
and 17 per cent of refined copper.
(b) Latift-; Americas grounds for concern
Notwithstanding the number and nature! o f ' these-.relationships, ;
there are serious reasons for concern by Latin American countries, 
particularly in view of foreign trade figures and the policy followed 
in this respect. To mention a few, they are:
(i) The permanent deterioration of Latin America's participation 
in the Community market:2/ the imports of EEC countries from outside 
fell between 1955 and 1974 from 68 to 55 per cent. In particular, 
Latin America's share fell sharply from 7*4 to 3«1 per cent during' 
that same period; relatively, this drop was substantially higher 
than that of Asia (South and South east) and that of Africa.
(ii) Latin America's growing trade deficit with the EEC: this'' ‘ 
deficit first appeared and continued to increase throughout the 
1970s, amounting to 1 ,2 3 0 million dollars in 1974 (excluding the 
cost of services: freight, insurance, etc.), and feplfesents 17 per
cent of its exports to the EEC.
(iii) The lack of diversification of Latin American exports! : -
most of the exports to the EEC consist in primary commodities which 
undergo very little processing, and in many Latin American countries 
exports are restricted to a limited number of products.
2/ There is a relative reduction whether oil is taken into account
or not. Latin America's relative ,posit i on we ak ene d vi s-a-vi s 
the developed countries and the other developing countries in 
respect of agricultural raw materials, fuels, non-ferrous 
metals, and manufactures. In the case of foodstuffs* its 
relative position improved compared with that of the other 
developing regions and weakened in terms of both ifitra-cdmmunity 




Latin America's commodity exports to the Community have not 
recorded satisfactory increases, because of - among other reasons, 
the increasing degree of self-sufficiency of the/EEC in respect of 
food products, the absence of growth in tiie demand for tropical 
products, and the long-term stability of prices.
The increase in self-sufficiency' is seen in products covered 
by the common agricultural policy of the Community: wheat, maize, 
beef, sugar, some vegetable oils, etc. Latin America's share of the 
EEC market in these products has fallen considerably, except in the 
case of vegetable oils. Furthermore, the substantial increases in 
sales of animal feeds (soya beans, fishmeal, etc.,) helped to 
increase the Community's general supplies of meat and dairy products 
to the detriment of Latin American exports of these goods.
Table 1 sums up the position as regards conditions of access 
of goods which represent 80 per cent of Latin America's commodity 
exports to the EEC. Three groups of products must be distinguished:
(i) Those in respect of which trade is covered by the common 
agricultural policy;
(ii) Tropical products;
(iii) Metallic raw materials, textiles and others*
(i) Products affected by the common agricultural policy 
represent one-quarter of the exports of selected Latin American 
products to the EEC. They face a serious access problem because of 
the common agricultural policy of the Community, which applies 
variable but, in general, high duties to offset the difference 
between the price of imported products (CIF plus the 
flat customs duties) and the guaranteed domestic prices fixed 
bach year.)
The substantial protection provided through the common 
agricultural policy was not accompanied by measures to promote a 







EEC: CONDITIONS OF ACCESS FOR COMMODITIES
Import Shire Share
value C1F of of ACP
Most-favoured­ Generalized
Tariff preferences










nation tariff preferences Convention (applicable tariff)
of dollars) ages) oentage)
Beef 1 681 28.9 1.5 C.A.P.s/ y Favourable treatment
. 1 1 : ; ; . • _ - *
y .
(reg. 706/76)
Wheat 1 113 . «V C.A.P.Maize 1 H 63 16.2 C.A.P. y Favourable treatment
16.0 5 to 20$ 0/ 
Sugar: 5.A.P. y
(reg. 706.76)Linseed and palm oil Hoy 13.2 Exempt
Sugar and honey 781 I3 .3 23.5 y  „ ExemptHoney: 27$ Honey: 20$ Exempt ,
Bananas 367 5I+.8 18.8 20$ y  y Exempt
Peanuts 158 2.6 62.0 0 y  y Exeaipt ,
Copra 108 — 1 .0 0 y  y Exempt
Wood 2 950 2.2 15.9 0 y  y fixent
Peanut oil I6y 21+.1+ I9.2 10 to 20$ 0/ 4^ y  y Exeapt
Coconut oil 10 6 0.5 0.6 5 to 8$ ¡/ y  y Exempt
Coffee 1 3 8 k 58.7 25.8 , y ,




Coooa 505 6.5 71.^ Butter; 12$ 
Remainder: 15-16$
Exeaçt :
Tobacco 831 7.7 5.5 Processed: 26$ or Only reduced




Baw skins and hide 631 5.9 8.3 : 0 y  y ExemptWool 1 238 9.1 0.1 Carded and combed: 3$ y ExemptResaaiftder: 0
Cotton 81+2 15*8 15.7 Carded and oombed: 1.5$ y  y Exempt
11+5 lh.8
Remainder: 0 -
Sisal and manllla hamp 18.7 0 y  y ExemptIron ore 1 1+26 22.1+ 19.2 0 y * ExemptRefined copper 2 600 16.7 32.2 0 Exempt
Lead and refined zino Hyy 2.8 3.1 l+.5$ plus speoiflo duty ï ExemptRefined tin 203 2.1 1 3.3 0 ExemptNone-ferrous metallic minerals 1 173 • 15.0 7 . 3 0 y  • Exempt
Fieh meal 291 33.1 0.9 2$ y Exempt
a/ Measures established within the framework of the Common Agricultural Policy. 
b/ Hot Include in the OSP,
0/ This concession Is subject to a preestablished quota. Tariffs applicable to various types of vegetable oils other than olive and castor 
oil: oils for Industrial use which are not for human consumption: crude 5$> others 0$, oils for other purposes: 10-20$. In addition to 
a certain surcharge ln'speolfin eases, 
d/ The maohinery for guaranteeing export earnings is applied (STABEX).
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itself and in the developing countries which have potential demand 
- that is to say a high food deficit - but lack purchasing power.
Thus, the common agricultural policy is translated into increasing 
self-sufficiency in its own, market and growing competition in the 
international markets for third-world'producers. These problems “ 
affect several products which are of .special interest to Latin 
America: wheat, maize, beef, vegetable oils, and sugar. Latin 
America's share of total EEC.imports of these products fell from 
20.6 per cent to 16.5 per cent between 1965 and 1973» An outstanding 
example was that of beef, the imports of which were temporarily 
suspended by the EEC.
(ii) Tropical products are affected by tariff and non-tariff 
barriers; in some cases the high excise duties act as a serious 
brake on demand. The ACP countries, signatories of the Lome Convention, 
enjoy exemption from customs duties and guaranteed export earnings 
under STABEX (Stabilization of Export Receipts Scheme). Several 
of these products are of vital importance to: small Latin American 
countries whose exports make up a high percentage of such products.
As regards bananas the high-tariff of 20 per cent may be held 
responsible for the high consumer price which hampers the growth of 
domestic demand. In respect of cocoa and coffee the tariffs and 
excise duties are considerable. Germany and Italy apply an excise 
duty on coffee of 90 per cent of the CIE;value in addition to customs 
tariffs. Over the last 10. years the wholesale price of roasted coffee 
in Germany was four times the unit price of imports. In Italy it 
was more than three times the unit price during the same period.
(iii) Metallic raw materials, textiles, and others account for 
more than one-third of the commodities imported by the Community 
from Latin America. Tariffs on almost all of these commodities are 
either: non-existent or low. '»The main problems arise in respect of 
the fluctuation in prices and the volume of imports.. Most of the • 
imports are without value added by industrial processes. Processed
2/ Pan American Coffee Bureau, Annual Coffee Statistics, 197^*
/products made
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p r o d u c t s  m a d e ‘f r o m  t h e s e  r a w  m a t e r i a l s  e n c o u n t e r  s e r i o u s  p r o b l e m s  
o f  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  EEC m a r k e t s  ( l e a t h e r  a r t i c l e s ,  f o o t w e a r ,  t e x t i l e s ' ,  
c l o t h i n g *  p r o c e s s e d  Wood p r o d u c t s ) .
A s  r e g a r d s  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  t r a d e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  a  d i s t i n c t i o n  
m u s t  b e  m ad e  b e t w e e n  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  p r o d u c t s  w h i c h  f a c e  l i m i t e d  
c o m p e t i t i o n  i n  t h e  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s  a n d  t h o s e  w h i c h  f o r c e  i n t e n s e  
c o m p e t i t i o n .  . - , • ' :
T h e  f i r s t  a p p l i e s  t o  t r o p i c a l  p r o d u c t s ,  f o r  w h i c h  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  
c o u n t r i e s  s h o u l d  s e e k  c o n c e s s i o n s  w i t h i n  t h e  GATT f r a m e w o r k  p r o v i d e d  
t h a t  t h e y  a r e  c o n t r a c t u a l  o n e s .  S o  f a r ,  t h e  o f f e r s  m ad e h a v e  n o t  
b e e n  a c c e p t a b l e  t o  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a .
I n  f a c t  n o ! p r o p o s a l s  W e r e  m ad e i n  r q ^ p e c t  , o f  b a n a n a s ;  a s  
r e g a r d s  c o f f e  a n  o f f e r  w a s  m ad e t o  r e d u c e  t h e  t a r i f f  f r o m :  7  t o  5  p e r  
c e n t  ( f o r  r i o n - p r o c e s s e d  n o r  d e c a f f e i n a t e d  c o f f e e ) ,  a  m a t t e r  w h i c h  
i s  s u b j e c t 1 t o  t h e  s a t i s f a c t o r y  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o f f e e  
A g r e e m e n t  ; i t  m u s t  b e : r e m e m b e r e d  t h a t  i n '  t h i s  c a s e  a  v e r y  s e r i o u s  ' 
o b s t a c l e  i s  t h a t  o f  e x c i s e  d u t i e s .  ; F u r t h e r m o r e * :  n o  c o n c e s s i o n s  w e r e  
m ad e o n  n o n - t a r i f f  b a r r i e r s ;  a n d  i t  w o u l d  s e e m : t h a t  m o s t  o f  t h e  
o f f e r s  m ad e  b y  t h e  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  t r o p i c a l  
p r o d u c t s  w o u l d  n o t  c o n t a i n  a n  u n d e r t a k i n g  o n  t h e i r  c o n s o l i d a t i o n  
i n  G A TT, a n d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  c a n n o t  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  f i r m .
A s  r e g a r d s  t h o s e  p r o d u c t s  i n  w h i c h  c o m p e t i t i o n  b y  t h e  
d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s  i s  i n t e n s e ,  t h e  c o n c e s s i o n s  u n d e r  t h e  G e n e r a l i z e d  
S y s t e m  o f  P r e f e r e n c e s  a r e  p r e f e r r e d  f o r  t h e y  a r e  n o t  b i n d i n g  o n  
t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  m a k i n g  t h e m  a n d  a r e  f o r  t h e  e x c l u s i v e  b e n e f i t  o f  
t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s ;  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  
G e n e r a l i z e d  S y s t e m  o f  P r e f e r e n c e s  i s  n o t ,  u n d u l y  r e s t r i c t e d .  I n  
p a r t i c u l a r ,  s o m e  c o m m o d i t i e s  o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  a r e  i n c l u d e d  
i n  t h e  G e n e r a l i z e d  S y s t e m  o f  P r e f e r e n c e s ,  b u t : a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  
r e s t r i c t i o n s .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  c o c o a  b u t t e r  t h e r e  i s  a  
t a r i f f  r e d u c t i o n ,  b u t  i t  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  a  q u o t a ;  a n d  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
t o b a c c o  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e  m a r g i n  i s  v e r y  s m a l l .
/Exports of
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Latin America's exports of manufactures to the EEC increased 
during the period 1955-1973 at an annual rate of 17 per cent, about 
half the rate of increase in exports of these goods to the United 
States and to Latin America itself. However, in absolute terms, 
the size of the EEC market for these goods is still less than half 
that of the United States market. Thus, EEC imports of manufactures 
from Latin America amount to just about 0.5 per cent of the total 
value of imports of these products; this means that there is ample 
scope for increasing and diversifying Latin American exports of 
manufactures to the Community. In particular, the composition of 
exports of manufactures to the EEC is noted for the relatively small 
share of the engineering knd metal products industry, as distinct 
from sales to the United States and Latin America itself where the 
share of goods from these sectors, which involve a higher degree 
of processing, is greater. In contrast, in the case of foodstuffs 
their share in exports to the EEC is much higher than in exports 
from Latin America to the United States.
Latin American sales have been limited so far by unfavourable 
conditions of access to the EEC market, because of both the trade 
practices of transnational corporations, and difficulties of taking 
full advantage of the benefits of the Generalized System of Preferences. 
The problems of access affect three groups of products:
(i) processed agricultural products;
(ii) textiles, leather and leather products;
Ciii) the products of the growth industries, particularly the 
engineering and metal-products industry.
(i) Processed agricultural products. This group is thé most 
important of non-traditional Latin American exports to the EEC and 
it faces formidable barriers. First, there is a high effective rate 
of protection with a scaled tariff structure depending onFthe degree 
of processing and second, non-tariff barriers have been erected, 
such as quantitative restrictions and sanitary regulations. Furthermore, 
the products included in the generalized system of preferences only 
enjoy small margins.
(b) Exports of manufactures
/There are
- 236 -
The EEC established and widened its relations with more than 
80 countries of the world. A brief summary helpts to show the 
possible consequences for relations with Latin Americaand to identify 
useful aspects for more effective co-operation. The countries can 
be divided into three main groups, on the basis of the form their 
relationship takes.
Importance is given to such policies in order to underline 
the desirability of defining a comprehensive policy for relations 
between Latin America and the EEC in keeping with the potential of 
both regions.
(i) EFTA countries ( European Free Trade Association)
(ii) Mediterranean countries
(iii) Member countries of the Lome Convention (ACP)
The relations of the Community with each one of these three 
groups are different, both in terms of established machinery and 
the diversity of the economic and the trade structures in each case.
(i) EFTA countries. This is a free trade area created through 
a series of agreements. The most important implication for Latin 
America involves the exports of manufactures. In spite of the GSP, 
Latin American manufactures face tariff disadvantages, since the 
manufactures of all of the industrial countries of Western Europe 
are exempt from duties. A further disadvantage suffered by Latin 
America is that its industrial development is not so advanced as 
that of those countries.
(ii) Mediterranean countries. The framework of the special 
relations which exist between those countries and the EEC is defined 
by the global Mediterranean policy; treatment in specific aspects 
varies from country to country.
In general, the main features of these relations is the 
preferential trade system which operates through a variety of 
mechanisms, the setting up of a customs union (Greece, Turkey, Malta 
and Cyprus under article 238 of the Treaty of Rome); free trade 
(provisional agreements under article 113 of the Treaty of Rome with
3» Relations between the EEC and selected areas
/a view
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a view to establishing a free trade area: Spain, Portugal and Israel); 
a broad scheme of trade co-operation (Maghreb countries: Morocco,
Tunisia and Algeria, also under article 238 of the Treaty) or 
Preferential Agreements (Egypt and Lebanon). In principle, the 
aim of all these schemes is to liberalize the trade of industrial 
products and establish a preferential system for agricultural 
products. The .difference between the different schemes lies mainly 
in the degree of reciprocity and of liberalization.
These mechanisms yrhich reflect special relations are continually 
being strengthened and the possibility of the admission of some of 
these countries to, the Community as. new members, has even been 
considered. Negotiations for the admission, of Çreece began formally 
in July 1976.
.The Mediterranean countries are at a level of intermediate 
development, somewhat similar to that of the countries of Latin 
America, and, therefore, are strong competitors in the field of 
manufactures in which the Latin American countries are competing 
in the market of the developed countries. In addition, the 
Mediterranean countries export processed agricultural products which 
are also of great importance to Latin America. Thus, the strengthening 
of these relations entails considerable consequences for this region.*
(iii) ACP countries. Through the Lome Convention, the Community 
established a special system of relations with ^6 developing 
countries. Although this Convention was preceêded by those of 
Yaounde and Arusha it is not a mere extension of them, for it 
established a system of global co-operation, which broadened the 
previously existing special relations and set up more efficient 
machinery for. trade, financial, industrial and technical co-operation.k/
k/ The description and analysis of this Convention and of its
consequences for the countries of Latin America were presented 
in a previous study by the CEPAL secretariat, See “Relaciones 
comerciales, crisis monetaria é integración económica en 
América Latina. CEPAL Cuadernos, 1975, from page 7 onwards.
/Furthermore,this
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Furthermore, this Convention constitutes a valuable precedent 
for the, establishment of new types of relations between developing 
and developed countries. Among the machinery set up, the most 
important are the guarantee of export earnings from commodities 
(STABEX); exemption without reciprocity from tariffs and other 
barriers for most products; and new provisions governing financial, 
technical, and industrial co-operation. Furthermore, an Industrial 
Co-operation Committee and an Industrial Development Centre were 
set up. All these mechanisms open possibilities for co-operation 
between the EEC and the ACP pountries at the level of enterprises 
and finance institutions; for infrastructural development,, research 
and the transfer of technology and its adaptation to the ACP countries; 
for special actions directed towards small and medium-sized, 
enterprises;, for better use of earnings from the export of raw 
materials the aims of which are similar to those of UNCTAD's integrated 
programme, etc.
From another point of view, attention has been drawn to its 
limitations, since this policy is applied in a restrictive manner 
between a group of developed countries and a group of developing 
countries, which may prove unfavourable to trade with the other 
developing countries, among them many Latin American onea»%/ In 
this respect, the measures which may well have the greatest 
consequences for Latin American countries are the incentive to the 
production of commodities, the possible breaking up of the market, 
reserving a part of it for specific countries, and favourable 
access to the EEC market. The export of manufactures section of 
table 1 shows that the treatment received by Latin American countries 
is substantially unfavourable in comparison with that received by 
the countries of the Lome Convention, in respect of a large number 
of products of great importance to Latin American countries.
See CEPAL, "Trade relations, monetary crisis and economic 
integration in Latin America", op.cit.
/4. Perspectives
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4. Perspectives of economic relations between 
Latin America and Europe
Among the main factors which will influence eoonomic relations* 
between Latin America and Europe in the future, there are, on one 
hand, the problems of foreign trade and, on the other, those of 
specialization in production arising from the possible transfers 
of industrial activity.
(a) Foreign trade
As a result of the recent -recession and recovery,6/ the major 
issues of economic policy in the European countries appear to be the 
control of inflation and the improvement of the balance-of-payments 
situation.2/ Both have a;restrictive impact at present, the severity 
of which depends on the intensity of the attempts to achieve other 
objectives as well, (for example, employment, or real wages) and 
the international conjuncture (particularly, the prices of oil and 
some raw materials). It is to be expected, therefore, that 
there will be some restraint on the rate of growth of imports, with 
its inherent impact on Latin American exports. But in addition to 
the short-term factor, most of the medium-term projections forecast 
a slower growth rate in economic activity in Europe, which could 
make the expansion in import requirements proceed at a slower pace. 
Thus for example, for the period 1975-1980, an OECD report forecasts 
moderate growth, and advocates an extremely prudent and sound 
economic policy, designed to counteract disequilibrium of any kind
6/ See United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Economic
Survey of Europe in 1975. New York, 1976.
2/ The trade deficit for the industrialized countries of the
area amounted to 5*^00 million dollars in the first half 
of 1975» to 6,^00 million in the second half, and to 
12,000 million in the first half of 1976 (these figures 
refer to Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Frahcè, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, 
Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and 
Switzerland). See Economic Commission for Europe, Economic 
Bulletin for Europe, vol. 26, page 1 6.
/which may
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which may have inflationary consequences.8/ Furthermore, long-term 
projections for the European economy show a relative increase in 
the service sector, where the impoft content is considerably lower 
than that of industry»2/ For these reasons if the full weight of 
Latin America's bargaining power - which can affect European exports - 
is not brought to bear, the trend could lead to a slower rate in 
the relative growth of Latin American exports.
( b )  I n v e s t m e n t  a n d  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  i n  p r o d u c t i o n
The possibility exists in the medium and long term, as a 
result of an industrial specialization policy, of transferring 
to lesser developed areas some activities which are at present 
being located in Europe. In the theoretical discussions opposed 
positions were taken. On one hand, some analyses link the drop in 
the earning rates in Europe to the need for taking advantage of 
the inequality in the costs of production between regions (which 
mainly reflects lower labour costs); and conclude that many 
multinational corporations, installed in an unified international 
area would carry out certain phases of their production in 
developing countries, whereas they would concentrate the management 
of the process and the generation of technology in developed 
countries.1 0 /  However, on the other hand, it was argued that it was 
a time-consuming process and that basically it could be an 
industrialization gadget, necessarily short-live.11/
8/ See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
"U n  s c e n a r i o  d e  c r o i s s a n c e  a  1 ' h o r i z o n  1 9 8 0 " ,  i n  P e r s p e c t i v e s  
E c o n o m i q u e s  d e  l ' O C D E , Nw 1 9 ,  J u l y  1 9 7 6 ,  p .  1 2 9  t o  1 7 0 .
2/  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s ,  S e c r e t a r i a t  o f  t h e  E c o n o m i c  C o m m i s s i o n  f o r  
E u r o p e .  O v e r a l l  e c o n o m i c  p e r s p e c t i v e  f o r  t h e  E C E r e g i o n  up 
t o  1 9 9 0 .  P e r s p e c t i v e  o u t l i n e  ( d r a f t s ,  J u n e  a n d  N o v e m b e r  1 9 7 6 ) .
10/ See Charles-Albert Michalet, Le capitalisme mondial. Presses 
Universitaires de France, Paris, 1976 and the bibliography 
mentioned in this work.
w  See Ministry of Industry and Research, Etudes de politique
i n d u s t r i ^ I l e ,  P e r s p e c t i v e s  d e  l a  l o c a l i s a t i o n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l e  
d e s  a c t i v i t i e s  i n d u s t r i e l l e s .  s t a t e m e n t  b y  t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  
I n d u s t r y  a n d  R e s e a r c h  M r .  M e c h e t  d ' O r n a n o ,  pp. 64 a n d  65«
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From the Latin American point of view, it is of some importance 
to be able to formulate hypotheses concerning the nature of the 
European industries Which could be transferred to these countries; 
and in particular, to determine which branches or products would 
be involved, and What would be the dimension of that process.
Above all, it would be necessary to distinguish - as is 
done in chapter I - between foreign investments made in Latin 
America with the prime aim of taking, advantage of lower labour 
costs through sub-contracting and those which aim at supplying the 
domestic market.
As regards the first, the most outstanding case is that of 
the Mexican “maquila“ suboontracting-industry, which involves 
United States investment; furthermore, there is no substantial 
European investment in the region for that purpose. This type of 
investment involves activities in which the capital and research 
ratio is low and the absorption of relatively low-cost labour 
high.
The second concerns investment in the manufacturing industry . 
which supplies the protected domestic market of the Latin American 
countries. As regards such investments, it would be of interest 
to determine first of all which industrial sectors would be given 
preference, with a view to establishing a few guidelines for future 
action. In this case, the main European investments in Latin 
America were made in transport equipment, chemical products and 
base metals. In contrast, investment is low in sectors such as 
textiles, clothing,leather, wood, paper and printing.12/ In other 
words, investments were directed preferably to branches of 
industry which have in their countries of origin a relatively high 
ratio of research and capital and, at the same time, high labour costs 
However, the flow to activities with a low ratio of research and 
capital was small.
12/ More than 60 per cent of France's investment in Argentina,
Brazil and Mexico is directed towards transport equipment and 
chemical products. In the case of Germany the corresponding 
investment in the same countries is 85 per cent. In contrast, 
investment in textiles by both remains at almost zero level in 
all three countries.
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As regards these industries, since Latin American countries 
applied policies in the past which induced these enterprises to set 
themselves up in Latin America to supply the local market instead 
of exporting from the country of origin, it would be useful if they 
would henceforth usé their bargaining power to induce them to- 
export as well.
5• Consultations and negotiations between Latin America
and the Community
Since contact was established between the Community and Latin 
America in 1958, attempts have been made on various occasions to 
set up suitable machinery for dialogue and multilateral negotiations. 
Latin America proposed through CECLA in 1970, the establishment of 
a system of co-operation and consultation machinery, and the 
organization of a meeting at ministerial level. It was agreed, in 
fact, to hold meetings at ambassador level. Seven such meetings 
have been held.
It cannot be denied that the results of these meetings failed 
by far to satisfy the aspirations of the Latin American countries; 
above all the Ministerial Conference dësigned to set up a better 
organized system of co-operation was not held. Similarly, the 
EEC project for a generalized system of preferences for 1976, 
introduced only minor improvements, in spite of the repeated 
manifestations of the Latin American countries and the submission 
of a list of products for inclusion; neither has any progress been 
made in respect of the major issues of financial, industrial and 
technological co-operation. There has only been slight progress in 
respect of trade fairs and expositions, trade missions and trade 
promotion seminars.
A very eloquent example of thé limited interest in fact shown 
by the EEC, and of the consequences of the lack of dialogue at a 
suitable political level, are the measures adopted by the. EEC, on 
meat, which were adopted unilaterally and without consultation with 
Latin, America.
/However, they
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However, they have entered into agreements with Argentina, 
Brazil, Uruguay and Mexico. The agreements with the first three 
countries are limited practically to trade aspects; the agreement 
with Mexico also includes other subjects of co-operation. But 
they have all produced limited results.
Such scanty progress contrasts with the wide range of 
operational provisions being implemented by the Community with 
the three groups of countries mentioned previously. This point is 
even more noteworthy, since, as was mentioned earlier, Latin America 
is the developing area which absorbs the greatest share of direct 
investment from countries of the Community, and the one that accounts 
for the highest share of purchases of the more dynamic export of 
the European countries.
The possibilities for future progress hinge to very large 
extent on Latin America's capacity to make effective use of its 
bargaining power based on its purchases from the EEC. For this, 
it is necessary that the region negotiate and act in unity - since 
if each country is to act separately the significance of these 
purchases diminishes considerably - and show that it is prepared 
to take specific action through which the volume of its purchases 
from the countries of the EEC would vary in function with those 
which in turn the Community buys from Latin America. Of course, 
the same policy would be applied to other developed areas.
6. Co-operation between Latin America and the EEC
Although it is not the purpose here to outline the elements 
of such co-operation, mention may be made of some aspects which 
ought to be borne in mind.
The field of such co-operation should be wide, in response 
to the fact. that, the common interests involved cover both trade 
and direct investment, the transfer of other private financial 
resources and technology. Since European investment in Latin 
America is channelled into joint ventures with, the countries to 
supply the Latin American domestic market, the natural counterpart 
called for is the opening up of European markets to the production
/of these
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of these very interprises. There are also those difficulties of 
access in respect of products, which by limiting Latin American 
exports to the EEC (with the ensuing trade deficit), act as a 
brake on the expansion of the purchases which Latin America could 
make in Europe in terms of equipment and intermediate goods which 
are essential to its development. Furthermore, industrial and 
technological co-operation, apart from the participation of the 
enterprises of the countries of the Community in the industrial 
development of Latin America, may also take the form of incentives 
to medium-sized and small enterprises by both parties; the transfer 
and adaptation of technology on conditions acceptable to both 
Latin America and the countries of the Community. In the case of 
the Lome Convention, provision is made for the establishment of 
an Industrial Co-operation Committee which could also be considered 
in the case of Latin America.
As regards a suitable juridical framework for co-operation, 
it is worth bearing in mind the precedent set in the case of Canada, 
recourse having been had to article 235 of the Treaty of Rome 
which offers a greater margin of flexibility than article 1 1 3»
A broad treaty containing provisions for co-operation, in accordance 
with needs, drawn up along the lines suggested by the different 
types of treaties entered into by the Community with the three groups 
of countries mentioned previously, is worth looking into as a 
possible framework for the case of Latin America.
Machinery for dialogue and negotiations should be established 
at suitable political levels; so far such machinery has been limited 
and inadequate compared with those established between Latin America 
and the United States, and also between the EEC and other 
developing or semi-industrialized countries of the world.
Finally, it should be mentioned that in such co-operation 
Latin America's unfavourable trends in its relations with the 
Community which were pointed out above should be borne in mind: the 
increasing trade deficit., the small share of Latin American exports 
to the Community, lack of diversification of those exports, and the 
low level of official financial assistance to Latin America from the EEC.
/I V . RELATIONS
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Relations with Japan
For the second consecutive year, Latin American exports to 
Japan declined in 1976, according to the estimates based on the 
figures for the first-half of the year. The 7 per cent drop was 
smaller than in 1975 (when there was a drop of almost 12 per cent 
in comparison with 1974) and in both cases these drops were due 
partly to the recession affecting the Japanese economy and partly 
to the fall in Latin American export prices in. those1 two years.
It should also be recalled that while the growth of Latin American 
exports to Japan in the three-year period 1972-1974 reached relatively 
high rates, this growth 'was not limited to the region alone since 
Japanese purchases in other areas of the developed and developing 
world grew at much higher rates. Between 1971 and 1975 Japanese 
purchases from South East Asian countries increased by 212 per cent; 
from the group of socialist countries by 235 per cent; and from the 
Middle East by 450 per cent (unquestionably as a result of higher 
oil prices). Purchases from Latin America, on the other hand, only 
rose by 92 per cent, less than the growth of Japanese purchases 
from North America (United States and Canada) .and Western Europe. 1/
Latin American imports from Japan followed a similar trend 
falling by 6 and 10 per cent in 1975 and 1976 respectively, after 
having increased significantly in the three previous years. However, 
while Japanese purchases from.Latin America in 1971-1975 grew by 
only 92 per cent, as indicated above, Japanese sales to the region 
in that period increased by 200 per cent, their highest growth rate 
after sales to the countries of the Middle East and the socialist 
area (primarily the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union).
IV. RELATIONS WITS JAPAN AND THE. SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
Y  Office of the Prime Minister, Monthly Statistics of Japan,
nq 183. ■.. . .. ~
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On the whole, the growth of Japanese external sales in recent years 
has been based primarily on the markets of the developing countries; 
the following figures illustrate the change which occurred between 
1971 and 1975 in total Japanese exports (in millions of dollars).2j
Total Developed % Developing % Socialist %
Exports Countries _____ Countries ______ Countries _____
1971 2 b  019 13 027 54.2 9 834 40.9 1 148 4.8
1975 55 753 23 434 42.0 27 632 49.6 4 683 8.4
The problems facing Japanese exports in the United States and 
the European markets, particularly the European Economic Community, 
may highten the trend towards more rapid growth of trade with the 
developing world, especially if the process of liberalization of 
imports carried out at the beginning of the 19?0s is renewed, having 
been interrupted partly by the recession and partly by the onset 
of the GATT multilateral trade negotiations. The restrictions applied 
by Japan mainly affect imports of meat and processed food, some 
fisheries products, various fruits and products of hides and skins,
i.e., products which come very largely from developing countries.
For the Latin American countries a substantial improvement in the 
Generalized System of Preferences applied by Japan would be very 
important; its effects hitherto have been very limited because of the 
low level of quotas for each product included in the system. Most 
of the developed countries have already made known the concessions 
they are prepared to make in favour of tropical products, and some 
are beginning to apply them in the present year. Although the majority 
of these concessions are really of very little significance, neither 
Japan nor Austria nor Canada have confirmed them.¿/
The importance of the Latin American countries in the Japanese 
policy of foreign investment, loans and trade will undoubtedly 
increase in the near future. The agreements entered into with Brazil,
2 /  M o n t h l y  S t a t i s t i c s  o f  J a p a n , o p .  c i t .
G A TT, P r e s s  R e l e a s e  NQ 1 1 9 0 ,  3 0  D e c e m b e r  1 9 7 6 .
/under which
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under which Japan will grant it loans for joint projects in the steel 
industry and some agricultural products, such as soya, and the 
agreements for the export of pulp and paper, iron ore and pellets, 
are good examples of the possibilities which exist of increasing 
mutual trade. It must also be recognized that Japan is making an 
* effort to gain a better knowledge of the Latin American countries
and broaden its relations with them by setting up offices of the 
Japan External Trade Organization, which is responsible for promoting 
export and import activities. It already has offices in a good 
number of Latin American countries. In November 1976, it co-sponsored 
•with CEPAL a seminar on aspects of Japanese experience in the promotion 
of foreign trade, with the participation of representatives of eight 
Latin American countries.
2. Relations with the socialist countries
In overall terms these relations, in the past sporadic and 
limited to a few countries, show a tendency to become stronger and more 
diversified and permanent. The two basic issues are trade and 
co-operation agreements.
(a) Trade
Trade is relatively limited, but it has grown rapidly in recent 
years. Three groups of countries should be distinguished: Argentina, 
Brazil and Peru, which account for most of the trade; the remaining 
countries of Latin America, excluding Cuba; and, finally, Cuba.
In the first group, exports'have grown rapidly, from an annual 
average of 238 million dollars in the period 1966-1970 to 97^ million 
in 197^ and 1,209 million in 1975« Imports were rather lower, standing 
at 102 million, 270 million and 306 million dollars for. the same years.
The volume of trade in the second group is less important. It 
exported an annual average of 50 million dollars, 'worth of goods 
between 1966 and 1970, 239 million in 197^ and 203 million in 1975« 




Despite the low percentage of exports of Latin American countries 
(excluding Cuba) in total imports of the group of socialist countries, 
they are the main suppliers of wool, coffee, vegetable oils, cocoa 
and tin. Latin American imports from the socialist countries mainly 
consist of a great variery of manufactures, including electrical 
generators, mining, petroleum * railway and textile equipment, and 
agricultural machinery.
The 1973 trade figures show that foods and cereals accounted 
for half of LAFTA exports to the European members of CMEA, out of a 
total of 880 million dollars; agricultural raw materials and textile 
fibres represented 20 per cent, and manufactured products 18 per 
cent . 85 per cent of the 282 million dollars' worth of exports of
the socialist countries consisted of manufactures.
Cuba has been a member of CMEA since 1972 and has close relations 
with the other member countries, particularly the Soviet Union.
Average trade figures for 1971-1973 show Cuban exports to the other 
CMEA countries'at 650 million dollars and imports at 900 million.
There are about 35 agreements which establish and regulate the 
trade between the Latin American countries - except Cuba - and these 
European countries. In almost all of them, the parties grant each 
other most favoured nation status in the trade of goods, although 
this does not extend to some special advantages granted to neighbouring 
countries or stemming from integration processes. In addition, 
recently re-exporting has been prohibited except when the parties 
agree to it. Joint commissions are usually set up for the application 
of the conventions.
An important change lias occurred in payments. In the latest 
agreements signed by Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico with 
various socialist countries, it is established that payments shall 
be in.freely convertible currencies, without prejudice to the forms 
of running down the previously existing trade balances, which the 
Latin American countries appear to have been unable to use to the 
full. Since 1972 the Council of the International Bank for Economic 
Co-operation - a member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance -
/approved the
approved the terms for adjustments in transferable roubles among 
CMEA member countries and non-member countries, through their own 
banks, including the possibility of using convertible currencies to 
repay loans. In turn, the International Investment Bank, also a 
member of CMEA, set up a special fund in JTanuary 197^ to grant loans 
in transferable roubles for economic and technical assistance to the 
developing countries (95 per cent in transferable roubles and 5 per 
cent in convertible currency).
(b) Economic co-operation agreements
In recent years there has been a shift from strictly commercial 
agreements to broader economic Co-Operation agreements, Which do not 
concern trade alone but attempt to affect the factors which generate 
trade flows. The Latin American countries which have entered into 
this type of agreement are Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, 
Mexico and Peru, while the socialist countries are the German Democratic 
Republic, Bulgaria, Czhecoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (not a member of CMEA). The agreements 
which are in force do not follow a single model. Some are essentially 
commercial and payments agreements; others also specify other areas 
for co-operation as well as the forms such co-operation will take, 
in some cases. Most of them are connected with the industrial sector, 
but some are also linked with scientific, technical and cultural 
co-operation. As a general rule joint commissions are established, 
which are responsible for seeing to the implementation of the agreement 
and opening up new possibilities for co-operation.
In the case of Cuba, economic co-operation takes on greater 
importance, since it is a member of CMEA. The main agreement entered 
into is for CMEA assistance in the construction of nickel and cobalt 
concentrate plants. In addition, at the request of the Government 
of Cuba, CMEA is studying the technical and economic problems of 
production and pulp and paper from sugar-cane husks. With regard 




Economic co-operation among developing countries - including 
Latin American countries - and socialist countries has been the subject 
of statements by both of these groups since the creation of UNCTAD. 
Section VIII of the Manila.Declaration adopted by the Group of 77 
sets,forth the views of the developing countries as a whole on trade 
and economic co-operation with the socialist countries, including 
financial assistance. At the Fourth Session of UNCTAD the group of 
socialist countries adopted a long declaration in which it reaffirmed 
its aims of strengthening multilateralism in.economic and trade 
relations; resorting to a greater extent to multilateral payments in 
transferable roubles and other correncies; joining efforts with 
interested developing countries, for the solution of their main economic 
problems; and, finally, improving the machinery of mutual co-operation 
so that it should reflect to the greatest possible extent the specific 
nature of relations among countri.es with, different levels of developed 
and social and economic systems.
At its fourth session, UNCTAD also adopted resolution 95 (IV), 
which repeats similar recommendations which are more or less to those 
adopted at its earlier sessions. It further recommends that the 
Secretary General of UNCTAD should hold consultations with the member 
countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in order to 
determine the trade opportunities for the developing countries 
stemming from the implementation of the various multilateral schemes 
of the CMEA member countries, and in the light of these consultations 
convene an intergovernmental group of experts to evaluate the results 
and put forward recommendations on the measures to be adopted and their 
implementation. It also requests the Secretary General of UNCTAD 
to convene another intergovernmental group of experts to study, in 
particular, the feasibility of a multilateral system of payments between 
the socialist countries members of CMEA and the developing countries. 
Decisions 138 and 139 adopted by the Trade and Development Board at 
its 16th session, in October 1976, defined the terms of reference of 
these two groups of experts.
4/ See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Fourth
"* Session, Joint Declaration by the Socialist Countries, Doc.TD/211.
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1. General remarks
Any study of integration in recent years reveals a number of 
positive aspects which have directly or indirectly given rise to 
this process in Latin America. The way in which this has contributed 
to industrialization and in particular to the export of manufactures 
in Latin America will be discussed further on.
Even if these achievements are assessed in their true light, 
it can be said that today, after fifteen years of experience in 
integration, much less progress has been made in taking advantage 
of the potential it offers than was expected or seemed possible.
In some cases, and especially in periods of shortage of international 
means of payment, the results have consisted mainly of compensatory 
effects in the sphere of trade, through the utilization of the 
installed capacity, with possibly lesser repercussions in terms of 
new investment.
In other situations, when the relative shortage of external 
payments has been a secondary factor, the forces of integration have 
tended to manifest themselves in other ways, the exploitation and 
industrialization of natural resources, the construction of major 
infrastructure projects and in general in the formation of industrial 
capital, mainly in the more dynamic and advanced sectors. These 
unlike the previously mentioned manifestations, have a more direct 
multiplying effect of integration in the sense that they represent 
an element of continuous impulse to growth.
In the two decades which have gone by since the first integration 
agreements were concluded the most obvious effects have been of the 
first type mentioned and the main influence has been in broadening 
and making better use of existing activities. The multiplying or 
development effects, through investment and the development of 
industries of greater regional scope, have been in existence and have 
led to major achievements in some cases, but in general they have been 
of relatively lesser significance.
V. LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
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From this point of view alone one can appreciate the need to 
introduce substantive changes in the orientation of this process, 
aimed at giving greater priority, than in the past to building up 
basic capital and production capacity, which have been lagging behind 
in the integration processes. :
In this respect the progress made in linking the economies was 
not accompanied by an exploitation of the external and internal 
conditions which were especially favourable to the integration process 
during the last t\*o decades. Thus a long period went by during which 
high rates of expansion predominated but were not reflected in an 
equivalent broadening of the integrated economy. During the last 
25 years Latin America recorded one of the most intensive and 
continuous movements of expansion.
At the same time as these movements of expansion occurred, the
Latin American economies tended to become more closely interlinked
and to depend increasingly on imports of capital goods, raw materials 
and intermediate products from third countries for their development. 
It is difficult tq determine whether the rapid expansion of dependence 
on the exterior or the creation of greater Latin American economic 
interdependence had greater relative significance in this well-known 
process.
In respect of this point, it is clear from any angle that the
25 years which have gone by did not produce any decisive change in
the relations existing previously, and instead established conditions 
in which for many countries, their economic links with the rest of 
Latin America became a factor of their development. Thus for more 
than half the countries exports towards the regional economy already 
represented between 20 and 30 per cent of the total exported, either 
under the. stimulus of the general, integration policies or under that 
of other policies and special arrangements which in.general may be 
assumed to have been induced by those policies.
At the same time, in recent years a very positive trend has 
been emerging in the expansion of the geographical sphere in which 
integration is making itself felt, either directly or through the
/forms of
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forms of co-operation it has encouraged. It is thus a fact that the 
economies of the countries have been becoming more closely linked 
not only within each regional integration group but also, in many 
cases, with other countries and integration groups, despite the fact 
that they are frequently separated by considerable economic distances 
in respect of their individual capacities.
This process of the rapprocehement of schemes and countries in 
general tends to afford greater flexibility and possibilities to 
integration and can in this way contribute to overcoming the problems 
faced by a number of the existing schemes which, together with other 
factors, determined a contraction in the quantum of trade in 1975 for 
the first time since the integration agreements were signed.
In other words, a greater and more flexible degree of rapprochement 
of schemes and countries seems a prerequisite for strengthening the 
various groups. If that is so, it can be envisaged that in the future 
the new phases which integration will reach will increasingly tend to 
be based on a double link: within the system which is integrated, and 
between that system and other groups and countries of Latin America.
Lastly, the integration process is now at the same time 
experiencing the accumulated consequences of the situations of crisis 
and stagnation which for many years have been affecting the Central 
American Common Market and LAFTA and of the crisis which has recently 
risen within the Andean Group.
The significance of these crises is very different in each case. 
However the fact that this common trend towards crisis has been 
recorded may indicate that the various efforts at integration have 
lacked one or other indispensable element to contribute towards solving 
the problems of development which the countries face or to respond 
to the transformations and very rapid changes in economic situations 
which have occurred over the years. There may also have been slow 
progress in the creation of sufficiently broad economic possibilities 
to resolve problems which the advance of integration itself is producing. 
Mention should also be made of a problem which has been difficult to 
overcome, namely the trend towards the concentration of the benefits
/o f  in te g ra tio n
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and manufacturing production five times, and industrial exports came 
to constitute around 20 per cent of the totals. In comparison with 
these rapid changes in the economies there is no doubt that the 
integration process advanced slowly.
It did, however, succeed in establishing very strong links and 
complementarity in particular schemes, as in the case of Central 
America where the integrated.structures have come to be a permanent 
part of the national economies. It also made its influence felt 
during the period when Latin America initiated exports of manufactures, 
which would, probably have been smaller and less dynamic without the 
experience of the regional market. Although this point will be 
discussed further on it is stressed at this stage of the appraisal 
as one of the aspects in which the integration efforts and the regional 
economies most clearly accompanied the development process of the 
countries by providing them with a market for the products of 
industries which constitute the most recent strata of their production 
structure, or those of most rapid development.
3» Integration and the industrialization
process
The impact of integration, in the case of industry, varies in 
form and extent according to the economic size and the stage of 
development of the countries. It tends to be greater in the small 
countries which undertook more advanced integration éfforts, as will 
be seen below when studying the Central American Common Market. In 
these countries, market expansion has often been the condition for 
setting up many of the production goods and other industries established 
from the 1960s onwards. In the medium-sizéd countries the impact, 
while less noticeable, still appears to have been felt and may be 
assumed to have helped to (increase the operating scale of the more 
complex and advanced Industries.
In the case of the larger Latin American countries, the effects 
of integration on the industrialization process are seen most clearly 
in the export phase of their industry. Today this group of countries 
exports about 1,100 million dollars' worth of products of the
/metal-working
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metal-working industries to Latin America alone, which represents 
about 40 per cent of the total value of these exports. This figure is 
70 per cent for Argentina, 45 per cent for Brazil, and considerably 
lower for Mexico which places a higher proportion of its production 
of such goods outside Latin America.
In any event, in different forms and to a varying extent 
industrialization and the process of linking up the national economies 
of Latin America have gone hand in hand, and apparently will tend 
to support each other to an increasing extent in the future. This 
seems to have been confirmed in 1975, when the drop in total exports 
to third countries was cushioned by trade within Latin America, which 
increased in value over the previous year or fell less than the 
former. Of 18 countries, only four were exceptions to this general 
trend, although the quantum of total exports declined in 1975«
These findings are also confirmed by a study of the different 
integration groupings.
(a) Central American Common Market
The case of the Central American Common Market is interesting 
because of its peculiar structural and working conditions. Its 
development is not normally accompanied by a fall but rather by the 
maintenance or expansion of the ratio of imports from outside the 
group, as a requirement of its own growth (table l).
In this group imports both from Central America and from other 
industrial countries rose, and the total imports-product ratio 
increased from 17 per cent in 1956 to 29 per cent in 1974, while that 
of imports from Latin America rose from 1 to 9 per cent. It should 
be observed that imports substitution by Central American production 
represented somewhat more than three-quarters of this striking growth. 
What is unusual in the case of the Central American countries, 
however, is that the stimulus their integration gave to regional 
production and trade perhaps led to a much higher level of imports 
from outside Central America than could have been purchased in the 
industrial centres without such regional production and substitution.
/Table 1
(b ) The Latin American Free Trade A ssociation
In recent years the formal integration process of LAFTA has not 
progressed. While in 1975 the value of exports of this zone to the 
rest of the world dropped drastically, trade within LAFTA rose by .
5 per cent over the previous year.
At thé sectoral level, the importance of trade within the group 
in the chemical, non-electrical machinery and electrical and transport 
equipment industries in 197^ is shown in table 2,
In the cáse of exports, generally speaking the relative importance 
of the regional market has tended to decline in recent years. It 
continues to be the main market of manufactures, but at a lower level 
than at the beginning of the 1970s. J/ The share of the Latin American 
market in the exports of three sectors (non-electrical machinery 
being the exception) is under 50 per cent. Table 2 also shows that 
the situation varies from country to country. While Colombia and 
Ecuador export mostly to Latin America ( a n d  particularly to the Andean 
subregion) the absolute value of their exports remain small. Latin 
America continues to be the main export market for such products for 
Argentina. For Brazil, exports to the rest of the world have gained 
importance and as á 'réfsult the LAFTA market for these four sectors 
as a whole dropped in 197^ to less than half of total exports of 
such goods, in comparison with 70 per cent in 1970 and 1971. The 
region absorbs less than a quarter of Mexican exports, . the same figure 
ás at the beginning of the 1970s.
With regard to imports, it also appears from table 2 that, 
exept in a few cases, LAFTA producers are relatively weak as providers 
of mechanical and chemical goods. Latin American imports within total 
Sectoral imports for the countries in the table stand at an,average 
5 per cent, and the figure does not vary greatly at the country level, 
except in Chile where inputs of transport equipment from Argentina and 
Brazil weigh heavily.
¿/ See J. Ayza, G. Fichet, N. González, ‘'Latin America: Economic 
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of sector Millions of seotor
or country of dollars or country
total total
33 235.0 5
55 18 5 .1  5
39 79.9 6
46 128.5 6
64 1 2 1 .3  8
42 170.9  3
61 70.8 8
39 l4 2 .4 o /  21
88 37.0 10
23 86.1 3
Ü2 M aS  5
Sour cet CEPAL, on the b a s is  o f  va rio u s LAFTA sour 0 e s .
a/ Exports of 6 countries to all LAFTA. . 
b/ All four seotore for each country,
0/  C h ilean  im ports of tra n sp o rt equipment represented 55 per oent of in tra zo n a l importa in  th e  t o t a l  o f these 
fo u r  in d u s tr ia l  s e c to r s .
/These figures
These figures are of considerable importance for the future 
potential of the Latin American regional market. It will be recalled 
that the majority of the products included in the industrial 
complementarity agreements fall precisely within the chemical and 
engineering sectors (excluding the transport equipment sector, where 
there are no complementarity agreements). In addition, for some kinds 
of metal-working products the Latin American market has begun to show 
signs of a certain amount of specialization and co-operation among 
countries, whose horizons may grow wider.
(c) The Andean Subregion
Trade within the subregion has grown considerably, as a result 
of tariff reductions and special treatment to the relatively less 
developed countries, sometimes accompanied by national export promotion 
policies (see table 3 ).
If petroleum and petroleum products are excluded from trade among 
the six countries of the group, the increasing phare of industrial 
products is apparent in the export structure within the subregion: 
from 48.2 per cent in 1969 to 6 6 .8 per cent in 1974. The relative 
share of'new, noh-traditional products within this total rose from 
7.9 per cent to 43.4 per cent in that period, or from 7 million dollars 
in 1969 to 156 million in 1974.4/ Similarly, in only two years of 
existence the metal-working programme has given rise to a trade flow 
of 6 million dollars, previously such trade was practically non-existent.
4/ JDNAC: “Evaluación de la marcha del proceso de integración", 
Document JUN/di 195* Lima, March 1976.
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Table 3
ANDEAN ®OJ?s SPORTS WITHIN THE SUStEOICH 
(Millions of dollars FOB)
1969 . l? 7^ 197&/ 197%/
_ . , Hydro- Total
carbons




m Hydro- Total oarbons
B o liv ia 4.8 - 62,0 52.2 25,7 16.3 32,6 19.0
Colombia 44.3 1 4 ,1 14c*6 248,7. e» 262.2 *»•
C h ile 1 3 .3 - 67.8 • 106,4 123a -
Ecuador 1 1 .4 - 172 .1 127.2 153.6 108,2 219.3 l 66»o
Peru 26,8 69.0 - 129,9 *r ^♦9 ■ -
V enezuela 69.8 62.0 254.4 230,2 172.9 ,14 7 .7 208« 2 1 7 7 .5
E xports w ith in  th e  • 
subregion 170.6 76-.1 765.9 409.6 837.2 272.2 900.3 362.5
T o ta l exports ( a l l  
d e stin a tio n s) 5 54o.o 2 270,0 21 853.0 15  445„o 16 104.0 1 1 1 6 1 ,0 16 649,0 • ••
Source: JON AC. Documenta JUN/di 135 ,  o p ,c i t . ,  C a rla  in fo r m ttv a  N° 57* agosto de 1976 CEPAL estim ates fo r  
petroleum 1»  1975» 
kJ  Estlnata,
/This process
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Table 4 
cariccm: msam teupe
(Millions of Eastern Caribbean dollars)
1970 1972 1975S/
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Subtotal 2 640.0 n o .8 2122*5 iB s l 6 565.0 i&2aii 6 832.9 ' ¿20,4
Other ocruntrles o/ 320,2 57.7 396.7 65.4 551.35/ 9 1 .% /
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Subtotal L 2 7 M l6 o ,4 S.X-2U5 220,9 6 326,2 465.7 .6, 545.4
Other oountries o/ 57.8 12.6 14 2 .4 1 7 .8 2 7 5 .» / 29. 9b / ... • ••
Total 2 036.2 173.0 2 296.4 238,7 6 601,4 b / 4 2 5 z& / Aia A24.




«/ Ineluding Belize and the ECCM (including Granada, whioh beoame independent in February 197*0 «
/In 1975
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In 1975 and 1976 a number of measures were taken to step up and 
strengthen the integration process. These include the creation of 
the Caribbean Food Corporation in 1976, whose aim is greatly to reduce 
imports of foods which have been growing at an alarming rate: they 
represented 14 per cent of total imports in 1974, only one-tenth of
which was accounted for by intra-zonal trade. In addition, the
Corporation supervises the joint maize and soya project in Guyana 
which belongs to the Governments Of Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago and 
St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla. A similar project is being negotiated between 
Belize and Jamaica. Both seek to provide food inputs for livestock 
and meat for the CARICOM countries.
In the industrial sector, three multinational projects are under 
study: an aluminium refinery to be set up in Trinidad and Tobago, 
which that country will share whith Guyana and Jamaica; a cement
plant to be set up by Barbados and Guyana; and a textile project shared
by Guayana (cotton production) and Trinidnd and Tobago (processing 
into final products). In addition, special measures have been adopted 
in favour of the less developed countries. Thus the Council of 
Ministers of the Eastern Caribbean Common Market encouraged the 
establishment of 35 new industrial firms among the seven countries 
on the basis of five to each country. In addition, seven other large- 
scale industries were chosen to cover the entire CARICOM market, 
including the four larger countries.
While many positive development have taken place in Caribbean 
integration, as reflected in the achievraents of the subregional 
integration process, a number of weak points remain to be tackled.
The balance-of-payments difficulties of the larger countries 
(excluding Trinidad and Tobago because of its petroleum) and the 
fiscal difficulties of the smaller countries will probably continue 
until the end of 1977 or even into 1978. Another point is the absence 
of a clearly established obligation to carry out prior consultation 
among CARICOM member countries before they individually enter into 
bilateral treaties and, industrial complementarity agreements with
/ th i r d  co u n trie s .
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third countries.2/ Furthermore, the exchange rate movements of the 
different countries have caused disequilibria in recent years, and 
there is a certain lack of co-ordination of monetary policies.
Finally, problems of infrastructure, administrative capacity, 
skilled labour and market size make it difficult for the relatively 
less developed countries to attract industrial investment.
4° Interrelations and closer links between integration 
groups and other countries of 
I»g.tin America
A striking feature in the past was the lack of economic links 
between the integration schemes, marked by a somewhat isolationist 
tendency with respect to each other and to other Latin American 
countries which did not belong to the same scheme.
\ This has been changing in recent years. Under the influence 
• of various circumstances, integration has ceased to be limited mainly 
to economic relations within specific integration groups and has entered 
a: phase of more open relations. The geographical scope of economic 
co-operation has to some extent become broader than the individual 
subregional schemes.
A first indication of this lies in the growing geographic scope 
of trade within Latin America. Although most (6l per cent) of total 
trade in Latin America is carried on among neighbouring countries, the 
effects of integration are clearly tending to spread to more distant 
countries. In the case of the three .countries with the greatest economic 
weight, this development and their increasing supply capacity has caused 
a movement towards decentralization, in which trade with distant 
countries is growing more rapidly than any other, and several times 
faster than trade with neighbouring countries. This has also happened 
in other groups of countries, such as many of the medium and small 
countries which have shown a noticeable trend towards trade with the
7/ It should be noted that during the negotiations with the
European Economic Community led to the signature of the Lome 
Convention, the four larger countries acted together.
/ l a r g e  co u n tries
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large countries and with others which may or may not be members of 
the same integration scheme. This is a recent phenomenon which 
deserves careful attention.
In the first place, the links which have begun to grow among 
integration schemes and between them and specific,Latin American 
countries in no way signifies that the economies of scale of the 
subregional groups have been exhausted, thus stimulating the.surge 
for broader opportunities. On the contrary, many economies of this 
kind remain, but for various reasons the different groups have run into 
increasing difficulties in taking advantage of their economic potential, 
and at some stage of their development their progress has stalled or 
been reversed.
The possibilities thus arises th$t the growing links among the 
different integration schemes or between them and countries with 
which special grounds for complementarity exist,, may stimulate and 
strengthen the different groups themselves,.which in turn appears to 
be a prerequisite for broader integration.
In fact we are still far; from such a,situation, although the 
need for it is becoming increasingly clear from day to day. At 
present, there is really very little communication and trade among 
the integration groups, and their efforts are mainly directed towards 
import substitution. Furthermore, it is assumed that the more complex 
industrial products which the different regions cannot produce themselves 
must necessarily be imported from the world industrial centres.
As a result, the most dynamic component of national demand is 
transferred to third countries, particularly in the periods of rapid 
growth, while the rate of integration slackens, as may have happened 
in 1972-1974. Latin America as a whole is thus in a vulnerable 
position with regard to the capital goods and production equipment 
it needs, since its supply reacts belatedly to the growth of domestic 
demand for such goods. Both the individual countries and the regional 
schemes seem to run into some limit in this important area. It may 
therefore be assumed that the high coefficient of elasiticty of imports, 
which reached an average value of 1 .3  in 1965-1 9 7 3, indicates that
/d u rin g  the
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d u r i n g  t h e  l a t e s t  s t r o n g e s t  p e r i o d  o f  d e v e l o p m e n t  t h e  r e g i o n  w a s  
n o t  r e a d y  t o  c o p e  w i t h ,  a n d  w a s  u n a b l e  t o  r e a c t  s p e e d i l y  t o ,  t h e  
g r e a t  r i s e  i n  t h e  d e m a n d  f o r  c a p i t a l  g o o d s  a n d  e q u i p m e n t .
I t  may b e  t h a t  a n y  a t t e m p t  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  l i n k s  w h i c h  a l r e a d y  
e x i s t  a n d  e x t e n d  t h e m  t o  e v e n  m o r e  c o m p l e x  i n d u s t r i a l  p r o d u c t s  w o u l d  
i n v o l v e  s e t t i n g  new  l i m i t s  f o r  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  s c h e m e s ,  w h i c h  i n  t u r n  
w o u l d  m e a n  g i v i n g  e a c h  o f  t h e m  g r e a t e r  f l e x i b i l i t y ,  s t r e n g t h  a n d  
c o h e s i o n .
F r o m  t h i s  s t a n d p o i n t , t h e  p r e s e n t  i n t e g r a t i o n  s c h e m e s  c o u l d  b e  
v i e w e d  n o t  a s  f i x e d ,  e s t a b l i s h e d  s t r u c t u r e s  b u t  a s  p a r t s  o f  d e v e l o p i n g  
s y s t e m s .  T h i s  s e e m s  t o  b e  c o n f i r m e d  b y  t h e  f a c t ,  p o i n t e d  o u t  a b o v e ,  
t h a t  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  t h e  i s o l a t i o n i s t  t r e n d s  w h i c h  u s e d  t o  p r e v a i l  
h a v e  b e e n  w e a k e n i n g  e v e n  w i t h o u t  s p e c i a l  t a r i f f  o r  o t h e r  a r r a n g e m e n t s .  
T h e r e  h a s  b e e n  a  c l e a r  m o v e m e n t  t o w a r d s  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  n ew  f o r m s  o f  
e c o n o m i c  l i n k a g e  am o n g  c o u n t r i e s  b e l o n g i n g  t o  d i f f e r e n t  i n t e g r a t i o n  
s c h e m e s ,  o r  o f  s t r o n g e r  i n d u s t r i a l  l i n k s .
B r a z i l ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  b e c a m e  f r o m  197° t h e  m a i n  r e g i o n a l  p u r c h a s e r  
o f  M e x i c a n  m a n u f a c t u r e s ,  w h i c h  h a d  p r e v i o u s l y  b e e n  e x p o r t e d  e x c l u s i v e l y  
t o  l e s s  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  o r  t o  c o u n t r i e s  
o u t s i d e  L a t i n  A m e r i c a .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  r e c e n t  s t u d i e s ,  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  
a n d  a m o u n t  o f  t h e s e  e x p o r t s  a p p e a r  t o  i n d i c a t e  a  h i t h e r t o  u n k n o w n  
d e g r e e  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a .
T h e s e  d e v e l o p m e n t s  m ay i n d i c a t e  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  new  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
a n d  f o r c e s  w i t h i n  t h e  e c o n o m i e s  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a .  I n  t h i s  f r a m e w o r k  
t h e  n e e d  f o r  s o m e  r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  i n t e g r a t i o n  n a t u r a l l y  a r i s e s ,  
b e a r i n g  i n  m in d  t h a t  t h e s e  t r e n d s  t o w a r d s  c l o s e r  l i n k s  h a v e  o n l y  
o c c u r r e d  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  a n d  t h a t  t h e i r  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  o r  w e a k e n i n g  
m ay c h a n g e  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  i n t e g r a t i o n .
T h e  s u p p l y  g a p  d e s c r i b e d  a b o v e  c o u l d  b e  o v e r c o m e  t h r o u g h  
c o - o p e r a t i o n  c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  a  b r o a d e r  s p h e r e  a n d  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
r e s t r i c t e d  t o  t h e  l i m i t s  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  s u b r e g i o n a l  s c h e m e s .  T h i s  
a s s u m e s  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  c h a n g e  o f  a t t i t u d e ,  w h i c h  i n  g e n e r a l  w a s  p r e v i o u s l y  
l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  p r o m o t i o n  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  p r o d u c t i o n  w i t h i n  e a c h  
i n t e g r a t i o n  z o n e .
/What is
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W h a t i s  e s s e n t i a l  i n  t h i s  s e l e c t i v e  e x p a n s i o n  o f  c o - o p e r a t i o n ,  
b y  i n d u s t r i a l  s e c t o r s  a n d  g r o u p s ,  i s  t o  a d v a n c e  t o w a r d s  t h e  v i e w  
t h a t  s o m e  o f  t h e  s u r p l u s  i n d u s t r i a l  d e m a n d  w h i c h  c a n n o t  b e  s a t i s f i e d  
i n t e r n a l l y  b y  a  s p e c i f i c  r e g i o n  s h o u l d  b e  c h a n n e l l e d  t o  o t h e r  
I n t e g r a t i o n  z o n e s  a n d  i n d i v i d u a l  c o u n t r i e s  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a .
A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h i s  v i e w ,  t h e  r a p i d  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  
i n t e g r a t i o n  z o n e  s h o u l d  i n  f u t u r e  h a v e  r e p e r c u s s i o n s  n o t  o n l y  w i t h i n  
t h e  i n t e g r a t i o n  z o n e  i t s e l f  b u t  a l s o  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  d e m a n d  w h i c h  i s  
p a r t i a l l y  t r a n s m i t t e d  t o  o t h e r  g r o u p s  o f  c o u n t r i e s  i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a .  
A d v a n t a g e  c o u l d  b e  t a k e n  o f  t h e  t r e n d  w h i c h  h a s  a l r e a d y  s e t  i n  f o r  
e c o n o m i c  l i n k s  a n d  c o - o p e r a t i o n  t o  g o  b e y o n d  t h e  l i m i t s  o f  t h e  
i n t e g r a t i o n  g r o u p s .  S t r e n g t h e n i n g  s u c h  g r o u p s  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  
f o u n d a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s  a m o n g  s c h e m e s  a n d  c o u n t r i e s  s i n c e  
a c t i v e  t r a d e  a m o n g  t h e m  c o u l d  h a r d l y  a r i s e  w i t h  t h e  l o s s  o f  t h e  
s t i m u l u s  o f  s u b r e g i o n a l  t r a d e  i t s e l f .  A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  t h e  p r o g r e s s  
o f  i n t e g r a t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  s u b r e g i o n a l  g r o u p s  m u s t  c l e a r l y  g i v e  r i s e  
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  t o  l i n k s  w i t h  o t h e r  z o n e s ,  a n d  o v e r  t i m e  b e c o m e  a  m e a n s  
o f  b r i n g i n g  a b o u t  g r e a t e r  c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y  a m o n g  t h e  e c o n o m i e s  o f  
L a t i n  A m e r i c a .  T h i s  w o u l d  m e a n  t h a t  m u ch  o f  t h e ' p u r c h a s i n g  p o w e r  
t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  c e n t r e s  t o  b u y  e s s e n t i a l  m a c h i n e r y  a n d  
e q u i p m e n t  w o u l d  b e  r e t a i n e d  i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a .  I t  w o u ld  t h e r e f o r e  a p p e a r  
t h a t  a n y  f u t u r e  i n t e g r a t i o n  e f f o r t s  s h o u l d  b e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  b a s e d  o n  
t h i s  t w i n  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  w i t h i n  t h e  i n t e g r a t i o n  g r o u p  a n d  b e t w e e n  i t  
a n d  t h e  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  a n d  r e g i o n s  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a .
/VI. CONCLUSIONS
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T h e  c o u n t r i e s  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  h a v e  m ad e g r e a t  p r o g r e s s  i n  
r e s p e c t  o f  t h e  g r o w t h  a n d  m o d e r n i z a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  e c o n o m i e s .  T h e  
c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  r e g i o n  s t i l l  n e e d  e c o n o m i c  c o - o p e r a t i e n  f o r  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  
h o w e v e r ,  a n d  a r e  a c t i v e l y  s e e k i n g  i t  a t  v a r i o u s  l e v e l s ;  w i t h i n  t h e  
r e g i o n ,  b e t w e e n  i t  a n d  o t h e r  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  a n d ,  f i n a l l y ,  w i t h ,  
t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s .  T h i s  s e a r c h  h a s  g e n e r a t e d  i m p o r t a n t  
l i n k s  w h i c h  s h o u l d  b e  t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t  i n  t h e  d e s i g n  a n d  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  
o f  t h e  g l o b a l  e c o n o m i c  s t r a t e g y  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  f o r  t h e  n e x t  f e w  
y e a r s .  B e c a u s e  o f  t h e  m a g n i t u d e  a n d  c o m p l e x i t y  o f  t h e  e c o n o m i c  l i n k s  
w i t h i n  t h e  r e g i o n  a n d  w i t h  t h e  e c o n o m i c a l l y  d e v e l o p e d  a r e a s . o f  t h e  
w o r l d ,  a t t e n t i o n  w i l l  b e  c e n t r e d  o n  t h e s e  tw o  a s p e c t s  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  
o f  t h e  d o c u m e n t .
I n  t h e  r e c e n t  p a s t ,  i n  v a r i o u s  r e g i o n a l  a n d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f o r a ,  
L a t i n  A m e r i c a  h a s  m ad e k n o w n  i t s  p o s i t i o n  o n  a  w i d e  r a n g e  o f  t h e m e s  
l i n k e d  w i t h  d e v e l o p m e n t .  T h e  p a g e s  w h i c h  f o l l o w  d o  n o t  r e p e a t  
p o s i t i o n s  a l r e a d y  e x p r e s s e d , 1 /  b u t  i n s t e a d  a i m  t o  s e l e c t  som e o f  t h e  
m a i n  p r o b l e m s  w h i c h  e x i s t  a n d  t o  s u g g e s t  i d e a s  f o r  a c t i o n  a i m e d  a t  
s o l v i n g  t h e m .  Among t h e  p o s s i b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  f o r  s o l u t i o n s  s t r e s s  
h a s  b e e n  m ade o n  t h o s e  w h i i h  p o s s e s s  t h r e e  m a i n  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : • 
w h i c h  h a v e  p r a g m a t i c  s c o p e  a n d  c o n t e n t ;  w h i c h  c a n  b e  i m p l e m e n t e d  
r e l a t i v e l y  s o o n ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  i n  t h e  l o n g - t e r m ;  a n d  w h i c h  c o n t r i b u t e  
t o  r e d u c i n g  o r  e l i m i n a t i n g  t h e  e x i s t i n g  a n d  f o r e s e e a b l e  g a p s  i n  t h e , 
e x t e r n a l  s e c t o r  a n d  t e c h n o l o g y .  T h i s  c h a p t e r  p r e s e n t s  so m e  i d e a s  o n  
e x t e r n a l  a c t i o n  c o v e r i n g  a s p e c t s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  p o l i c i e s ,  
f i n a n c i n g  a n d  d e b t ,  d i r e c t  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t m e n t  a n d  t r a n s n a t i o n a l  
e n t e r p r i s e s ,  t e c h n o l o g y  a n d  i n t e g r a t i o n .
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1 .  T r a d e  p o l i c y :  m a n u f a c t u r e s  a n d  s e m i m a n u f a c t u r e s ;
b a s i c  p r o d u c t s
T h i s  s p h e r e  c a n  i n c l u d e  a  v e r y  w i d e  r a n g e  o f  s u b j e c t s ,  so m e  o f  
a  g e n e r a l  n a t u r e  a n d  o t h e r  m o r e  s p e c i f i c  s u b j e c t s  r e l a t e d  t o  c o u n t r i e s  
o r  g r o u p s  o f  c o u n t r i e s  o f  m a j o r  i m p o r t a n c e  f o r  t h e  t r a d e  o f  L a t i n  
A m e r i c a ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  t h e  E u r o p e a n  E c o n o m i c  C o m m u n i t y .
I t  i s  a l s o  n e c e s s a r y  t o  p r o c e e d ,  i n  a  c o m p l e m e n t a r y  a n d  p a r a l l e l  w a y ,  
w i t h  s o l u t i o n s  o f  a n  o v e r a l l  a p p r o a c h  a n d  o t h e r s  o n  a  c a . s e  b y  c a s e  
b a s i s .
( a )  G e n e r a l  m a t t e r s
T h e r e  a r e  so m e  i m p o r t a n t  c o n c e p t u a l  a s p e c t s  i n  t h e  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  
t r a d e  p o l i c i e s  a n d  p r a c t i c e s  w i t h  m any d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s .  One 
e x a m p l e  i s  t h e  r o l e  p l a y e d  b y  e x p o r t  s u b s i d i e s  a s  a  p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t  
o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  a n d  o t h e r  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  T h e y  c o n s i d e r  t h e  
u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  f i s c a l  i n c e n t i v e s  l i n k e d  w i t h  e x c h a n g e  a n d  o t h e r s  o f  
a n  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  n a t u r e  a s  a  l e g i t i m a t e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t  
o f  p r o t e c t i o n  t o  n a t i o n a l  i n d u s t r y  i n  t h e  s p h e r e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
t r a d e .  Som e d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  c o n s i d e r  t h a t  s u c h  s u b s i d i e s  
r e p r e s e n t  a n  u n j u s t i f i e d  a s s o c i a t i o n  b e t w e e n  p r i v a t e  t r a d e  i n t e r e s t  
a n d  t h e  p u b l i c  a g a i n s t  w h i c h  c o m p e n s a t o r y  t a r i f f s  s h o u l d  b e  a p p l i e d  
i n  r e t a l i a t i o n .  I t  i s  w o r t h  c l a r i f y i n g  a s p e c t s  a s  i m p o r t a n t  . .a s  t h e s e ,  
a l l o w i n g  v a r i o u s  d e f i n i t i o n s  a n d  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  s u b s i d i e s  w h i c h  c o u l d  
b e  u s e d  i n  d i f f e r e n t  w a y s .
A t  t h e  c u r r e n t  t i m e ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  e x p o r t  s u b s i d i e s  w h i c h  a i m  t o  
c o m p e n s a t e  f o r  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  i n t e r n a l  t a x e s  a r e  a c c e p t e d  w i t h o u t  
r e t a l i a t o r y  a c t i o n .  T h e  s u b s i d i e s  d e s i g n e d  t o  c o m p e n s a t e  f o r  t h e  
e f f e c t  o f  t a r i f f s  a n d  o t h e r  f o r m s  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  i m p o s e d  on . t h e  i n p u t s  
w h i c h  e n t e r  i n t o  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  e x p o r t e d  g o o d s  s h o u l d  a l s o  b e  
a c c e p t e d ;  o r  t e m p o r a r i l y  o v e r - v a l u e d  r a t e s  o f  e x c h a n g e .  T h e - a p p l i c a t i o n ,  
o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  o f  s u b s i d i e s  o r  o t h e r  
a d d i t i o n a l  s t i m u l i  f o r  a m o u n t s  l i m i t e d  t o  r e a s o n a b l e  m a r g i n s  a n d  f o r  
l i m i t e d  p e r i o d s  s h o u l d  a l s o  b e  a c c e p t e d .  T h i s  l a t t e r  t y p e  o f  
i n c e n t i v e  i s  j u s t i f i e d ,  am o n g  o t h e r  a s p e c t s ,  b y  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  a n  i n i t i a l  d i s a d v a n t a g e  f o r  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  i n  p e n e t r a t i n g
/the markets
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t h e  m a r k e t s  o f  t h e  m o r e  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s .  T h e  d i s a d v a n t a g e  d e r i v e s  
f r o m  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  e s t a b l i s h e d  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e l s ,  t h e  l a c k  o f  
k n o w l e d g e  i n  t h e  i m p o r t i n g  c o u n t r y  o f  t h e  p r o d u c t  o r  b r a n d  a n d  i t s  
l e v e l s  o f  q u a l i t y ,  a n d  o t h e r  a s p e c t s  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  e a r l y  s t a g e s  o f  
d e v e l o p i n g  e x p o r t i n g  a c t i v i t y .
S p e c i a l  p r e f e r e n c e  s h o u l d  a l s o  b e  g i v e n  t o  t h e  p r o d u c t s  d e r i v i n g  
f r o m  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  w h e n  t h e  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s  u s e  n o n ­
t a r i f f  s a f e g u a r d s  a n d  b a r r i e r s  t o  a c c e s s  t o  t h e i r  m a r k e t s ,  r e q u e s t  
v o l u n t a r y  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o n  t h e  e x p o r t s  o f  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  a n d  i n t r o d u c e  
s c a l e d  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t a r i f f s  a n d  o t h e r  s i m i l a r  i n s t r u m e n t s  o f  p r o t e c t i o n .
T h e r e  i s  a  s e c o n d  a s p e c t  o f  a c t i o n  o f  a  g e n e r a l  n a t u r e ,  i n v o l v i n g  
t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  s e c t o r s  \i?hich a r e  h i g h l y  p r o t e c t e d  i n  t h e  d e v e l o p e d  
c o u n t r i e s  a n d  f o r  w h i c h  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  c a n  h a v e  a d v a n t a g e s .
A g r a d u a l  r e d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  s u c h  c a t e g o r i e s  i n  t h e  
d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s  w o u l d  s t i m u l a t e  t h e  s h i f t  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  f r o m  th e m  
t o w a r d s  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  A g e n e r a l  p o l i c y  i n  t h a t  r e s p e c t ,  
a g r e e d  o n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y ,  c o u l d  b e  v e r y  u s e f u l  i n  t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  
o f  s p e c i f i c  c a s e s .
A t h i r d  a s p e c t  i n  w h i c h  g e n e r a l  a c t i o n  i s  v e r y  u s e f u l  i s  t h e  
r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  s u b s t a n t i a l  t a r i f f  r e d u c t i o n s  w h i c h  t h e  L a t i n  
A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  h a v e  m ade i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s .  S u c h  r e d u c t i o n s  h a v e  
o f t e n  b e e n  w i d e s p r e a d  a n d  h a v e  n o t  b e e n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  n e g o t i a t e d ,  
b u t  i n  e f f e c t  c o n s t i t u t e  " a n t i c i p a t e d  r e c i p r o c i t y " .  S u c h  r e d u c t i o n s ,  
w h i c h  a r e  o f ■g r e a t  m a g n i t u d e  i n  so m e c a s e s ,  h a v e  f a c i l i t a t e d  a  m a j o r  
i n c r e a s e  i n  i m p o r t s ,  m a i n l y  d e r i v i n g  f r o m  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s .
A f o u r t h  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  e l e m e n t  o f  t r a d e  p o l i c y  i s  t h a t  r e l a t i n g  
t o  b a s i c  p r o d u c t s .  T h e  i n t e g r a t e d  p r o g r a m m e  w h i c h  i s  i n  p r o c e s s  i n  
UNCTAD a i m s ,  i n t e r  a l i a , t o  s e c u r e  g r e a t e r  p r i c e  s t a b i l i t y ,  a  g r e a t e r  
d e g r e e  o f  m a n u f a c t u r e  i n  t h e  p r o d u c e r  c o u n t r i e s  a n d  a  m o r e  a c t i v e  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  t h o s e  c o u n t r i e s  i n  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  T h e  com m on f u n d  
i s  a  b a s i c  p a r t  o f  t h e  p r o g r a m m e .  I n  t h e  p r e p a r a t o r y  m e e t i n g s  o n  
p r o d u c t s  w h i c h  a r e  p r o g r a m m e d ,  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  t a k e  i n t o  a c c o u n t  
t h e  p r o d u c t s  a n d  a s p e c t s  w h i c h  a r e  o f  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  t o  L a t i n  A m e r i c a ,
/and also
- 277 -
and also the goods in respect of which agreements with appropriate 
mechanisms for carrying out consultations and adopting decisions 
recently entered into force.
(b) The approach concentrating on "specific cases"
Complementing and in no way replacing the general approaches, 
the solution of the problems of the various export products requires 
a case by case study, so,that an additional approach concentrating on 
"specific cases" can be included with advantage. As Latin America 
secures successive gains in its efforts to place increasing volumes 
of manufactures or semimanufactures in the markets of individual 
developed countries, the resistance of the producers of identical or 
similar articles in those countries also rises. As a result, debates 
have arisen in regional and global fora of negotiations which have 
frequently led to confrontation.
With a view to minimizing the loss of time resulting from the 
prolonged interchange of arguments and counter-argumeiits, which often 
contain strong ideological connotations, the Secretariat of CEPAL 
suggests that the time has come to consider - for a specific number of 
products which will involve export problems for the countries of Latin 
America in the near future - the establishment of a new systematic 
process for reviewing the problems of export with a view to resolving 
them on mutually acceptable bases of distribution of costs and profits. 
Such a process can consist» for example, in an annual analysis of the 
aspects which affect the: supply , demand, price and access to the main 
markets 2/ of certain important products for -the export trade of Latin 
America, including a careful consideration of the problems which arise 
and of the alternative courses of action for solving them.
2/ For example: (a) What importance does each product have for each 
Latin American exporting country? (b) What could be the impact 
on employment in the importing developed country? (c) What other 
countries compete with Latin America in the market of the importing 
country? (d) What are the tariff and non-tariff barriers? These 
are only a few of the questions which could be considered. In 
the past analyses have been made of specificf aspects and products 
in GATT, UNCTAD and CEPAL as part of the activities of support to 
CECLA. The analyses suggested here would cover thè main aspects 
of each product or group of manufactured products, and would be 
carried out in a practical way.
/A detailed
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A d e t a i l e d  r e p o r t  o n  e a c h  p r o d u c t  c o n s i d e r e d ,  p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  
f a c t s ,  r e s u m i n g  t h e  m a i n  p r o b l e m s  a n d  s u g g e s t i n g  a l t e r n a t i v e  a p p r o a c h e s  
f o r  s o l v i n g  t h e m ,  w o u l d  t h e n  b e  p u b l i s h e d .  On t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e s e  
r e p o r t s  i t  w o u l d  b e  p o s s i b l e  t o  p r o m o t e  d i s c u s s i o n  am o n g  t h e  s e c t o r s  
a n d  b o d i e s  c o n c e r n e d  i n  t h e  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  a n d  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s .
T h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  c o u l d  b e  p r e c e d e d ,  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  
c o u n t r i e s ,  b y  a  p r e p a r a t o r y  s t a g e  i n  w h i c h  t h e y  w o u l d  s t u d y  t h e i r  
p r o b l e m s  a n d  d e f i n e  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s .  T h e  f i n a l  r e s u l t  w o u l d  i n  a n y  
c a s e  b e  a  p r a c t i c a l  a n d  c o m p l e t e  p r o g r a m m e  o f  a c t i o n  o n  a  c a s e  b y  c a s e  
b a s i s .  S u c h  a  p r o g r a m m e  w o u l d  c l e a r l y  b e  o f  g r e a t  v a l u e  b o t h  f o r  t h e  
L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  a n d  f o r  t h e  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s ,  a n d  f o r  t h e  
p r i v a t e  a n d  p u b l i c  s e c t o r s .
( c )  T h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s
T h e  c o m p l e m e n t a r y  a p p r o a c h  o f  u n d e r t a k i n g  o v e r a l l  s o l u t i o n s  
-  s u c h  a s  r e f o r m s  w h i c h  c o u l d  b e  m ade i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  T r a d e  Law  -  
a n d  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  c o n s i d e r i n g  s p e c i f i c  c a s e s  i n  t h e  w ay  d e s c r i b e d  
i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  s e c t i o n  c o u l d  b e  o f  i m m e d i a t e  u s e  i n  t h e  t r a d e  o f  t h e  
L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  T h e r e  a r e  b a s i c a l l y  
t w o  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h i s :  t h e  f i r s t  r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  b a r r i e r s  t o  t h e  e x p o r t  
o f  m a n u f a c t u r e s  a n d  s e m i - m e n u f a c t u r e s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  m a r k e t  
w h i c h  h a v e  e x i s t e d  f o r  a  l o n g  t i m e ;  a n d  t h e  s e c o n d  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  
t r a d e  l a w  o f  t h a t  c o u n t r y .  T h e  m a j o r  l i m i t a t i o n s  o n  t h e  i n c r e a s e  o f  
L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  e x p o r t s  w h i c h  t h a t  l a w  c o n t a i n s  a n d  w h i c h  m u s t  b e  o v e r c o m e  
i n c l u d e  p r i n c i p a l l y :  ( i )  t h e  f o r m u l a  o f  c o m p e t i t i v e  n e c e s s i t y ;  ( i i )  t h e  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  o n  t h e  r u l e s  o f  o r i g i n ;  ( i i i )  t h e  s a f e g u a r d  c l a u s e s  a n d  
o t h e r s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e m ;  ( i v )  c o m p e n s a t o r y  s u b s i d i e s  o r  t a r i f f s ;  ( v )  
e x c l u s i o n  o f  t h e  OPEC c o u n t r i e s .
T h e  s y s t e m a t i c  c a s e  b y  c a s e  a p p r o a c h  w h i c h  h a s  b e e n  s u g g e s t e d  
c o u l d  b e g i n  v / i th  a n  e x h i b i t i o n  o f  e x p o r t  p r o d u c t s  o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  t h e  
L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s ,  f o r  w h i c h  t h e  T r a d e  Law ( a n d  a n y  o t h e r  
p r e v i o u s  i m p e d i m e n t )  c o n s t i t u t e s  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  l i m i t a t i o n  o n  t h e  
a c c e s s  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  m a r k e t .
B y  w ay  o f  e x a m p l e ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  t h e  f o u r  
c a t e g o r i e s  o f  p r o d u c t s  m e n t i o n e d  i n  C h a p t e r  I I  w h i c h  may d e s e r v e  
i n d i v i d u a l  a t t e n t i o n :
/(a) Goods
(a) Goods excluded from the generalized preference system 
because of their sensitivity, an exclusion which is obligatory for the 
President of the United States in accordance with the Trade Law. As 
has been mentioned, this is the case of some 7b0 items of the United 
States tariff, including footwear, certain textiles and garments and 
some electronic and glass products, all of which are of great current 
or potential importance for Latin America.
(b) Goods excluded from the preference system by decision of
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the President because of the possibility of unfavourable effects of 
imports on industry or employment in the United States. This group 
includes products such as leather goods, underwear, artisanal carpets, 
tablecloths and some foods such as chicken and other fowl, fish, 
certain milk products and vegetables and fruit. Many of the products 
included are also of great interest to Latin America.
(c) Goods included in the préférence scheme, but to which the 
competitive necessity clause is applied, and
(d) Goods temporarily subject to barriers, such as cotton, certain 
milk products and tools made of stainless steel and alloys.
Latin America can of course also undertake, parallel to this, 
a number of co-ordinated actions, in respect of both the Executive and the 
Congress of the United States, with a view to securing an improvement 
in the five aspects of the Tradle Law which have been mentioned. One 
possibility which has So far not been tried in a systematic manner is 
that of encouraging representatives of the public and private sectors, 
of Latin America to present the points of view of the region in the 
bodies of the Administration and the Committees of Congress.
Furthermore, the lack of knowledge about the product or brand is 
a difficult barrier to overcome when attempting to export new 
manufactured products to a demanding market such as that of the United 
States. This barrier can be overcome through the creation of mechanisms 
which give a guarantee of quality to the consumer.
In this sphere it is worth considering the establishment of a 
new institute of industrial standardization and quality. Its purpose 
would be to provide to consumers an acceptable evaluation of the new
/manufactured products
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manufactured products which Latin America wishes to export to the 
United States market or to other markets for which the evaluation made 
is acceptable. The institute would, of course, only make such 
evaluations at the request of exporters or producers. The institute 
can also serve as a centre for information on the norms required in 
the consumer market and could provide technical assistance to secure 
better observance of them at the lowest possible cost. It would not 
necessarily require large laboratories as in many cases it could 
undoubtedly recommend the use of existing institutions for that purpose 
in certain spheres. The institute would be financed by the countries 
and could charge for its services» For its establishment it would be 
worth seeking the co-operation of the authorities and enterprises of 
the possible exporting countries and also that of the authorities of 
the importing country.
(¿0 The European Economic Community
Although for a long time Latin America and the European Economic 
Community have maintained a major and growing trade relationship there 
is no institutionalized mechanism to monitor this relationship and 
stimulate reciprocal trade. It therefore seems advisable to encourage 
a meeting of Latin American and EEC representatives at an appropriate 
level to consider the implications of the establishment of a mechanism 
in this respect. It is desirable in studying its design to take into 
account not only the increasing strengthening of the trade relations 
between Latin America and the Community but also the advisability of 
enabling it to provide industrial, financial and technical assistance 
for the fulfilment of its objectives.
From the point of view of Latin America, an appropriate mechanism 
can facilitate consultations and negotiations. Such a mechanism alone 
would not, however, change the region's negotiating power; it is also 
necessary to analyse carefully the means of improving the region's 
negotiating capacity. Such measures could include joint action in 
decisions to purchase or sell certain products, or in the operation of 
tariffs and other disincentives to import.
/Simultaneously, and
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S i m u l t a n e o u s l y ,  a n d  i n  p a r a l l e l ,  s p e c i f i c  a c t i o n  c a n  b e  t a k e n  
b y  t h e  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n ; c o u n t r i e s  t o  o b t a i n  f r o m  t h e  C o m m u n it y  a n  
e q u i v a l e n t  t r e a t m e n t  i n  t h e  s p h e r e  o f  t r a d e  t o  t h a t  w h i c h  i t  a f f o r d s  
t o  t h e  l e s s  d e v e l o p e d . M e d i t e r r a n e a n  c o u n t r i e s  a n d  o t h e r  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s »  i n c l u d i n g ; t h e  s i g n a t o r i e s  o f  t h e  Lomé C o n v e n t i o n .  I t  i s  
a l s o  p o s s i b l e  to .  s e e k  a n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
p r o d u c t s  f o r  w h i c h  t h e  e x t r a - c o m m u n i t y  t r a d e  i s  a f f e c t e d  b y  c o m m u n i t y  
a r r a n g e m e n t s  s u c h  a s  t h e  com m on a g r i c u l t u r a l  p o l i c y .  T h e  a p p r o a c h  o f  
s p e c i f i c  c a s e s  c a n  b e  u s e f u l  i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t *  w h e n  a p p l i e d  t o  p r o d u c t s  
s e l e c t e d  f r o m  a m o n g  t h e  t h r e e  m a i n  g r o u p s  o f  m a n u f a c t u r e d  p r o d u c t s  
i m p o r t e d  b y  t h e  E E C ;  p r o c e s s e d  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t s ,  t e x t i l e s  a n d  
l e a t h e r  p r o d u c t s  a n d  p r o d u c t s  o f  t h e  m o r e  d y n a m i c  i n d u s t r i e s  s u c h  a s  
t h e  m e t a l  w o r k i n g  a n d  m a c h i n e r y  i n d u s t r y .
A n o t h e r  s p h e r e  o f  a c t i o n  i n  w h i c h  m an y  m u t u a l  b e n e f i t s  f o r  t h e  
C o m m u n it y  a n d  L a t i n  A m e r i c a ,  c a n  b e  e x p e c t e d  i s  t h a t  o f  s t u d y i n g  a  
b r o a d e r  f r a m e w o r k  O f  e c o n o m i c  r e l a t i o n s  w h i c h  w o u l d  i n c l u d e ,  i n t e r
. . . . .  j / • •
a l i a , d i r e c t  p r i v a t e  i n v e s t m e n t  b y  t h e  C o m m u n it y  i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a .
I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  O b t a i n  r e c i p r o c a l  b e n e f i t s  f r o m  t h e  i n v e s t m e n t  m ade 
b y  E u r o p e a n  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e  t h r o u g h  p r o d u c t i o n  b o t h  f o r  t h e  
i n t e r n a l  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  m a r k e t  a n d  t h e  E u r o p e a n  m a r k e t s ,  i f  a c c e s s  
i s  g a i n é ' d  t o  t h e m .
T h i s  b r o a d e r  f r a m e w o r k  c a n  a l s o  i n c l u d e  a n  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  l o n g ­
t e r m  c o m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  e c o n o m i e s  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  a n d  t h e  EEC 
w h i c h  w o u l d  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  l i n e s  o f  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  a n d  
: c o - o p e r a t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  tw o  r e g i o n s .
( e )  J a p a n ,  m e m b e r  c o u n t r i e s  o f  CMEA a n d  o t h e r  d e v e l o p i n g  a r e a s  
A s  p a r t  o f  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a ' s  
e x t e r n a l  e c o n o m i c  r e l a t i o n s ,  t h e  i n c r e a s e  o f  t r a d e  w i t h  J a p a n  a n d  t h e  
m e m b e r  c o u n t r i e s  o f  CMEA c a n  p r o d u c e  i m p o r t a n t  r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  n e x t  
f e w  y e a r s .  J a p a n  h a s  s h o w n  i n t e r e s t  i n  j o i n i n g  w i t h  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  
c o u n t r i e s  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s  a n d  t h e i r  p r o c e s s i n g ;  i t  i s  
b e g i n n i n g  t o  c a r r y  o u t  a  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  o f  i n d u s t r i e s  
f o r  r e a s o n s  l i n k e d  w i t h  t h e  c o s t  o f  l a b o u r  a n d  w i t h  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t ;  
a n d  i t  h a s  e x p e r i e n c e  i n  t h e  a d a p t a t i o n  o f  t e c h n o l o g i e s  t o  c o n d i t i o n s
/more like
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more like those of the developing-countries. The trade of various 
Latin American countries with the member countries of CMEA has increased 
significantly, the scope of the trade agreements has been broadened and 
at the same time experiments in industrial qo-operation and technology 
have been carried out, which although as yet limited are of significance. 
The systernization and strengthening of the co-operation efforts deserve 
special attention in both cases.
With regard to the developing countries of other areas, the 
current development of Latin America makes it possible to realize 
co-operation of mutual benefit for the broadening of markets and 
technological advance. Until how this co-operation, except in isolated 
cases, has been limited. SELA can be an important instrument to 
complement the initiatives of individual countries of the region.
2. Financing and debt
As has.been indicated in previous chapters, the problems of 
financing and debt in Latin America are closely linked with trade.
The greater the success attained in the trade sphere, in terms of the 
increased access of Latin American exports to the main world markets, 
the lesser will be the need to seek formulae to alleviate the burden 
of foreign debt servicing and ensure the participation of Latin America 
in the concessional resources available.
With regard, to this last aspect, it should be pointed out that 
the concessional resources are being directed mainly at the poorest 
countries and those described as "most seriously affected". This occurs 
both in official bilateral aid and in the multilateral agencies, and 
gives rise to two problems. On the one hand, various Latin American 
countries are being forced to turn to the private capital markets and 
private banks to meet their growing financial needs, but no policies 
have been formulated in this respect in the international sphere and 
none-are envisaged. On the other, a certain number of Latin American 
countries still need official .assistance under the traditional terms 
and conditions, but cannot obtain it because of the emphasis placed 
on the poorest and most seriously affected countries. Latin America
/is thus
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i s  t h u s  i n  a  m i d d l e  p o s i t i o n :  w h i l ë  t h ë r è i s  n e i t h e r  a  p o l i c y  n o r  
a n  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  m e c h a n i s m  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  t h e  m o r e  a d v a n c e d  c o u n t r i e s ,  
t h e  e x i s t i n g  p o l i c i e s  a n d  m e c h a n i s m s  a r e  m a i n l y  o r i e n t e d  t o w a r d s  
a s s i s t i n g  t h e  p o o r e s t  a n d  m o s t  s e r i o u s l y  a f f e c t ë d '  c o u n t r i e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  
t h e  l e s s  a d v a n c e d  c o u n t r i e s  o f  L à t i n  A m e r i c A .
T h i s  new  p r o b l e m  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  c o u l d  b e  r e s o l v e d  b y  m o d i f y i n g  
t h e  c r i t e r i a  o f  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  u s e d  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  p o o r e s t  a n d  m o s t  
s e r i o u s l y  a f f e c t e d  c o u n t r i e s .  A t  t h e  c u r r e n t  t i m e ,  t h e - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
i s  m ade s i m p l y  b y  d i v i d i n g  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  i n t o  tw o  g r o u p s  o n  t h e  b a s i s  
o f  t h e i r  p e r  c a p i t a  i n c o m e ;  t h e  f i g u e  o f  300 d o l l a r s  i s  o n e  o f  t h o s e  
g e n e r a l l y  u s e d  t o  m ak e  t h e  d i v i s i o n  b e t w e e n  t h é  p o o r e s t  c û u n t r i è s  
a n d  o t h e r s .  I t 1 i s  p r o p o s e d  t h a t  i r t s t e a d 1 o f  t h i s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  t h e r e  
s h o u l d  b e  a  t r i p l e  c l a s s i f i c A t i o n . '  A f i r s t  g r o u p ,  m ade u p  o f  c o u n t r i e s  
w i t h  a  p e r  c a p i t a  i n c o m e  o f  300 d o l l a r s  o r  l e s s ,  w o u l d  b e  t r e a t e d  a s  
t h e y  a r e  n o w .  T h e  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  a  p e r  c a p i t a  i n c o m e  o f  m o r e  t h a n  
300 d o l l a r s  c o u l d  b e  d i v i d e d  i n t o  tw o  g r o u p s ,  t a k i n g  i n t o  a c c o u n t  n o t  
o n l y  t h e  p e r  c a p i t a  i n c o m e  b u t  a l s o  o t h e r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  s u c h  a s  t h e  
p r o d u c t i o n  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  d e g r e e  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  d e v e l o p m e n t , t h e  e f f e c t i v e  
e x p o r t  p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  a n d  a c c e s s  t o  s h o r t  a n d  l o n g - t e r m  p r i v a t e  
f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s .  W i t h  m u l t i p l e  c r i t e r i a  s u c h  a s  t h o s e  d e s c r i b e d ,  
t h e  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  a  p e r  c a p i t a  i n c o m e  o f  m o r e  t h a n  300 d o l l a r s  w o u l d  
b e  c l a s s i f i e d  i n  t h e  s e c o n d  a n d  t h i r d  g r o u p s ;  t h e  s e d o n d  w o u l d  b e  m ade 
u p  o f  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  w h i c h  s t i l l  d e p e n d  o n  t h e  e x p o r t  o f  a  f e w  b a s i c  
p r o d u c t s  a n d  w h i c h  h a v e  l i m i t e d  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  p r i v a t e  f i n a n c i n g  m a r k e t s  
a n d  t h e  t h i r d ,  b y  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  w h i c h  h a v e  a l r e a d y - s e c u r e d  a  g r e a t e r  
d e g r e e  o f  e c o n o m i c  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n ,  A c c e s s  t o  t h e  g o o d s  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  
m a r k e t s  a n d  a  r e l a t i v e l y  h i g h e r  p e r  c a p i t a  i n c o m e .  T h e  c o u n t r i e s  o f  
t h e  s e c o n d  g r o u p  w o u l d  r e c e i v e  e c o n o m i c  a n d  f i n a n c i à l  c o - o p e r a t i o n  o f  
a  n o t  v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  t y p e  f r o m  t h a t  w h i c h  L a t i n  A m e r i c a ’ o b t a i h e d : A t  
t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  n i n e t e e n  s i x t i e s ,  a l t h o u g h ' w i t h  a p p r o p r i a t e  i m p r o v e m e n t s ;  
f o r  t h o s e  o f  t h e  t h i r d  g r o u p  i t  w o u l d  b e  n e c e s s a r y  t o ’ p r o v i d e  f o r  a  
m o r e  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  t y p e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e c o n o m i c  c o - o p e r a t i o n ,  a d a p t e d  
t o  t h e i r  new  s i t u a t i o n ,  w i t h  g r e a t e r  e m p h a s i s  o n  p u b l i c  a n d  p r i v a t e  
f i n a n c i n g  a n d  a  l e s s e r  d e g r e e  o f  c o n c e s s i o n a l i t y ,  a n d  a  s t r o n g  a c c e n t  
o n  t h e  c o m m e r c i a l  a s p e c t s .
/(a) Private
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P r i v a t e  f i n a n c i n g
As can be seen?in the previous chapters, the need to improve the 
assessment made by creditors of.the solvency of various debtor 
countries of Latin America, taken separately or together, has high 
priority. There are various ways of securing this, but there are two 
to which special attention should be devoted which have already been 
proposed by CEPAL and on which no political decision has yet been 
taken. ' -
'The first idea for action in this sphere concerns the establishment 
of a refinancing service within an appropriate organization. The 
individual debtor countries .wishing to request aid for their particular 
debt problems would be able to do so within the normal operations of 
the relevant organization,, which would be financed for this purpose 
through contributions from the creditor countries and OPEC countries, 
and also by their own resources. This proposal combines three elements 
of a highly practical nature: (a) there would be a case by case study, 
within a global-institutional,framework; (b) there would be no counter­
productive effect on the solvency of the requesting countries, and 
indeed the mere availability of the new service would represent' an 
additional guarantee of payment; and (c) some form of subsidy to 
similar interests along: the lines of the. subsidy account in the 
petroleum service of the International Monetary Fund could be envisaged.
The second idea concerns the proposal to create a financial 
security net in Latin America which was originally raised at the 
Sixteenth Session in 1975« The central banks of Latin America and the 
American Governments, with secretarial support drom CEPAL and CEMLA, 
have already initiated the detailed study pf the idea, which was 
favourably received. The necessary political consensus has not yet 
been achieved, but this could be an.opportunity to again revise the 
possibilities of joint action of the Latin American countries so as 
to increase their; forms of collective financial support and collective 
guarantee in relation to the balance of payments and debt difficulties.
/As the
A s  t h e  a c c e s s  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  t o  t h e  c o n c e s s i o n a l  r e s o u r c e s  o f  
a i d  t o  d e v e l o p m e n t  d e c l i n e s ,  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  r e g i o n  n e e d  g r e a t e r  
a c c e s s  b o t h  t o  p r i v a t e  b a n k s  a n d  t o  t h e  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  o f  t h e  
d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s .  A t  t h e  c u r r e n t  t i m e  v e r y  f e w  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  
c o u n t r i e s  u s e  t h e  l o n g - t e r m  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  e x t e r n a l  m a r k e t s  s o  t h a t  
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  d o i n g  s o  s h o u l d  b e  s t u d i e d  i n  g r e a t e r  d e t a i l  b y  
t h e  r e l e v a n t  n a t i o n a l  a n d  r e g i o n a l  b o d i e s  w i t h  t h e  a s s i s t a n c e  o f  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  f r o m  t h e  c e n t r a l  a n d  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a .
To  t h i s  e n d  i t  i s  w o r t h  c o n s i d e r i n g  tw o  s p e c i f i c  i d e a s :  ( a )  
t h e  c o m p l e m e n t a r y  u s e  o f  m u l t i l a t e r a l  g u a r a n t e e  s c h e m e s ;  ( b )  h o r i z o n t a l  
t e c h n i c a l  c o - o p e r a t i o n  w h i c h  c a n  b e  o f f e r e d  b y  t h e  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  
g o v e r n m e n t s  w h i c h  h a v e  a l r e a d y  g a i n e d  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  b o n d  m a r k e t s  i n  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  E u r o p e  i n  o r d e r  t o  a s s i s t  o t h e r  g o v e r n m e n t s  t o  
g a i n  a c c e s s .
T h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  c o m m i t t e e  o f  t h e  W o r l d  B a n k  a n d  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
M o n e t a r y  F u n d  h a v e  s t u d i e d  so m e  p r o p o s a l s  f o r  m e c h a n i s m s  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  
t h e  a c c e s s  o f  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  t o  t h e  l o n g  t e r m  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s ,  
i n c l u d i n g  m u l t i l a t e r a l  g u a r a n t e e  s c h e m e s .  T h e  s e c r e t a r i a t  o f  t h e  
C o m m i t t e e  h a s  a t t a c h e d  g r e a t  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  t h e s e  a s p e q t s  a n d  h a s  
a d v a n c e d  v e r y  p o s i t i v e  p r o p o s a l s  a i m e d  a t  p r o v i d i n g  t e m p o r a r y  s u p p o r t  
t o  t h e  b o n d  i s s u e s  o f  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  a b r o a d ,  u n t i l  t h e s e  i s s u e s  
a r e  a b l e  t o  b e c o m e  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  t h e  m a r k e t .  T h e s e  p r o p o s a l s  d e s e r v e  
t o  b e  f a v o u r a b l y  r e c e i v e d  a n d  s t u d i e d  w i t h  a  v i e w  t o  t h e i r  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n .
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  s o m e  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  a l r e a d y  e s t a b l i s h e d  
i n  t h e  m a r k e t  w i t h  t h e i r  b o n d  i s s u e s .  I f  t h i s  e x p e r i e n c e  vie r e  m ade 
a v a i l a b l e  t o  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  r e g i o n ,  t h i s  w o u l d  h e l p  t h e m  t o  
o r g a n i z e  t h e m s e l v e s  i n t e r n a l l y ,  e s t a b l i s h  e x t e r n a l  c o n t a c t s  a n d  c a r r y  
o u t  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  s t u d i e s  t o  s u c c e s s f u l l y  m a k e  i n i t i a l  b o n d  i s s u e s  i n  
t h e  e x t e r n a l  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s .
F i n a l l y ,  i t  i s  w o r t h  c o n s i d e r i n g  p o s s i b l e  c o u r s e s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
a c t i o n  a i m e d  a t  s e c u r i n g  g r e a t e r  s t a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  p r i v a t e  f i n a n c i a l  
e u r o m o n e y  m a r k e t s .  T h e s e  m a r k e t s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  o u t s i d e . t h e  s c o p e  o f  
a c t i o n  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  m o n e t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  a n d  t h e y  d o  n o t  b e n e f i t  




t o  f l u i d i t y  i n  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  d o m e s t i c  c r e d i t .  T h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  
c o l l e c t i v e  d i s c o u n t  m e c h a n i s m s ,  p e r h a p s  i n  a n  a p p r o p r i a t e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
b o d y ,  w o u l d  h a v e  t h e  d o u b l e  a d v a n t a g e  o f  p r o m o t i n g  t h e  m o r e  s t a b l e  
o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  e u r o m o n e y  c r e d i t  m a r k e t  a n d  f a c i l i t a t i n g  t h e  g e n e r a l  
s u p e r v i s i o n  o f  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  t h a t  m a r k e t .  T h i s  m e c h a n i s m  c o u l d  a l s o  
p r o v i d e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t o  o t h e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r  r e g i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
t o  i n v e s t  p a r t  o f  t h e i r  r e s o u r c e s  i n  c r e d i t  s h a r e s  i n  e u r o m o n e y  o r i e n t e d  
i n  t h e ' d i r e c t i o n s  m o s t  c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  e a c h  i n s t i t u t i o n .
( b ) P u b l i c  c a p i t a l
A s  h a s  a l r e a d y  b e e n  m e n t i o n e d  t h e r e  a r e  a  c e r t a i n  n u m b e r  o f  
c o u n t r i e s  i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  w h i c h  s t i l l  r e q u i r e  a c c e s s  t o  f i n a n c i n g  
f r o m  o f f i c i a l  s o u r c e s  o n  c o n c e s s i o n a r y  t e r m s .  I n  t h e s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  
t h e  e f f o r t s  b e i n g  m ade b y  g o v e r n m e n t s  t o  h e l p  t h e  I n t e r - A m e r i c a n  B a n k  
a n d  t h e  W o r l d  B a n k  t o  f i n a n c e  t h e  n e e d s  f o r  r e s o u r c e s  o f  t h e  L a t i n  
A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  w h i c h  r e q u i r e  t h e i r  a s s i s t a n c e  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t .
I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  t h e  I D B ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  
e n s u r e  a n  a p p r o p r i a t e  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  o f  i t s  c o n c e s s i o n a l  l o a n  s e r v i c e s ,  
a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  o r d i n a r y  l o a n s *  d e s e r v e  s p e c i a l  a t t e n t i o n .  T h i s  i s  a l s o  
t r u e  o f  t h e  W o r l d  B a n k  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h i s  b o d y  C o n t i n u e s  t o  s u p p o r t  
L a t i n  A m e r i c a .  F u r t h e r m o r e  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  UNDP s h o u l d  b e  b r o a d e n e d  
s o o n  a n d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n  O r d e r  t o  s e c u r e  a  s t a b l e  a n d  s o l i d  f i n a n c i a l  
b a s e  f o r  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s .  1
( c )  C o m p e n s a t o r y  f i n a n c i n g
T h e  c o m p e n s a t o r y  f i n a n c i n g  s e r v i c e  o f  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  M o n e t a r y  
F u n d  h a s  b e e n  r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  u s e d  e x c e p t  i n  t h e  l a s t  y e a r  a f t e r  i t s  
l i b e r a l i z a t i o n .  T h e r e *  a r e  t h r e e  a s p e c t s  i n  w h i c h  a c t i o n  c a n  b e  t a k e n  
t o  s e c u r e  g r e a t e r  e x p a n s i o n  a n d  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h i s  s e r v i c e .  T h e  
f i r s t  r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  a d v i s a b i l i t y  o f  r e v i s i n g  t h é  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  t h e  u s e  
o f  t h e s e  r e s o u r c e s  s o  a s  t o  g u a r a n t e e  a  c e r t a i n  r e a l  v o l u m e  o f  i m p o r t s  
a n d * n o t  m e r e l y  c o m p e n s a t e  f o r  t h e  a b n o r m a l  f a l l  i n  e x p o r t s .  I n  t h i s  
w ay  t h e  t e r m s  o f  t r a d e  w o u l d  b e  b r o u g h t  i n t o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  a n d  i t  w o u l d  
b e  p o s s i b l e  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  f i n a n c i n g  o f  d e v e l o p m e n t  p l a n s  f r o m  t h e  
f l u c t u a t i o n s  w h i c h  c a n  o c c u r  i n  e x p o r t s  arid  i m p o r t s  f o r  r e a s o n s  w h i c h  
a r e  b e y o n d  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s .  T h e  s e c o n d  a s p e c t  r e l a t e s
/to the
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t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  d e s p i t e  t h e  r e c e n t  i m p r o v e m e n t s  i n  t h e  c o m p e n s a t o r y  
f i n a n c i n g  s e r v i c e  t h e r e  a r e  s t i l l  v a r i o u s  r e s t r i c t i o n s  w h i c h  a f f e c t  
t h e  t e r m s  a n d  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  l o a n s .  T h e s e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  c a n  b e  l e s s e n e d  
i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a s p e c t s ;  ( a )  b y  m a k i n g  i t  p o s s i b l e  t o  t a k e  m o r e  a c c o u n t  
o f  t h e  g e n e r a l  r i s i n g  t r e n d  o f  p r i c e s ;  ( b )  b y  l i b e r a l i z i n g  t h e  
l i m i t a t i o n s  o n  b i l l s  o f  e x c h a n g e  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  q u o t a s ;  a n d  ( c )  b y  
e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  a m o r t i z a t i o n  o f  b i l l s  o f  e x c h a n g e  d r a w n  u p  i n  r e l a t i o n  
n o t  w i t h  t i m e  b u t  w i t h  t h e  " s u r p l u s e s "  g e n e r a t e d . w h e n  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
w h i c h  g a v e  r i s e  t o  t h e  d r a w i n g  r i g h t  i m p r o v e s , .
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  t h i r d  a s p e c t  r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  a d v i s a b i l i t y  o f  c o n t i n u i n g  
t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  t o t a l  v o l u m e  o f  l o a n s  o f  t h i s  s e r v i c e ,  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  
w i t h  n e e d s ,  a s  t h e  r e c e n t  i n c r e a s e  i s  b e i n g  o f f s e t  b y  t h e  d i s a p p e a r a n c e  
o f  t h e  p e t r o l e u m  s e r v i c e .
( d )  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  m e c h a n i s m s  '
A s  h a s  b e e n  s h o w n  i n  p r e v i o u s  p a g e s ,  so m e  o f  t h e  L a t i , n  A m e r i c a n  
c o u n t r i e s  a r e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  t u r n i n g  t o  p r i v a t e  s o u r c e s  o f  f i n a n c i n g  a n d  
n o n - c o n c e s s i o n a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  w h i l e  o t h e r  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  h a v e  
t o  c o n t i n u e  t o  r e s o r t ,  t o  a  g r e a t e r  o r  l e s s e r  d e g r e e ,  t o  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
f o r m s  o f  b i l a t e r a l  a n d  m u l t i l a t e r a l  o f f i c i a l  a i d  f o r  d e v e l o p m e n t .  T h e  
e x i s t a n c e  o f  t h e s e  g r o u p s  o f  c o u n t r i e s  a n d  t h e i r  d i f f e r i n g  n e e d s  a r e  
a  c e n t r a l  p o l i t i c a l  a s p e c t  f o r  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  t o d a y .  T h e n e  i s  a n  u r g e n t  
n e e d  t o  d e s i g n  m e c h a n i s m s  w h i c h  e n s u r e  a  g r e a t e r  d e g r e e  o f  s y m m e t r y  i n  
e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  v a i i o u S  g r o u p s  o f  c o u n t r i e s  a n d  a l s o  t h e  c r e d i t o r  ■
c o u n t r i e s .  I t  i s  w o r t h  g i v i n g  c o n s i d é r a t i o n  now t o  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f
new  i n i t i a t i v e s  o n  a n  e x p e r i m e n t a l  b a s i s  a t  t h e  r e g i o n a l  l e v e l  i n v o l v i n g  
t h r e e  i m p o r t a n t  p a r t i c i p a n t s :  ( a )  p u b l i c  a n d  p r i v a t e  s o u r c e s  o f  
f i n a n c i a l  a n d  t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e ;  Cb) t h e  r e c e i v e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  w h a t e v e r  
t h e i r  l e v e l  o f  i n c o m e  o r  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ;  ( c )  a  g r o u p  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  
w i t h  v e r y  h i g h  t e c h n i c a l  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  a n d  i n t e l l e c t u a l  i n d e p e n d e n c e  
w ho a r e  c a p a b l e  o f  e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  o b s e r v a n c e  o f  t h e  c o m p r o m i s e s  e n t e r e d
i n t o  b o t h  b y  t h o s e  who p r o v i d e  t h e  f i n a n c i n g  a n d  b y  t h o s e  who r e c e i v e  .
i t .  T h i s  g r o u p  w o u l d  a l s o  s e r v e  t o  p r o v i d e  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  i n f o r m a t i o n  , 
a n d  a n a l y s i s .  " ‘ . 1
1 1 - • /Some countries
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Some countries have found that the so-called "consultative groups" 
partially meet this need. However, the increasing importance of private 
creditors points in the direction of seeking mechanisms which would 
allow an easier and more stable relation with them and also with the 
public creditors.
A mechanism involving the three participants mentioned could 
also facilitate the joint financing of public and private sources and 
would provide a greater degree of security for planning the future in 
the Latin American countries. Furthermore, it would strengthen the 
capacity of the private and public financial agencies to evaluate the 
effort in the economic sphere and the solvency of the debtor countries.
3 * Direct private investment ; and transnationals
Direct foreign private investment in Latin America is very 
significant not only for the economy of the■countries-of the .region but 
also for the economy of the developed countries from which it derives.
It is of great magnitude and provides an important supplement to the 
exports from the country of origin (through "indirect exports") ànd 
allows greater expansion of the transnational enterprises. Thé "  
importance of investment in Latin America for the developed countries 
provides the countries of the region with a potentially high power of 
negotiation which hâ’s. so far been used in only a limited way.
At the current time a nèw negotiating trend is emerging in ‘-Latin 
America. It arises from the fact that the substantial contribution 
of the transnational enterprises does not consist mainly of financial
v - 1 .. . . i ( ' ■
resources deriving from the country of origin but of technology, 
organizational forms and a programme of financing based largely on 
international resources and resources from the country of destination.
In these conditions the Latin American governments could negotiate 
- and in various cases are negotiating - for the association of local, 
public or private interests with the transnationals which operate in 
the country, and the more active role that the transnational enterprises 
can have in the exports of these countries - including the goods which 
they themselves produce for the domestic market - using the international
/distribution mechanisms
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distribution mechanisms and the facilities of access to other markets 
which are available to them. In this respect valuable experience has 
■j been accumulated in recent years in'the sphere of joint ventures.
At another.level, it is necessary to give¿special consideration
to the international trade,transactions carried out between branches
of a same enterprise in order to ensure that the prices do not become
uncompetitive. !
To this end,, at the same time as continuing the work of elaborating 
an international code of conduct for the transnational enterprises, 
frameworks for action can be prepared for the future negotiations on 
direct investment between the governments and the multinational 
enterprises on the basis of the experience'in-this matter v/hich has 
been acquired recently both in Latin America and in other regions-of the 
world.¿/ • ■■
* t .  T e c h n o l o g y
Some remarks v/ere made in a previous chapter on the technical 
progress in Latin America, with special reference to the problems, 
raised by the transfer of technology from the industrialized countries 
and the need to strengthen the region’s own capacity for technological 
adaptation and creation.
Because of the complexity of the challenges and tasks v/hich 
Latin American countries confront in this sphere, the effort required 
clearly exceeds their capacity of resolving the t^sks on their own, 
so that international co-operation and the external relations concerned 
with these matters acquire special importance.
In the paragraphs v/hich follow, in order to give them special 
emphasis, some proposals are repeated - many of which have already 
been set forth ,in the chapter already mentioned - which seem relevant 
to the purposes of this part of the document.
This is briefly referred to in chapter I of the first part of 
this study.
/In the
The payments and balance of payments support mechanisms already 
mentioned have already been tried out in practice so that their extension 
would require political will rather than long additional studies.
However, the medium and long-term credit mechanisms linked to 
acquisitions in the region, and also the extension of credit in the 
payments agreements with exporters or importers, require careful 
analysis before any attempt is made to implement them, but it is 
worth orienting efforts of analysis in these directions.
«
ft
%
î
/
